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Textbooks of rhetoric emphasize the significance of taking into account the values and 
interests of the particular audience when designing and delivering a speech. And the breach of 
this requirement is grouped among the greatest “vices” of the art of rhetoric. This dissertation 
investigates Shakespeare’s experimentations with this rhetorical “vice” (taken to its extreme) in 
his tragedies. I argue that Shakespeare presents tragic protagonists who are in one way or another 
spectacular human beings, but who are also in one way or another irresponsible and 
inconsiderate of others. And the downfall of the hero is initiated by his unrhetorical dealings with 
the people around him—even with those who sincerely admire and celebrate him. This hubristic 
hamartia of the hero is indiscriminate—the hero treats friend and foe alike. I hope to show how 
each tragedy is a unique display of the devastating consequences of being or becoming 
hubristically unrhetorical. Despite all of his outstanding features, due to his rhetorical 
shortcomings, the hero is easily manipulated. As I will demonstrate, cautiously considering the 
other in social interactions shields one against being exploited by the other. The unrhetorical, that 
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In his Rhetoric of Motives, Kenneth Burke observes that rhetoric is essentially 
“addressed, since persuasion implies an audience” (38). It is common knowledge that in oratory, 
the speaker or writer must take into consideration the values and interests of their audience when 
designing and delivering their speech. This is perhaps one of the most fundamental imperatives 
emphasized by textbooks of rhetoric.1 And breaking or disregarding this fundamental rule is 
viewed as one of the greatest “vices” of rhetoric. Furthermore, as stressed by some treatises on 
the art of rhetoric—most notably, Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria—proper rhetorical education 
builds good character. One who masters this art, in other words, becomes a good person. 
																																								 																				
1 For instance, to foreground the significance of the role of the audience, Aristotle’s Art of 
Rhetoric classifies the genres of public speech—deliberative, judicial, and demonstrative—based 
on their type of audience: “The species [eide] of rhetoric are three in number; for such is the 
number [of classes] to which the hearers of speeches belong” (47). The audience of a deliberative 
speech must judge whether a future happening will turn out to be advantageous or harmful. In a 
judicial speech, the audience must judge whether a past happening was just or unjust. And the 
audience of a demonstrative speech must observe whether the topic under consideration is 
honourable or shameful. The hearer of happenings future or past is a critical “judge” (krites); the 
hearer of present praise or blame is an “observer” (theoros) (48). It is worth adding that the 
Greek word theoros gives rise to the Latin theatrum, and subsequently to the English theatre. It 
is also the word Aristotle uses to define the general function of rhetoric: “to see the available 
means of persuasion in each case” (36). 
	 2 
According to many rhetoricians, rhetoric is not only a handy tool for the lawyer or the politician. 
Rather, being rhetorically thoughtful is, first and foremost, a necessary means for being socially 
good. Thus, it is not only the responsibility of the persuasive orator to be attentive to his or her 
particular audience. It is the responsibility of the social being to be attentive to those with whom 
he or she communicates (verbally or non-verbally). If it is among the “offices” of the art of 
rhetoric to cement social interaction, then it is easy to see why the breach of this code of conduct 
is basically anti-social. In short, the most intolerable and impermissible “vice” of rhetoric is such 
irresponsibility: being inconsiderate of others. 
In the following chapters, I will argue that, in his tragedies, William Shakespeare 
experiments with this rhetorical “vice” taken to its extreme. Tom McAlindon observes in “What 
Is a Shakespearean Tragedy?” that 
Shakespearean tragedy is centrally concerned with the destruction of human greatness 
embodied in individuals endowed with “sovereignty of nature”: men who are 
instinctively referred to as “noble” (in the moral or characterological sense) by those who 
know them, even their enemies. However, what constitutes true nobility in action 
invariably proves problematic for the hero, especially when he becomes entangled in the 
ethical contradictions associated with the notion of “honour.” (8–9) 
In this dissertation, I will look at the problem of the tragic hero from a rhetorical standpoint. 
Shakespeare’s tragedies present protagonists who are in one way or another spectacular human 
beings, but who are also in one way or another inconsiderate of others. The downfall of the tragic 
hero is initiated by his unrhetorical dealings with the people around him—even with those who 
sincerely admire and celebrate him. 
	 3 
To be clear, I am not arguing that Shakespeare’s tragic protagonist is ineloquent or that 
his language is without rhetorical style. As Russ McDonald observes in “The Language of 
Tragedy,” “Hamlet, Othello, and their theatrical kin are among the most charismatic speakers in 
all of world drama,” and the “distinctive poetic intensity” of their style is the result of their use of 
“lofty diction, repetition of words and syntactical patterns, classical allusions, rhetorical 
questions, sophisticated metrical schemes and effects, poetic and thematic recapitulation, 
overstatement” (24). In this dissertation, however, I do not focus on the nuances of style in the 
language of the tragic protagonist. Rather, the term unrhetorical in the context of this dissertation 
refers to the failure to properly and mindfully consider and address an audience. A case in point 
is Coriolanus being “ill schooled / In bolted language” (3.1.319–20). To appease the tribunes, 
Menenius justifies the unrefined soldier’s incivility by explaining that his unfamiliarity with 
“bolted language” makes him incapable of distinguishing between the “meal and bran” in his 
manner of speaking. That is to say, Coriolanus cannot distinguish between what his audience can 
and cannot digest. Furthermore, in characters such as Othello and Julius Caesar, it is in fact the 
loftiness of their style, being unrhetorical, that proves to be fatally problematic. For example, as 
Janette Dillon points out, Othello’s language (which is infused “with a bombast circumstance / 
Horribly stuffed with epithets of war” [1.1.13–14]) is “the first thing that Iago singles out for 
opprobrium” (Shakespeare’s Tragedies 87). A rhetorically embellished language, in other words, 
can still be unrhetorically inconsiderate. Conversely, undecorated language can considerately 
address its audience. 
There are two observations regarding Shakespeare’s dramatization of this rhetorical 
“vice” that I would like to highlight at the start. First, there is no single cause for this tendency in 
the tragic hero. The plays do not offer one clear, definitive reason for their protagonists’ 
	 4 
rhetorical shortcomings. The cause could be that the hero is not trained in the art of oratory (the 
poetic language of the outsider Othello comes close to this assessment). Or, it could be that it is a 
helpless incompetence (the rude Coriolanus comes close to this assessment). The hero’s 
incautious and impolitic behaviour could also be a stubborn and offensive refusal to engage with 
others rhetorically (the haughty Julius Caesar comes close to this assessment). The careless King 
Lear is more complicated. It is uncertain whether he has always been an irresponsible ruler or he 
has become irresponsible at the brink of retirement. But what is clear is that this hubristic 
hamartia of the tragic hero, with whatever motive, is indiscriminate—the hero treats friend and 
foe alike. Shakespeare seems to be experimenting with the origins of being inconsiderately 
unrhetorical as much as with its tragic conclusions. As is the case with the origin of Othello 
himself, Shakespeare is not interested in a specific cause. Perhaps the playwright aims to 
emphasize that, no matter what the cause, being unrhetorical has devastating consequences, 
which brings us to the second observation. Despite all of his outstanding features, due to his 
rhetorical shortcomings, the hero is easily manipulated. Cautiously considering the other in 
social interactions shields one against being persuaded by the other. The unrhetorical become 
easy prey for the rhetorically manipulative—such as Lady Macbeth and Claudius, not to mention 
Iago. 
The tragic characters that I will examine in this dissertation demonstrate different forms 
of rhetorical imprudence. For instance, Othello (discussed in the first chapter) and Julius Caesar 
(discussed in the third, fourth, and fifth chapters) are in the habit of making commands and 
demanding obedience. And their pompous manner of speaking is irritating to others. George 
Puttenham, in his Arte of English Poesie, disapproves of pompous speech in the section allotted 
to the “vices” of rhetoric (345). But one conspicuous difference between the black general in 
	 5 
modern Venice and the unwanted dictator in ancient Rome is that Othello’s manner of speaking 
appears to be natural. It is as though Othello is not familiar with any other manner of speech. 
Thus, it is not only the colour of his skin that marks him as a stranger among the Venetians. A 
Roman among Romans, Julius Caesar, on the other hand, appears to be performing every time he 
speaks pompously. Consider his imperious attitude when he turns his back on his concern 
regarding the threat that Cassius poses (1.2), when he dismisses his wife’s worries regarding the 
omens that instruct him to not leave his house on the Ides of March (2.2), or when he rejects the 
senators’ pleas moments before his assassination (3.1).2 In these and similar instances, Julius 
Caesar employs grandiose language to present authority and fearlessness. More importantly, he 
employs grandiose language to distinguish himself from his peers, something that Othello’s 
ethnicity accomplishes on its own. Othello is already different, but Julius Caesar strives to create 
difference artificially—that is, by means of language, in the words of Puttenham, “farced full of 
wind” (345). 
And here lies a crucial difference between Julius Caesar and Coriolanus (discussed in the 
third chapter). The Republic applauds both of these impressive men for their illustrious military 
feats. But while Julius Caesar demands more from Rome, Coriolanus demands to remain a 
																																								 																				
2 Robert Watson’s observation, in “Tragedies of Revenge and Ambition,” regarding Macbeth’s 
“innate craving for dominion and progeny” also applies to Julius Caesar: Macbeth, in pursuing 
his ambition “in a selfishly mechanical rather than co-operatively humane way, destroys his own 
chances for a place in the human future” (162). I will examine closely the implications of Julius 
Caesar’s ambition in the fourth chapter. And in the final chapter, I will compare it with the 
ambition of Macbeth. 
	 6 
formidable and forbidding soldier for Rome. Coriolanus does resort to pompous speech, 
particularly at the end of the play, which leads to his violent murder at the hands of the 
Volscians. Like Julius Caesar, the proud Coriolanus is killed immediately after a boastful speech. 
What is especially impolitic about Coriolanus, however, is his inability (or refusal) to be a 
political being outside the battlefield. The plebeians, led by their tribunes, will not accept his 
impoliteness. 
The striking feature that qualifies Mark Antony (discussed in the third chapter) as a tragic 
hero is his unquenchable desire. The names of his followers—Philo and Eros—underscore that 
he is driven by lust. Like King Lear (discussed in the fifth chapter), Mark Antony suffers the 
tragic consequences of neglect of duty. Octavius urges Mark Antony to, for the sake of Rome, 
abandon his “present pleasure” (1.4.32) with Cleopatra and marry his sister, Octavia, as political 
exigency. But the “ne’er-lust-wearied” (2.1.39) Mark Antony “reneges all temper” (1.1.8) 
because the “sober” and “dull” Octavia (5.2.53–54) is no match for the “rare Egyptian” 
(2.2.230). King Lear’s careless decision to abdicate his sovereign (and personal) responsibilities, 
however, is not because of lust. The old king wishes to unburden himself of the autonomy 
required for carrying out his responsibilities, which also includes the caring for himself. From the 
beginning of the play, we observe King Lear making one irresponsible decision after another. 
And Goneril and Regan, with their “glib and oily art” (1.1.222), take advantage of their father’s 
“hideous rashness” (149). 
Timon of Athens (discussed in the fourth chapter) demonstrates a different form of 
carelessness. He is incautious and impolitic in his monetary dealings with others. Athenians are 
friendly with Timon when he is generous but unfriendly when he is demanding. Timon’s 
indiscriminate non-reciprocal generosity is thoughtlessly inattentive to the enclosure imposed by 
	 7 
society’s law of reciprocity. As I will show, Timon’s non-reciprocal generosity is impossibly 
taxing because it demands (ironically) absolute reciprocity in the friendships that it forms, to 
which Athenians harshly oppose. Such generosity is non-reciprocal in the sense that reciprocity 
must be an absolute, unconditional, limitless given in social relations rather than being dictated 
by contractual agreements bound to reasonable time frames. Furthermore, in the fourth chapter, I 
will juxtapose Timon with Julius Caesar to argue that the demanding nature of Shakespeare’s 
Julius Caesar must be read in light of his inclination to be unconditionally generous and 
forgiving. In both tragedies, it is the social contract that is at odds with the hero’s burdensome 
expectation, hence the collective murder of Julius Caesar and the collective refusal to lend 
money to Timon. 
Similarly (and ironically), it is carelessness that causes the death of the meticulously 
careful Hamlet (discussed in the second chapter). At the end of the play, Hamlet makes light of 
his trepidation regarding the duel with Laertes—orchestrated by the treacherous Claudius. 
Hamlet even dismisses the warnings of his friend Horatio. Like Julius Caesar, Hamlet boldly and 
incautiously steps into danger. More importantly, Hamlet becomes unrhetorical at the start of the 
play, when he decides “to put an antic disposition on” (1.5.172).3 At times, Hamlet is rude; at 
other times, he is incoherent and vague. It is Hamlet’s reckless and incomprehensible madness 
																																								 																				
3 In “Tragedy and Political Authority,” Michael Hattaway points out that in early modern 
English, in addition to “clownage,” the word antic connoted “grotesquerie” and “monstrosity” 
(107). Thus, Hamlet’s “antic disposition,” Hattaway writes, “not only provided in feigned 
madness a fool’s cover for the truth-telling of a malcontent but created out of a sweet prince 
something of a monster, careless of the lives of those about him” (107). 
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that compels the astute and cunning Claudius to constantly keep a wary eye on him and twice 
plot his murder. 
In this dissertation, I will examine such manifestations of irresponsibility—subtle or 
evident—by Shakespeare’s major tragic heroes. To put this in another way, I will explore the 
different dramatizations of the polarity between incaution and calculation, between 
inconsideration and reasonableness, in Shakespeare’s major tragedies. My intention is to 
demonstrate that one of the functions of Shakespeare’s tragedies—in the context of the rhetorical 
tradition that the early modern period revived, preserved, and challenged—is to experiment with 
the fundamental question: To be or not to be rhetorical? Each tragedy, I hope to show, is a 
unique display of an extreme example of the process and outcome of a noble character being or 
becoming hubristically unrhetorical. 
Another aspect of rhetoric that I will examine in detail is the practice of argumentum in 
utramque partem (arguing both sides of a debating question), which was an important exercise in 
rhetorical education during the early modern period. Perhaps the most well-known dramatic 
rendition of argumentum in utramque partem occurs after the assassination of Julius Caesar 
(analyzed in depth in the section “Outstanding Debts” in the fourth chapter), when Brutus and 
Mark Antony argue for different impressions of the same Julius Caesar, who is now dead and 
therefore unable to confirm or deny either of these impressions. As Coppélia Kahn observes, 
Julius Caesar is “an enigmatic play, representing the assassination of Caesar from shifting 
perspectives that frustrate any certain judgement of either the victim or his assassins” 
(“Shakespeare’s Classical Tragedies” 212). Brutus confidently gives grounds for the 
assassination by dispraising ambition, Mark Antony artfully denounces the assassination by 
praising generosity, which amounts to dispraising ingratitude. In other words, the moment of 
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peripety in this play moves from the reproach of ambition to the reproach of ingratitude. 
Ingratitude, like ambition, is the failure to reciprocate. Both orators aim to settle debts. 
Ironically, that is to say, both orators protest against the same transgression: indebtedness. But 
Brutus and Mark Antony present interpretations of this transgression to the mob from different 
points of view. 
In addition to considering his or her particular (judging or observing) audience, the 
skilled orator must be able to re-present his or her topic from different points of view. These two 
aspects of rhetoric are not unrelated. To be able to demonstrate the topic under consideration 
from a different perspective, the orator must be equipped with the strategies necessary for praise 
and dispraise. The two rhetorical figures that epitomize praise and dispraise are paradiastole and 
meiosis.4 The flattering amplification in paradiastole and the belittling diminution in meiosis put 
forward an acceptable or unacceptable translation of a characteristic. In the fifth chapter, I will 
concentrate on the reversal of values that these strategies bring about. And in the second chapter, 
I will compare the meiotic languages of Hamlet and Iago. But more importantly, in the first 
chapter, I will argue that, from the standpoint of rhetoric as artful social interaction, the most 
intolerable and impermissible form of meiosis is being inconsiderate of one’s audience. The 
																																								 																				
4 It is debatable among textbooks of rhetoric whether these strategies are rhetorical figures. 
Thomas Wilson’s Art of Rhetoric, for instance, explores these strategies in detail among the 
different types of amplification, not among the rhetorical figures. Puttenham, on the other hand, 
examines paradiastole and meiosis among his “sensable” figures. Meiosis is once more 
examined among the “sententious” figures. 
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technical term for this version of meiosis is tapinosis.5 Following Quintilian, Puttenham 
disapproves of this figure among the “vicious” manners of speech. In fact, Puttenham explains 
tapinosis immediately before pompous speech. Tapinosis, according to Puttenham, which is “no 
small fault in a maker,” occurs when language “impair[s] the dignity, height, vigor, or majesty” 
of an honourable cause or “greatly blemish[es]” the value of an impressive accomplishment 
(344–45). The “Abaser,” Puttenham continues, “almost speak[s] untruly and injuriously by way 
of abasement” (345). Moreover, Puttenham explains that tapinosis is a “vicious” manner of 
speech because it is out of “ignorance or error in the choice of your word” (269). Tapinosis, put 
simply, is the “vice” of speaking slightingly as a result of being blind to the worth of the content 
of the speech or its interlocutor. To summarize, being inconsiderately unrhetorical, being 
unapologetically indifferent toward the values and interests of one’s audience, is one 
manifestation of meiosis. 
 
CHAPTER SUMMARIES 
The first chapter of the dissertation, “The Different Othello,” will explore how Othello 
stands out in Venice. In the first section of the chapter, “The Price of Patience,” I will argue that 
Othello is a man of action at the service of a calculating society. This confident warrior is 
surrounded by sedentary officials, a “counter-caster” (1.1.29) lieutenant, a scheming ensign, a 
passionately curious wife, and a father-in-law demanding to exact justice. The modernization 
																																								 																				
5 The Greek word meiosis means “making smaller,” and tapinosis means “lowering” or 
“demeaning.” Puttenham translates the former into the “Disabler” and the latter into the 
“Abaser.” 
	 11 
that Venice has undergone has, on one hand, suppressed warrior ethics, and on the other, left the 
city without a competent warrior to defend it. Thus, the city simultaneously repels and requires 
an outsider like the “all-in-all sufficient” (4.1.252) Othello. Venice, in other words, looks at 
Othello from a utilitarian point of view. With this observation as point of departure, I will 
compare how Desdemona and Iago react to the unfamiliar presence of Othello in their personal 
and professional lives. 
And in the second section of this chapter, “The Isolated Abaser,” I will examine this 
comparison with reference to Puttenham’s account of meiosis. Iago’s belittling manner of speech 
is, like Puttenham’s “sensable” meiosis, out of “spite” and “malice” (269). The ensign’s 
provocative and shocking meiosis aims to disgrace the reputation of those around him. 
Desdemona’s language, like the soothing words of the Duke, employs “sententious” meiosis, 
which is diminution for the purposes of extenuation.6 Such rhetorical diminution is reconciliatory 
and infused with goodwill. With peace as her objective, Desdemona strives to de-escalate 
tension—the strained relationship between her father and her husband at the beginning of the 
story, between Cassio and her husband in the middle of the story, and between herself and her 
husband at the end of the story. But, as I will show, the diminishment in Othello’s style is an 
effect of “vicious” meiosis—that is, tapinosis. Others appear less appealing in the awesome 
presence of Othello due to his constant self-aggrandizement. Othello’s poetic style is always out 
of place, which intensely exasperates the sensitive Iago. Like himself, Othello’s manner of 
speech is, in the words of his obscure and surreptitious nemesis, an “erring barbarian” (1.3.342–
43). 
																																								 																				
6 Puttenham calls “sententious” meiosis the “Figure of Extenuation” (304). 
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My intention in the second chapter, “A Reading of Hamlet: Early Modern Praise and 
Dispraise,” is to demonstrate that the meiotic language employed by Hamlet has different 
applications. The first section of the chapter, “Pride and Reputation,” with close readings of the 
examples for amplification in Thomas Wilsons’s Art of Rhetoric, will investigate in more detail 
the operation of praise and dispraise. Iago will serve as a fitting example of an orator equipped 
with the skills necessary for argumentum in utramque partem, for praising and dispraising the 
same topic. In the second section, “Meticulous Virtue,” I will argue that to complain about the 
nature of life in general and the corruption in Denmark in particular, the grieving Hamlet gives in 
to a mode of thinking that is permeated by dispraise. In this chapter, I will identify two functions 
for Hamlet’s meiotic and meticulous broodings—what he himself calls being “particular” 
(1.2.75).7 First, Hamlet’s constant employment of meiosis is a symptom of his noble, virtuous 
character. Extremely sensitive to vice and corruption, Hamlet painstakingly wishes to correct the 
world and the people around him: “The time is out of joint: oh, cursed spite / That ever I was 
born to set it right” (1.5.189–90). And second, Hamlet’s patient and offensive meiotic language 
is a ploy to postpone his hidden urge for revenge. An impatient desire for vengeance disgusts the 
noble, virtuous prince. Disregarding the ramifications of his unexplainable disrespectful 
behaviour (especially toward the vigilant Claudius), Hamlet, throughout the play, is more 
concerned about his compelling drive to exact revenge on his uncle, which is exacerbated by the 
																																								 																				
7 In response to Gertrude’s question, “Why seems it so particular with thee?” (1.2.75), Hamlet 
explains that he is as powerless to stop being “particular” as he is to seem “particular.” Hamlet is 
“particular”: “Nay, it is. I know not ‘seems’” (76). 
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promptings of the ghost and the memory of his father. And it is thanks to his habitual meiotic 
broodings that he is able to suppress this drive. 
Next, in the third and fourth chapters, “The Craft of Virtue in Shakespeare’s Rome” and 
“The Burden of Friendship: Demanding Generosity in Julius Caesar and Timon of Athens,” I 
will examine the reaction to the tragic hero’s unrhetorical behaviour. The tragic hero’s rhetorical 
shortcomings depreciate the people around him. Cassius, Octavius, Iago, and Claudius are 
among the many spiteful characters in Shakespeare’s tragedies who are offended because they 
are disregarded. In terms of rhetoric, the tragic hero becomes an unpardonable enemy of his 
community because of the meiotic effect of his unrhetorical behaviour toward others. Perhaps a 
testimony to human pride, being overlooked is deeply unsettling, excruciatingly unbearable. The 
rancorous envy of Cassius toward the “careless” Julius Caesar is a moving example: “This man / 
Is now become a god, and Cassius is / A wretched creature, and must bend his body / If Caesar 
carelessly but nod on him” (1.2.15–18). 
In the third and fourth chapters, focusing on the Roman tragedies and Timon of Athens, I 
will demonstrate that Shakespeare’s tragedies present characters in positions of power and 
influence who endorse certain virtues that seek to tame or counter the tragic hero’s hubristic 
tendencies. Volumnia, for example, to control Coriolanus’s insolent anger toward the plebeians, 
instructs him to be humble and polite (“Invective and Civility in Coriolanus” in the third 
chapter). Brutus and the conspirators free themselves from the loyalty that Julius Caesar 
demands (“Faith and Reason in Julius Caesar” in the third chapter). Just as Julius Caesar expects 
to be given loyalty freely, Timon expects to be given money freely (“The Bountiful Timon” in 
the fourth chapter). The Romans and the Athenians are unforgivingly unfriendly to any man who 
turns a blind eye to the law of reciprocity. And Mark Antony’s scandalous “voluptuousness” 
	 14 
(1.4.26) is finally defeated by Octavius’s relentless ascetic willpower (“Gratification and 
Mastery in Antony and Cleopatra” in the third chapter). Furthermore, these virtues are 
sometimes genuine, sometimes not. Volumnia, for example, instructs her son to act out humility; 
Calphurnia, on the other hand, sincerely implores Julius Caesar to be prudent. Each play, 
however, portrays its hero’s obstinate resistance to the patient virtue, which ultimately leads to 
his tragic downfall. 
As I mentioned earlier, being unrhetorical in social relations leaves one susceptible to 
persuasion. Finally, in the fifth chapter, “Shakespeare’s Tragic Rhetoric of Temptation,” 
focusing on King Lear, Julius Caesar, Macbeth, and Othello, I will explore the rhetoric of 
temptation to which such vulnerability falls prey. While in the previous two chapters I will 
concentrate on open and public remedies for the tragic hero’s inconsideration and irresponsibility 
that benefit society, in this chapter I will concentrate on secret and cunning manipulations that 
lead to chaos and destruction. The manipulator is quite close to and familiar with the tragic 
protagonist. Such manipulators are, in the words of Timon’s faithful servant, “friends / Who can 
bring noblest minds to basest ends” (4.3.465–65). This is why Goneril and Regan, Cassius, Lady 
Macbeth, and Iago serve as excellent examples.8 In the second chapter, I will uncover the 
operation of rhetorical praise in the deceptive language of Claudius (contrasting it with the 
dispraise in Hamlet’s deceptive language). In the first section of this chapter, “The Game of 
Paradiastole,” with reference to ancient and early modern accounts of paradiastole, I will 
																																								 																				
8 McAlindon claims that “the figure of the manipulator in Shakespeare’s tragedies is descended 
by way of the morality Vice from the devil of Christian mythos, the tempter who deploys the arts 
of the orator and the actor in making evil seem good to his deluded victim” (11). 
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examine how this rhetorical figure functions. And in the following four sections of this chapter, 
each dealing with one of the above-mentioned tragedies, I will argue that in order for temptation 
to successfully reel in its prey, the tempter must make use of the dignifying translation of 
paradiastole. As Iago phrases it: “When devils will the blackest sins put on / They do suggest at 
first with heavenly shows” (2.3.346–47). 
More specifically, in the final chapter of the dissertation, I will demonstrate that the 
dangerously perceptive tempter—a “friend” like “honest” Iago—slyly develops a partnership 
with his or her victim by identifying and identifying with a latent drive in the victim. Goneril and 
Regan, for instance, are not the cause of their father’s “unruly waywardness” and “unconstant 
starts” (1.1.294–96). They recognize and encourage irresponsibility in their father. At the same 
time, they also present themselves as irresponsible. Lady Macbeth inspires the unhindered 
expression of the ambition that is already boiling up in Macbeth. Macbeth’s “dearest partner of 
greatness” (1.5.9–10) wishes to remove “all that impedes” (26) the hesitant Macbeth from 
becoming king. Temptation, in short, requires the identification of and with a dormant inclination 
in its prey. 
Furthermore, I will demonstrate that the paradiastolic dignification in temptation 
contains within itself the operation of meiosis (Puttenham’s “sensable” meiosis). And here occurs 
a reversal of values. After her sisters’ game of paradiastole, Cordelia’s “price” (1.1.195) falls in 
the eyes of her unwary father. By identifying with the victim, the tempter assures the victim that 
they pursue the same objective. And such a partnership necessarily entails antagonism. In uniting 
with the victim by wheedling him into believing in a common goal, the tempter creates a 
common enemy out of the one who is opposed to this goal. The tempter meiotically casts shame 
upon the opposition. “So will I,” Iago schemes, “turn her virtue into pitch / And out of her own 
	 16 
goodness make the net / That shall enmesh them all” (2.3.355–57). Desdemona, therefore, does 
not simply become the innocent target of Othello’s jealousy. Rather, her trusting character stands 























The Different Othello 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The city of Venice and its tragic hero represent two opposing forms of honour. Othello’s 
is in line with the morality of the warrior, which is founded on love and respect for the self. 
Venice has availed itself of a different kind of morality, one centering on respect for law, order, 
and rationality. In Othello, there is a collision between an active warrior and a calculating 
society. Paul Cantor, in “The Shores of Hybridity,” describes this juxtaposition of antithetical 
value systems as “the clash of civilizations” (902). This man of action is besieged by calculation: 
his sedentary superiors, who realize their desperate need of his service as they calculate the “just 
account” (1.3.5) of the Turkish fleet; his “counter-caster” (1.1.29) lieutenant; and, of course, his 
deviously calculating ensign. Even his wife warns him of the time when she will “touch” his love 
with a task “full of poise and difficult weight” (3.3.78–81). The opposition between these 
moralities is clearly demonstrated in the manner in which each responds to the desire for 
revenge. Warrior ethics passionately demands rightful vengeance, whereas the modernization 
that Venice has undergone has compelled this city to frustrate this desire and become a tolerant 
community. What I will show in the first section of this chapter is that Venice, in order to 
establish a safe and peaceful community, has transformed self-love into love for society, and at 
once repels and requires the antiquated epic grandeur of Othello: its army encourages Othello-
like ambition only if it benefits society, not the individual. Thus, the great general is idolized as 
the hero many wish to emulate. And Desdemona is the epitome of this social movement; she is 
the optimistic voice of the equality and inclusiveness that Venice is striving to establish. Not 
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everyone, however, can conform to this morality. Iago has no respect for the social order and 
embodies the desire to dismantle the system by exposing its flaws. The target of Iago is not any 
person but the values of his society. And in the second section, with reference to George 
Puttenham’s The Arte of English Poesie, I will demonstrate that these differences in the plot of 
Othello embody the different types of the rhetorical figure meiosis. With close readings of 
passages by Othello, the Duke, Desdemona, and Iago, I will show that there are different types of 
diminishment in their rhetoric. 
It is necessary to add at the start that the city of Venice, as I consider it in this chapter, is 
the rational pursuit of an idealized conception of a peaceful community by means of certain 
moral values, the most important of which is the acquisition of certainty through calculated 
thinking. And the characters in this play—ranging from the sensible Duke to the conniving 
Iago—stand for the different reactions toward the pursuit of these moral values. For instance, 
what the Duke and Iago have in common is their tendency to carefully evaluate a situation and 
consider the different approaches to the situation. They make decisions based on their 
evaluations. As I will show, this tendency requires two rhetorical strategies: bringing before the 
eyes (energeia) and arguing in utramque partem. But the difference between the Duke and Iago 
is a matter of intention. Employing different forms of rhetorical diminishment, the Duke seeks to 
mitigate disturbance, Iago causes disturbance. 
 
THE PRICE OF PATIENCE 
As the play opens, the audience is introduced to two conflicts: one is the internal conflict 
between Brabantio and Othello, the other the external conflict between Venice and the Ottoman 
Empire. The fact that the highest members of authority have been awakened and stirred at the 
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“odd even and dull watch o’th’ night” (1.1.119) attests to the socio-political weight of the two 
incidents, behind both of which reverberates cacophonously the formidable and alarming name 
barbarian. To understand the nature of this city, a closer examination of the two disturbances 
and how they are dealt with is necessary. 
There are two discrepancies in the dispute between Brabantio and Othello. First, there is a 
striking incompatibility between the accusation and the confrontation of the accuser, between 
Brabantio’s crude allegation that Othello has charmed Desdemona’s feelings by means of 
witchcraft and his refined solution: 
Othello: Were it my cue to fight, I should have known it 
Without a prompter. Where will you that I go 
To answer this your charge? 
Brabantio: To prison, till fit time 
Of law and course of direct session 
Call thee to answer. (1.2.83–87) 
We can appreciate the import of this dialogue only if we take into consideration the emotional 
condition of Brabantio. The prominent figure of the state has suffered a great loss. He has 
gathered his servants and kinsmen, and marched the streets of Venice in search of the culprit in 
order to exact revenge. But instead of resorting to violence after being publicly dishonoured, the 
proud and powerful senator resists the urge for what Francis Bacon calls “Wilde Iustice” (“Of 
Revenge” 11) and turns to the law at the peak of his anger on his own volition. The citizens of 
this society show genuine reverence for its judicial system. This civilized city is marked by 
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peace, and this peaceful state is achieved through upholding the law.9 When Iago and Roderigo, 
in the opening scene, cause an uproar as if the city is on fire and shout that there has been 
robbery, Brabantio replies, “What, tell’st thou me of robbing? / This is Venice: my house is not a 
grange” (1.1.102–03). The idea of someone breaking the law in Venice is strange to these urbane 
citizens. With such respect for the law also comes high esteem for rank and hierarchy. It is no 
wonder, then, that promotion is prized and sought after by ambitious young soldiers such as Iago 
and Cassio. 
We observe in the first act all those who are the protectors of the security that this city 
enjoys, yet among them we find no outstanding combatant. Venice, which has effectively 
established law and order so that its citizens refrain from the act of vengeance, lacks great 
warriors. Merciless and unbending heroes such as Macbeth and Coriolanus have no place in this 
civilized community. The best soldier that these modern Italians can produce is Cassio, hence his 
lieutenancy.10 Iago tells us that Cassio 
never set a squadron in the field, 
Nor the division of a battle knows 
More than a spinster—unless the bookish theoric, 
Wherein the tongued consuls can propose 
As masterly as he! Mere prattle without practice 
																																								 																				
9 In “Shakespeare’s Tragedies of Love,” Catherine Bates writes that “in Shakespeare’s day, the 
great trading city of Venice was a by-word for civilization and luxury, and the play opens with 
its citizens’ comfortable assurance of that fact just about still intact” (193). 
10 Even the Florentine Cassio may be regarded as an outsider among the Venetians. 
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Is all his soldiership. (1.1.20–25) 
The extent of the veracity of Iago’s description of his rival is not relevant here. What is obvious 
is that Michael Cassio is no Othello. And this is the main reason why the awe-inspiring Othello 
stands out in the eyes of everyone. For these civilians of a mercantile society, military skill has 
an exotic charm. Thus, law and order come at the price of mediocrity; this city is incapable of 
engendering greatness. 
The second discrepancy in the dispute is the inconsistency between the initial reaction 
Brabantio’s lawsuit receives and the process through which it is settled. When the wronged 
senator presents his case to his “brothers of the state” (1.2.96), he is comforted by a unified voice 
of sympathy. This fellow feeling is remarkable if we remind ourselves of the urgency of the 
meeting at night of the high officials to deal with the imminent threat of foreign invasion. 
Brabantio’s opening words are that he is not here for “the general care” but rather for his own 
“particular grief” (1.3.54–55). At first, he does not mention the identity of the criminal; he only 
states the crime that has been committed on his daughter: 
She is abused, stol’n from me, and corrupted 
By spells and medicines bought of mountebanks: 
For nature so preposterously to err, 
Being not deficient, blind, or lame of sense, 
Sans witchcraft could not. (60–64) 
The Duke puts the dire matters of the state on hold to get to the bottom of the complaint, and 
even empowers Brabantio with the full force of “the bloody book of law” to punish the person 
who has “beguiled” his daughter even if this person happens to be the Duke’s “proper son” (65–
70). Again, this fear of beguilement and witchery is coarse and uncouth, especially among the 
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wise, old officials of a civilized society. The irrational panic, however, is immediately 
counterbalanced by insistence upon supporting evidence. What follows in this scene is a fair 
legal procedure, which is fitting to a rational society. The Duke, with all due respect to 
Brabantio, informs him that his allegation alone is not sufficient: 
To vouch this is no proof 
Without more wider and more overt test 
Than these thin habits and poor likelihoods 
Of modern seeming do prefer against him.11 (106–09) 
The assembly demands concrete and conclusive proof of Othello’s black magic. Upon hearing 
the whole of Brabantio’s indictment, the senate’s interrogation proceeds by allowing first Othello 
and then Desdemona to present their defence. 
What is even more noteworthy is that the first person to speak after Desdemona’s 
testimony is her father: 
God be with you. I have done. 
Please it, your grace, on to the state affairs. 
I had rather to adopt a child than get it. 
Come hither, Moor. 
I here do give thee that with all my heart 
Which, but thou hast already, with all my heart 
I would keep from thee. For your sake, jewel, 
																																								 																				
11 This is in sharp contrast with how Othello and Iago, later in the play, proceed against 
Desdemona. 
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I am glad at soul I have no other child, 
For thy escape would teach me tyranny, 
To hang clogs on them. I have done, my lord. (189–98) 
Brabantio’s anguish at the betrayal of his daughter and the Moor who he often invited to his 
home is palpably intense, so much so that later “pure grief / Shore his old thread in twain” 
(5.2.200–01). But in terms of the legal process that takes place before him, he accepts his 
daughter’s decision and forgoes his desire for punishment—a heavy task that neither King Lear 
nor Shylock could do. The accuser instantly submits to and in no way challenges the verdict of 
the trial. The obstinate Brabantio’s acceptance of defeat once more reveals the advancement this 
society has made in relation to the pain of dishonour. The outraged senator surrenders to sensible 
judgement. 
Another distinctive sign of the value of logical thinking in Venice is the Duke attempting 
to console the distressed Brabantio with sententiae, even if it does turn out to be ineffective: 
When remedies are past, the griefs are ended 
By seeing the worst, which late on hopes depended. 
To mourn a mischief that is past and gone 
Is the next way to draw new mischief on. 
What cannot be preserved, when Fortune takes, 
Patience her injury a mockery makes. 
The robbed that smiles steals something from the thief; 
He robs himself that spends a bootless grief. (201–08) 
The irony of the Duke’s witticism is that it is these words that are “bootless” in the face of 
Brabantio’s grief, and it is Brabantio who makes a “mockery” of this speech with his retort that 
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“words are words: I never yet did hear / That the bruised heart was pierced through the ears” 
(217–18). But the Duke is persistent. A few lines later, his parting words are yet another 
consolatory witty remark: “If virtue no delighted beauty lack, / Your son-in-law is far more fair 
than black” (286–87). It seems as if the Duke’s argument has as much effect on Brabantio as 
Brabantio’s argument has on the Duke. Nevertheless, that Brabantio’s heartache renders him 
unable to love Desdemona and Othello as before does not deny the significance sound reasoning 
has in this society. Reason is not always powerful enough to pacify emotion. In The Future of an 
Illusion, Sigmund Freud claims that one of the “widespread human characteristics” is that 
“arguments are of no avail against their passions” (8). The failure of reason to quell Brabantio’s 
sorrow notwithstanding, Brabantio does yield to the ruling of a judicious legal system. 
In short, the Duke sorts out this strife by persuading an indignant citizen to accept an 
“erring barbarian” (1.3.342–43) as one of their own, not to mention as his son-in-law. This 
practice of fairness is in fact the preaching of tolerance. Venice has inhibited the classical ideal 
of revenge and, through law and reason, embraced the virtue of patience. At the start of this 
tragedy we see a society promoting tolerance; in the middle, we see the intolerant hero of this 
society showing his true colours: 
All my fond love thus do I blow to heaven. ’Tis gone. 
Arise, black vengeance, from the hollow hell; 
Yield up, O love, thy crown and hearted throne 
To tyrannous hate. Swell, bosom, with thy fraught, 
For ’tis of aspics’ tongues. (3.3.441–45) 
Shakespeare dramatizes the opposite situation in Richard II. The England of Richard still 
glorifies heroic vengeance: “That which in mean men we entitle patience / Is pale cold cowardice 
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in noble breasts” (1.2.33–34). John of Gaunt reprimands Richard for having weakened England 
through his lenient leadership: 
Thy deathbed is no lesser than the land 
Wherein thou liest in reputation sick; 
And thou, too careless patient as thou art, 
Committ’st thy anointed body to the cure 
Of those physicians that first wounded thee. (2.1.95–99) 
Even his wife, after his deposition, chastises him for lacking the spirit of retaliation: 
The lion, dying, thrusteth forth his paw 
And wounds the earth, if nothing else, with rage 
To be o’erpowered; and wilt thou, pupil-like, 
Take thy correction mildly, kiss the rod, 
And fawn on rage with base humility, 
Which art a lion and a king of beasts? (5.1.29–34) 
Of course, Richard’s weakness is not that he is a patient sovereign. He does desire to fight back, 
but he does not have the capacity to do so—hence, at the moment of realizing this, his identity 
collapses. More importantly, after Richard frustrates the duel between Bolingbroke and 
Mowbray by banishing both from England, Bolingbroke returns to England seeking vengeance 
and demanding justice, whereas Mowbray joins the campaign “in glorious Christian field, / 
Streaming the ensign of the Christian cross / Against black Pagans, Turks, and Saracens” 
(4.1.87–89). Interestingly, “toiled with works of war,” Mowbray’s remaining days are spent in 
Venice, where he “gave / His body to that pleasant country’s earth, / And his pure soul unto his 
captain, Christ, / Under whose colors he had fought so long” (90–94). Thus, in Richard II, 
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Shakespeare portrays a community whose idolization of the warrior is being diminished, and for 
whom the peaceful Christian Venice (set against its hostile non-Christian enemies) serves as a 
model. 
In Othello, we never encounter a Turk because the Turkish fleet never arrives. And 
throughout the play, there is absolutely no information given regarding the cultural values of the 
Turks. Nevertheless, being Turk and turning Turk have great (negative) implications among the 
Venetians. The generalized concept Turk refers to anything that is opposed to the social system; 
it is thus synonymous with barbarism. In The Arte of English Poesie, when discussing rhetorical 
figures, George Puttenham lists the “vices” in speech that are “always intolerable” thus: 
“barbarousness, incongruity, ill disposition, fond affectation, rusticity, and all extreme darkness 
such as it is not possible for a man to understand the matter without an interpreter” (335). In the 
following chapter, after explaining that “to speak barbarously” is the “foulest vice” (336), 
Puttenham presents an etymological analysis of the term barbarous: according to some, it refers 
to “the Africans now called Barbarians”; according to others, it refers to the Arabs who were 
“driven out of Arabia westward into the countries of Mauritania” by “seditious Mohammedans” 
(337). Othello’s adventurous background and Iago’s claim that Othello “goes into Mauretania” 
(4.2.217) upon learning that Venice no longer requires him suggest the same ambiguity 
regarding his roots. Puttenham further explains that uncovering the origin of this term is not as 
significant as what it connotes: that which is “strange.” As Michel de Montaigne, in his essay on 
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cannibalism, observes, “every one gives the title of barbarism to everything that is not in use in 
his own country” (“Of Cannibals” 34).12 
In Venice, the external enemy is Turk; the moral values that this city no longer 
accommodates are Turk; and in the final act, Othello, despite the fact that his origin remains 
unknown, becomes Turk. Critics who associate Othello’s otherness with the otherness of the 
Turks place too much faith in the Venetian stereotype and disregard his individuality. Thus, the 
blackness of the Turk is not only a threat from without; it also symbolizes the qualities that 
Venice is ashamed to have once itself possessed and has now proudly suppressed in order to 
establish a peaceful community. The city’s attitude toward heroic values is masked beneath 
																																								 																				
12 In Things of Darkness, Kim Hall argues that “the trope of blackness had a broad arsenal of 
effects in the early modern period, meaning that it is applied not only to dark-skinned Africans 
but to Native Americans, Indians, Spanish, and even Irish and Welsh as groups that needed to be 
marked as ‘other’” (6–7). Nevertheless, all of these instances of the “trope of blackness,” Hall 
asserts, extract their power from “an idea of African difference” (7). And Hall’s main contention 
in Things of Darkness is based on the association of this trope with “the dualism of good and 
evil” (6). Among the examples that Hall offers is Puttenham’s treatment of the rhetorical figure 
antiphrasis—a figure of ridicule that employs a phrase opposite to the intended meaning. 
According to Puttenham, the “Broad Flout” is “when we deride by plain and flat contradiction, 
as he that saw a dwarf go in the street said to his companion that walked with him, ‘See yonder 
giant’; and to a Negro or woman blackamoor, ‘In good sooth, ye are a fair one’” (275–76). As 
this example shows, blackness is not simply opposed to whiteness; it is a “plain and flat 
contradiction” to beauty. 
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racial prejudice. And since patience is of utmost importance in Venice, the urge for revenge is 
considered to be barbaric. Othello’s words to his men once he stops the drunken scuffle in 
Cyprus clearly reveal the binary opposition between impulsiveness and calmness disguised as 
Christian antagonism to the Turks: “Are we turned Turks, and to ourselves do that / Which 
heaven hath forbid the Ottomites? / For Christian shame, put by this barbarous brawl” (2.3.149–
51). Similarly, in his criticism of boldness, Francis Bacon employs an offensive reference to 
Islam. A “Bold Fellow,” writes Bacon, will 
many times, doe Mahomet’s Miracle. Mahomet made the People beleeve that he would 
call an Hill to him, And from the Top of it offer up his Praiers for the Observers of his 
Law. The People assembled; Mahomet cald the Hill to come to him, againe and againe; 
And when the Hill stood still, he was never a whit abashed, but said, If the Hill will not 
come to Mahomet, Mahomet will go to the hil. So these Men, when they have promised 
great Matters, and failed most shamefully, (yet if they have the perfection of Boldnesse) 
they will but slight it over, and make a turne, and no more adoe. (“Of Boldnesse” 33) 
We may, therefore, regard the Renaissance image of the audacious Muslim in these and similar 
examples as a trope used to comment on the hazards of impatience.13 
“Ability to wait is so difficult an accomplishment,” writes Friedrich Nietzsche in Human, 
All Too Human, “that the greatest poets have not disdained to make inability to wait a motif of 
																																								 																				
13 Impatience can function as an important ingredient for revenge. But this does not mean that all 
acts of revenge are triggered by impatience. Revenge may be calculated. Revenge may be carried 
out patiently. In the following chapter, I will discuss in detail the relationship between patience 
and vengeance in Hamlet. 
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their poems” (43). And of the two examples Nietzsche offers, Othello is the first. Nietzsche 
explains that the mentality of the warrior revolves around the lofty image he has of himself, his 
vanity. Accordingly, he is quick and vehement in his response to “the horrible promptings of his 
wounded vanity” (43). Warriors feel compelled to act out their passions. Their steadfast devotion 
to their self-image shapes their character to such an extent that their “tragic element” becomes 
“their inability to put off their work”—“they cannot wait” (43). This explains why the impetuous 
warrior considers a duel, which is the ultimate test in the morality of heroism, “necessary” and 
“reasonable.” Before every duel, the warrior “says to himself: ‘either I live on, in which event he 
dies this instant, or the other way round’. In such a case waiting would mean protracting the 
torments of wounded honour in the face of him who has wounded it, and this can be more 
painful than life is worth” (43). What the warrior cannot do is to not act. “Kill me tomorrow; let 
me live tonight!” (5.2.80), implores Desdemona just before Othello smothers her; “But half an 
hour!” (82); “But while I say one prayer!” (83). 
This does not mean that the warrior is incapable of patience. Othello is after all known 
for his composure. “Can he be angry?” asks Iago, “I have seen the cannon / When it hath blown 
his ranks into the air / And, like the devil, from his very arm / Puffed his own brother—and is he 
angry?” (3.4.126–29). But even his patience serves his self-love. His defence, for instance, 
before the Duke and the senators, amounts to self-praise. Before that, he tells Iago that he is 
immune to Brabantio’s charge: 
Let him do his spite: 
My services which I have done the signory 
Shall out-tongue his complaints. ’Tis yet to know— 
Which, when I know that boasting is an honor, 
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I shall promulgate—I fetch my life and being 
From men of royal siege, and my demerits 
May speak unbonneted to as proud a fortune 
As this that I have reached. (1.2.17–24) 
This is not the kind of patience that the Venetians practice. Born from contempt for the 
barbarous act of revenge, their patience serves their society. It is a waiting based on the idea of 
equality and, as Nietzsche points out, achieved when one can “console” oneself with the 
“reflection” that this injury could have happened to anyone (43). Venice forestalls the expression 
of anger through reasoning. It is reflective waiting that the Duke, upon hearing the Moor’s 
account of how he wooed Desdemona, teaches Brabantio when he says: “I think this tale would 
win my daughter too” (1.3.171). 
The genius of Iago is that he comprehends Othello’s vanity. Othello confides in Iago that 
he has chosen to hold back his “unhoused free condition” in “circumscription and confine” out of 
love for “the gentle Desdemona” (1.2.25–27). “Chaos is come again” (3.3.92), Othello is well 
aware, when he no longer loves her. Othello binds his self-love to his love for Desdemona; his 
self-possession translates into his possession of Desdemona; and he articulates this translation 
when he proclaims “My life upon her faith” (1.3.291). The astute Iago recognizes that 
undermining the latter would threaten the former. Iago provokes the impassioned warrior in 
Othello so that Venice be reminded of its disgust toward such temperament. The villain succeeds 
and the tragic hero mourns the loss of his (self-)possession: 
Had it pleased heaven 
To try me with affliction; had they rained 
All kinds of sores and shames on my bare head; 
	 31 
Steeped me in poverty to the very lips; 
Given to captivity me and my utmost hopes, 
I should have found in some place of my soul 
A drop of patience. But, alas, to make me 
The fixed figure for the time of scorn 
To point his slow and moving finger at! 
Yet could I bear that too, well, very well. 
But there, where I have garnered up my heart, 
Where either I must live, or bear no life, 
The fountain from the which my current runs, 
Or else dries up—to be discarded thence, 
Or keep it as a cistern for foul toads 
To knot and gender in! Turn thy complexion there, 
Patience, thou young and rose-lipped cherubin: 
I here look grim as hell! (4.2.46–63) 
It is “black vengeance,” therefore, that turns the “far more fair than black” Othello of the first act 
into “the blacker devil” (5.2.128) of the final act. 
The vanity of the warrior also determines his courage. But Venice celebrates Othello’s 
valiant ambition because it is useful to the city; and thus he is “hotly called for” (1.2.44) to deal 
with “the general enemy Ottoman” (1.3.49). “Another of his fathom,” Iago knows too well, “they 
have none / To lead their business” (1.1.148–49). This community has equipped itself with a 
judicial system that can resolve internal conflicts; since it lacks adept fighters experienced in 
warfare, for external conflicts it depends on a mercenary who is quite familiar with “feats of 
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broils and battle” (1.3.87). As Cantor puts it, “Venice despises the Turks as barbarians, and yet it 
recognizes its need to enlist a warlike spirit in its own defence. The city’s answer is to hire a 
barbarian to fight its battles, to fight fire with fire without getting burned itself” (903). The image 
of Othello as the protector of Venice becomes a model for young and envious Venetians—
including Desdemona—to emulate. Like their patience, their ambition shields the social bond 
from barbarism. The modernization of Venice, therefore, is in fact a conversion of the virtues of 
the warrior, which have been programmed to serve society. These virtues are conditioned to 
uphold pride in the social order rather than pride in oneself. The real evil in this society is self-
love, which has been transfigured into communal love. Having removed vanity, Venice 
optimistically hopes that all of its citizens will pursue the common good. But, as Nietzsche 
observes in Daybreak, “In the lands where man is restrained and subdued there are still plenty of 
backsliding and unsubdued men” (109). With every conversion there will also be a perversion. 
Iago is highly critical of the values of his society. His perverted envy does not wish to preserve 
the social order but to disrupt it by laying bare its weaknesses. In sum, Desdemona’s sympathy 
and Iago’s antipathy are opposite manifestations of the virtues of Othello that Venice has 
appropriated for itself. 
To better understand the distinction between Othello and Venice, it is worth going over a 
number of notable instances of the criticism of the tragedy. T. S. Eliot, in “Shakespeare and the 
Stoicism of Seneca,” faults Othello’s refusal to abandon his “individualism” and “vice of Pride” 
(112), even after the horrible murder of Desdemona. With regard to Othello’s final speech, Eliot 
writes, “What Othello seems to me to be doing in making this speech is cheering himself up. He 
is endeavouring to escape reality, he has ceased to think about Desdemona, and is thinking about 
himself” (111). Eliot claims that this “attitude of self-dramatization assumed by some of 
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Shakespeare’s heroes at moments of tragic intensity” (110) is derived from the stoical principles 
of Seneca, and culminates in Nietzsche, who “is the most conspicuous modern instance of 
cheering oneself up” (112). What bothers Eliot about Othello is that his “stoical attitude is the 
reverse of Christian humility” (112). There is a contradiction, however, in Eliot’s argument that 
sheds light on the main difference between Othello and Iago. Eliot first assigns a cause to pride: 
“universal human weakness” (110); then, he defines it as “the refuge for the individual in an 
indifferent or hostile world too big for him” (112). The type of pride Eliot has in mind is a 
“deliberate resignation” (114). One turns to pride after one has failed to conform to the social 
order, because “men who could take part in the life of a thriving Greek city-state had something 
better to join themselves to; and Christians have had something better” (112). And finally, such 
stoicism grows into anarchism (114). The secluded individual becomes socially destructive 
because he could not take pride in the values of his community. His pride in himself is the 
consequence of a lack of pride in society. And that is what humility is: pride with a different 
target—social pride. Eliot’s description of pride is not incorrect, but it is not the pride of a tragic 
hero. This is a perverted version of Othello’s pride; it is the depraved pride of Iago. Eliot does 
unintentionally hint at tragic pride when he prescribes humility. “Humility,” writes Eliot, “is the 
most difficult of all virtues to achieve; nothing dies harder than the desire to think well of 
oneself” (111). At this impasse in his argument, it is humility that is the consequence of a lack of 
pride. Humility, which is uplifting social values at the expense of one’s vanity, can be achieved 
once pride, which is uplifting oneself, dies—the former is the converted pride of Desdemona, the 
latter the tragic pride of Othello. Social pride and anarchic pride are antithetical metamorphoses 
of tragic pride. 
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Eliot’s conservative criticism aims to preserve social standards such as humility. That he 
equates Othello’s destructiveness with Iago’s destructiveness stems from his expectation of 
moral education from tragedy. He analyzes tragedy from the point of view of the moral effect it 
has on its spectator, a critical stance initiated by Aristotle’s doctrine of catharsis. According to 
this doctrine, the function of tragedy is to cleanse the audience of the pity and fear aroused by the 
tragic hero. The spectator is encouraged to renounce the hero’s hubristic tendency. (Kenneth 
Burke, in his essay on Coriolanus, points to three meanings of the Greek term hubris: “pride,” 
“excess,” and “a civil offence, an insulting air of superiority, deemed punishable by death” 
[187].) It is not that Aristotle holds pity and fear in high esteem. Like Plato, Aristotle considers 
these emotions as feminine and harmful to a masculine society. But while Plato banishes tragedy 
from his republic for arousing these emotions, Aristotle sees the purging of these emotions 
through tragedy as beneficial to society. As Terry Eagleton explains in Sweet Violence, the 
doctrine of catharsis is Aristotle’s “ingenious riposte” to the Platonic censure of tragedy: 
“Tragedy can perform the pleasurable, politically valuable service of draining off an excess of 
enfeebling emotions such as pity and fear, thus providing a kind of public therapy for those of 
the citizenry in danger of emotional flabbiness” (153).14 Thus, from this perspective, Othello is 
immoral and Iago is the tempter who goads him to actualize his immorality. 
																																								 																				
14 It is worth mentioning that Nietzsche vehemently objects to Aristotle’s doctrine of catharsis. 
Firstly, he argues, pity and fear are not “discharged” or “relieved” but “intensified” after their 
excitation (Human, All Too Human 98). But more importantly, Nietzsche asserts that tragedy in 
its origin in Greece intended to please the spectator with “pleasing speech” not overwhelm them 
with fear and pity; it delights the spectator to observe the tragic hero “speak well and at length” 
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More recent Shakespeareans, however, have reduced the moral interpretation to a reading 
of the play that is limited to religion. Daniel Vitkus, in “Turning Turk,” and Robert Watson, in 
“Othello as Reformation Tragedy,” employ this method in their allegorical readings of the play 
as a defence of Protestantism. According to Vitkus and Watson, Othello and Iago together 
symbolize a dire threat that Protestant England faced at the start of the seventeenth century, the 
threat of being converted to either Roman Catholicism or Islam. And through the “caricature” of 
these two religions depicted in Othello, Watson argues, “Shakespeare can make his audience into 
more committed Protestants” (154): 
By making Desdemona a Christlike heroine, Iago a jesuitical devil, and Othello an 
imperfectly reformed infidel, Shakespeare renews the polemical function of the morality 
play for a new theological era, depicting a Protestant ideal of marriage sustainable only 
through the Protestant version of love, as a gift that nothing earthly can earn or repay. I’m 
not entirely sure what Shakespeare believed in 1604, or wanted us to believe. But a 
Jacobean audience convinced to value spontaneous love above Venetian traditions, to 
condemn Othello for letting the dubious evidence of his senses distract him from the 
certain devotion of his heart, and to hate Iago for deluding Christians into believing in 
reward and retaliation rather than love, would have found itself endorsing the Protestant 
Reformation. (168–69) 
																																								 																				
when he is “in the most difficult situations,” when “life approaches the abyss and a real human 
being would usually lose his head and certainly his fine language” (The Gay Science 80). The 
purpose of tragedy, Nietzsche contends, is not purgation but pleasure from praising speech. 
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In “Othello Circumcised,” Julia Lupton claims that Othello and Iago correspond to the 
Judeo-Islamic tradition—or more precisely, the religious practice of circumcision, which 
Christianity replaced with baptism. “In Othello,” writes Lupton, 
the romance of Gentile conversion supports the dream of a universal brotherhood that 
allows Shakespeare to set up and see through the black-white opposition. Yet this 
Christian-humanist discourse always operates as a universalism minus the circumcised; 
the Jew and the Muslim are subtracted from the nations of the world ingathered by 
Christianity, singled out and cut off by the ritual stroke through which they continue to 
distinguish themselves. (84) 
Outside of the religious context, in A Theater of Envy, René Girard approaches 
Shakespeare from the same moral perspective. Instead of pride, Girard focuses on envy—the 
ambitious drive to imitate the other. According to Girard, “mimetic desire” is not only “imitation 
in social life as a force for gregariousness and bland conformity through the mass reproduction 
of a few social models” (3). “Imitation does not merely draw people together, it pulls them apart. 
Paradoxically, it can do these two things simultaneously” (3). And this “mimetic rivalry” is the 
“fundamental source of human conflict” and the paradox at the heart of Shakespeare’s plays (3). 
The “resolution” of this human predicament is the “violence of scapegoating” (6). The task of 
tragedy is to purge its audience of the destructiveness of envy: “It is unanimous victimage that 
transforms the disruptive force of mimetic rivalry into the constructive force of a sacrificial 
mimesis periodically reenacting the original violence in order to prevent a return of the crisis” 
(6). The problem in Girard’s argument is not that he universalizes envy (for envy has always 
existed) but that he universalizes the social tendency to “fear and repress envy” (4). 
Consequently, he does not distinguish Othello’s envy from the envy of the other characters. The 
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cause of Othello’s envy, Girard claims, is an “internal weakness”: he “lacks confidence in 
himself” (290). But to remain a hero, Othello’s “self-poisoning” must appear to come from 
without, from “a sacrificial substitute”; “Iago’s role consists essentially in making explicit the 
thoughts that Othello is vainly trying to repress” (291–92). Similarly, in his essay on the tragedy, 
Kenneth Burke sees Iago as a katharma, a poisoner and scapegoat. Iago, writes Burke, is “a 
voice at Othello’s ear”; and “villain and hero here are but essentially inseparable parts of the one 
fascination” (166). 
There are critics, in contrast, who distance Iago from Othello, but for the sake of their 
romantic fascination with the former. In Shakespearean Tragedy, A. C. Bradley sees Iago as the 
“father” of Goethe’s Mephistopheles (170), and in The Invention of the Human, Harold Bloom 
sees Milton’s Satan as “the legitimate son” of Iago (434). Both Bradley and Bloom praise the 
artistic creativity of Iago. This revolutionary, writes Bloom, is a “psychologist, dramatist, and 
aesthete (the first modern one) as he contemplates the total ruin of the war god Othello, reduced 
to murderous incoherence” (435). Their readings do not equate Iago’s destructiveness with that 
of Othello; rather, they equate his creativity with that of his creator. “Shakespeare,” Bradley 
notes, “put a good deal of himself into Iago” (189). Intrigued by Iago’s genius, such critics 
regard genius as the distinguishing factor between Othello and Iago. Othello is noble but naïve, 
Iago a malcontent mastermind. Bloom observes that Iago does not understand “the limits of war” 
because he “is always at war”; and Othello, “the skilled professional who maintains the purity of 
arms by sharply dividing the camp of war from that of peace,” understands that “his brave and 
zealous ancient” cannot “replace him were he to be killed or wounded” (434). Being rejected by 
Othello is “the trauma that truly creates Iago, no mere wicked Ensign but rather a genius of evil 
who has engendered himself from a great Fall” (436). Thus, an undying devotion to the spirit of 
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the warrior transforms into an undying spirit of revenge, and a creative “prophet of Resentment” 
is born: 
In Iago, what was the religion of war, when he worshiped Othello as its god, has now 
become the game of war, to be played everywhere except upon the battlefield. The death 
of belief becomes the birth of invention, and the passed-over officer becomes the poet of 
street brawls, stabbings in the dark, disinformation, and above all else, the uncreation of 
Othello, the sparagmos of the great captain-general so that he can be returned to the 
original abyss, the chaos that Iago equates with the Moor’s African origins. (437–38) 
Conversely, Othello is “a great commander, who knows war and the limits of war but who 
knows little else, and cannot know that he does not know” (445). Likewise, Bradley argues that 
all of Iago’s attributes are “admirable”; had they not gone to “evil ends,” Iago would have been 
“the perfect man” (191). And “Othello’s description of himself as ‘one not easily jealous, but, 
being wrought, / Perplexed in the extreme’, is perfectly just. His tragedy lies in this — that his 
whole nature was indisposed to jealousy, and yet was such that he was unusually open to 
deception, and, if once wrought to passion, likely to act with little reflection, with no delay, and 
in the most decisive manner conceivable” (151). 
In glorifying Iago, once again, what distinguishes Othello is overlooked. The 
conservative and the romantic interpretations of Othello fail to identify Othello’s defining 
characteristic. In both approaches, Othello is defined in his relation to Iago. In both approaches, 
Othello remains a homeless warrior whose sense of place is forever burdened by his sense of 
displacement. In contrast, I would like to identify Othello’s distinguishing quality. It is precisely 
that aspect of Othello that has him feel at home in himself that is neglected—a quality that Iago 
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clearly does not possess. To do so, I argue that it is first necessary to examine Desdemona, not 
Iago. 
Desdemona, as her father informs us, has been stubbornly “opposite to marriage” 
(1.2.67). Her marriage to Othello is her escape from “house affairs” (1.3.147); she is not worried 
that her “gross revolt” (1.1.130) will “incur a general mock” (1.2.69) because she dislikes her 
domestic life. In the presence of her father and his colleagues, she boldly announces that she has 
decided to “consecrate” her “soul and fortunes” to Othello’s “honors” and “valiant parts” 
(1.3.250–51). This marks the main difference between Desdemona and Othello: in the previous 
scene, Othello announces that he is proud of his “parts,” “title,” and “perfect soul” (1.2.31). I 
argue that it is not only womanhood that prevents the ambitious Desdemona to become an 
adventurous and formidable warrior like Othello; her status as a civilized Venetian citizen, who 
has been taught the moral values of her community, also keeps her ambition within socially 
acceptable bounds. An ambitious and young woman trapped in a restricted masculine community 
dominated by her father and his peers, Desdemona lacks autonomy and self-determination, and 
this lack defines her relationship to her hero: she does not like who she is and yearns to be 
someone else, someone like Othello. This explains why, upon listening “with a greedy ear” 
(1.3.149) to Othello’s adventures, “she wished / That heaven had made her such a man” (162–
63). She strongly objects to returning to her father’s house to wait for Othello’s return from 
battle (1.3.239–41) and enthusiastically asks to accompany her hero to Cyprus: 
if I be left behind 
A moth of peace, and he go to the war, 
The rites for why I love him are bereft me, 
And I a heavy interim shall support 
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By his dear absence. Let me go with him. (252–56) 
Obviously, she is referring to her fondness for the rites of war rather than the rites of marriage. 
Her zeal to become a warrior similar to Othello is vehement, so much so that others quickly 
discern. Cassio introduces her to Montano as “our great captain’s captain” (2.1.74). And in order 
to “recover the general again” (2.3.249), Iago counsels Cassio to “importune her help to put you 
in your place again” (292) because the “general’s wife is now the general” (288–89). 
Desdemona’s excessive admiration for Othello, therefore, is not simply a manifestation of 
marital love; it is the worship of the heroic way of life. Why else would she immediately 
conclude from the discovery that “we must think men are not gods” (3.4.140) that she is an 
“unhandsome warrior” (143)? This is the same kind of traumatizing rejection that Bloom 
attributes only to Iago. And a little later, upon observing her valiant hero blinded by uncalled-for 
jealousy, she is struck by the realization that her obsession with heroism is a mistake when she 
confides in Emilia that the Venetian Lodovico “is a proper man” who “speaks well” (4.3.34–35), 
a realization that is promptly lulled by the heartrending Willow Song. Both of these fleeting 
moments of anagnorisis remind Desdemona not of her choice of Othello over other men as 
husband but of her choice of the life of the warrior over familial life. She has built an ideal image 
of herself based on the image she has of the adventurous and formidable warrior Othello, an 
ideal image that proves impossible to actualize. 
In other words, I argue that what restricts Desdemona is not only a problem of gender. 
Desdemona believes that in order to become a productive and useful member of society she must 
emulate the warrior of which her city has made an example. She wants to become an assertive 
and competent problem-solver like Othello. And what distinguishes Desdemona from the 
senators of Venice (including her father) is that they have set limits for themselves so as to avoid 
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discontentment. Venice has firm boundaries to prevent itself from getting too close to Othello. 
From his reaction to the news of Desdemona’s secret marriage, it is clear that Brabantio never 
accepted Othello as one of their own. But when Othello told Brabantio of the “process” (1.3.142) 
of his adventures, he believed that Brabantio actually “loved” (128) him. In fact, for Brabantio, 
Othello’s adventures were only fascinating stories. Venice believes in a firm boundary between 
fact and fiction, truth and lie. Anything beyond its borders is deemed fiction. And here, I argue, 
we can recognize Othello’s function for Venice. He is hired to serve as an extension of Venice to 
learn about problems that arise beyond Venice. This foreign object is merely a means to learn. 
But in the process, this foreign object becomes an object of learning. Venice becomes interested 
in learning about Othello. And it is the rigid boundary between fact and fiction observed by the 
Venetians that stops them from bringing his stories into their actual lives. His adventures are 
perceived and enjoyed as a work of art. The difference between Desdemona and her father is that 
she does not submit to this rigid boundary. For Desdemona, Othello becomes a beautiful object 
of imitation. Through Othello, she wants to learn about the “strange” and “wondrous” (160–61) 
world beyond the borders of Venice. But in Brabantio, there is no genuine love for strangeness or 
strangers. In conclusion, what restricts Desdemona more than her femininity is a self-imposed 
restriction firmly established in Venice—the avoidance of contact with strangeness. Venice 
forbids itself to familiarize itself with the darkness that lies beyond its borders. And Desdemona 
pays a heavy price for courageously becoming the voice of resistance to this self-imposed 
restriction. 
And while Desdemona’s envy is founded on discontentment with the self, Iago’s envy is 
founded on discontentment with others. Desdemona pulls herself up, Iago pulls others down. 
Iago’s envy humiliates its object to change how others perceive it. And the strategy behind his 
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master plot, disgracing Desdemona in the eyes of Othello to ultimately disgrace Othello, is to 
blur the distinction between fact and fiction, truth and lie. But these are not the only types of 
envy in this tragedy. Burke and Girard maintain that Othello represents the ugliness in 
possessiveness, and his death purifies us of the same ugliness that exists within us all. Bradley 
and Bloom depict Othello as the possessive tyrant whose authority is undermined by his 
insubordinate follower. In both cases, Othello is the evil that we must resist. Through this tragic 
hero, however, we get glimpses of a different kind of envy, an envy that pulls others up. It can 
do this because it is founded on self-regard and self-reliance. That this competent warrior can 
honour others is due to the fact that he first honours himself—he self-confidently elevates 
confidence in others. He has elected Cassio as his lieutenant, his place-holder. Upon their 
reunion in Cyprus, he greets his newly-wed bride with “O my fair warrior!” (2.1.174). But no 
envy can be free of harm. Just as Othello honours those around him by raising them up, he 
punishes them when they do not act in accordance with honour. And finally, after realizing the 
dishonour in his own actions, Othello punishes himself. 
Having identified these types of envy in Othello, in the following section, I will show that 
each type articulates itself using its own rhetoric. 
 
THE ISOLATED ABASER 
In this section, I will examine the different types of rhetoric in Othello in terms of George 
Puttenham’s account of the rhetorical figure meiosis. More specifically, I hope to show that the 
various styles of rhetoric in Othello are symptomatic of the type of morality their speaker 
upholds. In the third book of The Arte of English Poesie, “Of Ornament,” Puttenham analyzes 
first the various figures, then the “deformities,” and finally “decency.” Puttenham’s contention is 
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that “viciosity” will cause “dolor and disliking to the ear and mind”; to avoid this, figures must 
be decorous so that they “dispose the hearers to mirth and solace by pleasant conveyance and 
efficacy of speech” (239). Critics have commonly associated Puttenham’s decorous and decent 
figures with the aristocratic manners of the court, and his “vicious” figures with the uncultivated 
lower classes. For instance, in “Outlandish Fears,” Wayne Rebhorn claims that in The Arte of 
English Poesie—as in Thomas Wilson’s The Arte of Rhetorique and Antoine Furetiere’s 
Nouvelle allegorique—to conform to decorum means to distance oneself from the socially 
marginalized, the outlandish. These three Renaissance rhetoricians, according to Rebhorn, teach 
the orator to build his ethos based on the norms of the social elite. Similarly, in “Poetry and 
Court Conduct,” Daniel Javitch writes that in Puttenham’s treatise on rhetoric, the “norms of 
courtly conduct serve to determine poetic norms” (866). In “Puttenham, Shakespeare, and the 
Abuse of Rhetoric,” David Hillman focuses on that which Puttenham’s “ideologically 
conservative” (79) treatise devalues: the “indispensible range of individual experiences and 
aspirations, which lie beyond the realm of collective reality” (81). Hillman maintains that 
Puttenham’s indecorous rhetoric represents the style of those at the bottom of the social ladder, 
who have been denied access to the education of the upper classes. To clarify this, Hillman 
compares Theseus and Bottom in A Midsummer Night’s Dream: Theseus embodies “the 
orthodox, rationalistic rejection of the supremely personal experience: his is the voice of absolute 
authority throughout the play. And, at the level of language, it is above all Bottom and his 
artisanal companions who continually disrupt this authoritative discourse” (81). In what follows, 
I hope to show that the rhetoric opposed to the social norm is included within Puttenham’s 
decorous and decent rhetoric, and that the “vicious” use of rhetoric is insulated from both; it is 
neither at the centre nor in the margins. 
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Let us first look at a few significant incidents in the plot of Othello. Othello belittles 
Brabantio’s threat to punish him for his elopement with Desdemona. The Duke tries to calm 
down Brabantio’s anger at the secret union of Desdemona and Othello. Desdemona pleads to 
extenuate Cassio’s misbehavior. Iago meticulously stage-manages the ruin of Cassio and 
Othello’s reputations in the army. What these instances have in common is the element of 
diminishment—the outcome in all of them is a reduction. In evaluating an action, we factor in its 
consequences. Thus, the actions of the Duke and Desdemona are good because they are socially 
beneficial—the Duke encourages Brabantio to see the positive in his alien son-in-law, 
Desdemona encourages Othello to see the positive in his outcast lieutenant. Iago, on the other 
hand, is a nonconforming critic who ingeniously stands up to the flaws of the established order in 
the military. By exposing Cassio’s alcoholism and Othello’s violent rage, Iago undermines the 
military’s choice of its leaders. Finally, Othello constantly glorifies himself. From the start of the 
play to its end, Othello is the hero of his own myth (as a result of which others are rendered 
inferior from his perspective). 
Of course, this is a superficial reading of Iago’s rhetoric. On the surface, Iago’s attentive 
exposure of the flaws of others may even appear as a conscientious act, as a service to his 
community. But we must not forget that this act is a defence mechanism. Iago only disparages 
those who are in one way or another superior to him. That he must unrelentingly and mercilessly 
stain the good names of Cassio, Desdemona, and Othello is stimulated by the anxiety caused by 
his sense of inferiority toward them. And in stark contrast to Iago’s belittlement of others, 
Othello’s self-glorification is a manifestation of the confident contentment he feels toward 
himself. What I wish to expand upon in this section of the chapter is the different types of 
diminishment that ensue from these different types of rhetoric. 
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The rhetorical figure that epitomizes an act of diminution is meiosis. Thomas Wilson 
places “Abating” among the schemes and defines it thus: “We make our doinges appeare lesse, 
when with wordes we extenuate and lessen the same. As when one had giuen his fellowe a sound 
blowe, being rebuked for the same, said he scant touched him. Likewise, when two haue fought 
together, to say, that the one had his legge prickt with a sworde, when perchance he has a great 
wounde” (208). Puttenham’s analysis of this figure is more helpful to this discussion. Meiosis is 
dealt with on three occasions. First it appears among the “sensable” figures—figures that affect 
the mind by altering the sense of words or sentences. The “Disabler” aims to “diminish and 
abase a thing by way of spite or malice, as it were to deprave it” (269). Then it is discussed in 
more detail among the “sententious” figures—figures that are more suited to be employed by the 
orator “to plead, or to praise, or to advise”; in short, to “persuade both copiously and 
vehemently” (281). Embedded in the “sententious” figures is social utility. Of the purposes of 
this form of the “Disabler,” Puttenham mentions humbling oneself “for modesty’s sake and to 
avoid the opinion of arrogance”; belittling others “for despite, to bring our adversaries in 
contempt”; lessening the fear of “any perilous enterprise, making a great matter seem small, and 
of little difficulty”; making “an offense seem less than it is, by giving a term more favorable and 
of less vehemence than the truth requires”; and extending a friendly gesture toward “our equals 
or inferiors” by referring to them in informal terms (304–05). Meiosis is once more examined as 
a “vice” along with other “barbarous” and “strange” figures. The technical term for its “vicious” 
version is tapinosis, which Puttenham translates as the “Abaser”: “It is no small fault in a maker 
to use such words and terms as do diminish and abase the matter he would seem to set forth, by 
impairing the dignity, height, vigor, or majesty of the cause he takes in hand” (344–45). 
“Vicious” meiosis is marked by autonomy; unlike “sententious” meiosis, it has no wish to mend 
	 46 
or improve social relations. Nor does it humiliate out of “spite or malice” like “sensable” 
meiosis. Puttenham explains that tapinosis is meiosis “by ignorance or error” (269). This does 
not mean that “vicious” meiosis is unintentional; rather, it means that it has no intention to 
benefit or harm others. It is marked by a blatant disregard for others. Tapinosis is “vicious” 
thanks to its unapologetic indifference. That it belittles is the repercussion of it being out of 
place—it is, as it were, an “erring barbarian” (1.3.342–43). 
Othello’s rhetoric consistently engages in tapinosis. It is free from the anxiety that 
agitates Iago. When Iago warns Othello that Brabantio has “a voice potential / As double as the 
Duke’s,” and will either “divorce you, / Or put upon you what restraint or grievance / The law, 
with all his might to enforce it on, / Will give him cable” (1.2.13–17), the confident general 
calmly reminds himself of his own prized accomplishments and noble heritage: 
Let him do his spite: 
My services which I have done the signory 
Shall out-tongue his complaints. ’Tis yet to know— 
Which, when I know that boasting is an honor, 
I shall promulgate—I fetch my life and being 
From men of royal siege, and my demerits 
May speak unbonneted to as proud a fortune 
As this that I have reached. (17–24) 
Othello does not insult his opponent. Rather, uplifting himself has the effect of downgrading the 
hostility directed toward him. 
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And in the following scene, Othello approaches the distressing news that the Turkish fleet 
“with a most mighty preparation makes for Cyprus” (1.3.220–21) with the same rhetorical 
strategy: 
The tyrant custom, most grave senators, 
Hath made the flinty and steel coach of war 
My thrice-driven bed of down. I do agnize 
A natural and prompt alacrity 
I find in hardness, and do undertake 
This present war against the Ottomites. (227–32) 
Self-praise in both cases overshadows the “might” of the threat. Attenuation is achieved through 
amplification. 
Othello’s “vicious” meiosis is the by-product of self-aggrandizement. That others appear 
less appealing in the presence of Othello is due to his habit of mythologizing himself. From his 
own perspective, nothing about him is ugly. Othello poeticizes even his resolve to destroy Cassio 
and Desdemona: 
Like to the Pontic Sea, 
Whose icy current and compulsive course 
Ne’er feels retiring ebb, but keeps due on 
To the Propontic and the Hellespont, 
Even so my bloody thoughts, with violent pace, 
Shall ne’er look back, ne’er ebb to humble love 
Till that a capable and wide revenge 
Swallow them up. (3.3.447–54) 
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Likening the “violent pace” of his desire for revenge to the “icy current and compulsive course” 
of the Black Sea renders the “retiring ebb” of his “humble love” for his victims impossible to 
occur. 
The clearest example of tapinosis occurs in the final scene of the play: after learning the 
truth about Desdemona and Iago, the “honorable murderer” brashly declares that “naught I did in 
hate, but all in honor” (5.2.287–88). It is extremely difficult for us to digest this statement 
because it demeans Desdemona’s death, but that is not Othello’s intention. Othello is doing the 
only thing he knows to do: relying on his honour—just as he, immediately prior to stabbing 
himself, introduces his suicide as an honourable act. It is important to point out that at the end of 
the play we discover that Othello is conscious of the fact that his version of meiosis is foreign to 
the Venetians when he makes the following request: “I pray you, in your letters, / When you 
shall these unlucky deeds relate, / Speak of me as I am; nothing extenuate, / Nor set down aught 
in malice” (5.2.333–36). He is asking those present to refrain from the “sententious” and 
“sensable” forms of meiosis when they talk of him—he does not wish the account of his actions 
to be palliated or disgraced. 
Contrast this with Desdemona’s attempt to reconcile Othello and Cassio by reminding her 
husband of Cassio’s love for him (3.3.46) and his assistance in the process of courting her (68–
71). Desdemona’s rationalization is that excusing Cassio is for Othello’s own good: 
Why, this is not a boon, 
’Tis as I should entreat you wear your gloves, 
Or feed on nourishing dishes, or keep you warm, 
Or sue to you to do a peculiar profit 
To your own person. (74–78) 
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Unlike Othello’s rhetoric, in this placatory meiosis, diminishment is not a corollary but the 
primary objective and reinforced by goodwill. Desdemona hopes that Cassio’s fault will fade 
away as she highlights his loyalty to Othello. Desdemona’s rhetoric involves the good 
overshadowing the bad. 
The Duke’s soothing words to the grief-stricken Brabantio after his daughter announces 
that it was her own choice to marry the Moor betray the same rhetorical technique: 
When remedies are past, the griefs are ended 
By seeing the worst, which late on hopes depended. 
To mourn a mischief that is past and gone 
Is the next way to draw new mischief on. 
What cannot be preserved, when Fortune takes,  
Patience her injury a mockery makes. 
The robbed that smiles steals something from the thief; 
He robs himself that spends a bootless grief. (1.3.201–08) 
The Duke instructs Brabantio to think less of his misfortune by being more accepting. Another 
example follows a little later when the Duke emphasizes Othello’s valued qualities to cast a 
shadow over his otherness: “If virtue no delighted beauty lack, / Your son-in-law is far more fair 
than black” (286–87). “Sententious” meiosis draws attention toward something pleasant so as to 
draw attention away from something unpleasant. It is worth adding that these meiotic 
appeasements are carried out through other “sententious” figures. Desdemona uses what 
Puttenham calls “Resemblance by Example,” in which similar examples are offered to support 
the case; the Duke uses sententia (the “Sage Sayer”). 
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Puttenham distinguishes sententia from proverbs on the basis of the intention of the 
former to moralize: “In weighty causes and for great purposes, wise persuaders use grave and 
weighty speeches, especially in matter of advice or counsel, for which purpose there is a manner 
of speech to allege texts or authorities of witty sentence, such as smatch moral doctrine and teach 
wisdom and good behavior” (321). A proverb, which is a “sensable” figure, only seeks to alter 
judgement. In the opening scene, Iago uses a proverb to convince the reluctant Brabantio that his 
daughter has eloped: “Sir, you are one of those that will not serve God if the devil bid you! 
Because we come to do you service and you think we are ruffians, you’ll have your daughter 
covered with a Barbary horse; you’ll have your nephews neigh to you; you’ll have coursers for 
cousins and jennets for germans” (1.1.106–10). Brabantio is to trust the message rather than the 
messenger. With the aid of this proverb, Iago reduces the union between Desdemona and Othello 
to bestiality. Iago also presents his case as a benefit; he is informing a father that his daughter is 
missing. His intention, however, is not to placate, but to upset and provoke. 
Throughout the play, Iago’s “sensable” meiosis is unfailingly provocative; it alters the 
mind by polluting it. He would like to “poison” and “throw such chances of vexation” on 
“delight” and “joy” so that “it may lose some color” (1.1.66–71). He would like to degrade love 
to “a sect or scion” of “our raging motions, our carnal stings, or unbitted lusts” (1.3.321–23), and 
to “set down the pegs” that make the music of love (2.1.192). “I’ll have our Michael Cassio on 
the hip, / Abuse him to the Moor in the right garb” (2.1.288–89), declares Iago. To sabotage his 
lieutenancy, Iago persuades Cassio to indulge himself in drinking. He discredits the self-
possessed Othello by arousing his anger, by “practicing upon his peace and quiet / Even to 
madness” (2.1.293–94)—the same Othello who would not lose his composure when the 
“cannon” exploded his men in the battlefield and “from his very arm / Puffed his own brother” 
	 51 
(3.4.126–29). After observing Othello’s outburst of rage, Lodovico, the representative of the 
Venetian government, asks with regret and disillusionment, 
Is this the noble Moor whom our full Senate 
Call all-in-all sufficient? Is this the nature 
Whom passion could not shake? Whose solid virtue 
The shot of accident nor dart of chance 
Could neither graze nor pierce? 
to which Iago, pleased with his triumph over the hero of Venice, responds, “He is much 
changed” (4.1.251–55). 
Iago’s most daring exploit, however, concerns Desdemona, who is “full of most blessed 
condition” (2.1.237–38). “The wine she drinks,” Iago berates Roderigo, “is made of grapes” 
(2.1.239–40). He urges the enamored suitor to pursue her as an object of lust rather than love. 
Iago playfully tells Cassio that the Desdemona he regards as the “most exquisite lady” is “full of 
game”: her eye “sounds a parley to provocation” and her voice is “an alarum to love” (2.3.17–
23). Meiotic belittlement is quite clear in these examples. Iago, in short, is determined to defile 
Desdemona’s chastity by inciting everyone to think of her as fleshly and lascivious, as one more 
“super-subtle Venetian” (1.3.343). 
Ultimately, Iago craftily plants the idea of Desdemona’s debauchery in Othello’s mind 
and assures him that “One may smell in such a will most rank, / Foul disproportions, thoughts 
unnatural” (3.3.231–32). Tarnishing Desdemona’s reputation is more complicated because Iago 
	 52 
must improvise and invent her adultery.15 Others witness the intoxicated Cassio losing control 
and Othello furiously losing his temper. But it is impossible to provide “ocular proof” of 
Desdemona losing her fidelity. Thus, Iago resorts to energeia—bringing before the eyes with 
words.16 Iago revoltingly suggests the lie of Desdemona’s sexual encounter with Cassio for 
Othello: 
It were a tedious difficulty, I think, 
To bring them to that prospect. Damn them, then, 
If ever mortal eyes do see them bolster 
More than their own. What, then? How, then? 
What shall I say? Where’s satisfaction? 
It is impossible you should see this, 
Were they as prime as goats, as hot as monkeys, 
As salt as wolves in pride, and fools as gross 
As ignorance made drunk. But yet, I say, 
If imputation and strong circumstances— 
Which lead directly to the door of truth— 
Will give you satisfaction, you might have’t. (3.3.394–405) 
In these and similar meiotic aggravations, Iago stains an admired attribute by foregrounding an 
undesirable one. A virtue is blemished by means of accentuating an opposite vice. 
																																								 																				
15 In “The Language of Tragedy,” Russ McDonald writes that through Iago, this tragedy displays 
“the danger of fiction in the hands of the wicked” (45). 
16 Puttenham describes energeia as the function of “sensable” figures (227). 
	 53 
To summarize, in Puttenham’s division of figures, “sensable” figures—such as the 
“Abuse” (catachresis), the “Misnamer” (metonymy), the “False Semblant” (allegory), the “Bitter 
Taunt” (sarcasm), and the “Loud Liar” (hyperbole)—intend to change perspective. They are 
transgressions that seek the “alteration” of the hearer’s “conceit” (262). Puttenham emphasizes 
repeatedly that these figures do not serve the ear. That is to say, these figures do not sweeten. 
That is why he distances them from “auricular” figures—those superficial alterations that are 
only “pleasant and agreeable to the ear” (245). Sweet to the ear, “auricular” figures embody 
leniency and hospitality. While “sensable” figures break the rules of accepted language, 
“auricular” figures bend the rules to accommodate difference.17 “Sensable” meiosis is ruthlessly 
critical; it faults and shames something of social value. Should it be moderated by the forgiving 
sweetness offered by the “auricular,” it becomes “sententious”—“as well tunable to the ear as 
stirring to the mind” (281). And the diminishment caused by these two forms of meiosis is quite 
different. “Sententious” meiosis deflates a negative quality as it inflates a positive quality. 
Relying on Kenneth Burke’s terminology, the “terminisitic screen” through which “sententious” 
meiosis presents its object reflects on its desirable aspect in order to deflect from its undesirable 
aspect. Here is a diminution of negativity. The diminishment of “sensable” meiosis, on the other 
hand, involves either the invention of negativity or the amplification of an already existing 
negativity. The negative characteristic (whether invented or not) is exaggerated so as to shock. 
“Vicious” meiosis, however, is fundamentally different. It is unashamedly inconsiderate. And the 
																																								 																				
17 Desdemona’s rhetoric becomes “auricular” when she unexpectedly comes back to life and tells 
Emilia that Othello is not guilty (5.2.115–22). This act of forgiveness does not change Emilia’s 
opinion of Othello; it is only—as Emilia points out twice—“sweet.” 
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diminishment here is a consequence of this inconsideration. The rhetoric of the other characters 
always includes the other; it is calculating and tendentious. Othello’s rhetoric, however, is 
isolated and distinct; it is distinction as such. Tapinosis is rudely separate, offensively self-






















A Reading of Hamlet: Early Modern Praise and Dispraise 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Continuing my discussion of the rhetorical figure meiosis, in this chapter, I will 
concentrate on the strategic use of this figure as a means to practice patience. In Hamlet, I will 
argue, Shakespeare shows the manner in which meiotic belittlement can be consciously applied 
to postpone the gratification of passion. 
In his analysis of the traditional principles of rhetoric, Kenneth Burke observes that 
amplification is “the most thoroughgoing” rhetorical device (A Rhetoric of Motives 69). The 
most basic use of amplification is synonymous with, in the words of Burke, “extension” and 
“expatiation” (69). One of Burke’s examples is Søren Kierkegaard’s expatiation of the Biblical 
story of Abraham and Isaac in his Fear and Trembling. Amplification is an expansion upon, a 
more detailed interpretation of, a subject matter, that postpones the conclusion of the matter to a 
later point in time and space. Amplification as a fundamental aspect of rhetoric, with its delaying 
interpretation, is the extension of the life of its object. As Michel Foucault puts it: rhetoric as 
speaking or writing “so as not to die” (“Language to Infinity” 53). Needless to say, such 
extension is not simply one of length. Amplification, aside from its interpretative enlargement, is 
at its core repetition. Burke explains this quantitative increase thus: “The saying of something in 
various ways until it increases in persuasiveness by the sheer accumulation” (69). Furthermore, 
Burke points out that, because of the inclusion of new elements by its author, Kierkegaard’s 
amplification is not simply an unadulterated expatiation of the Biblical story: “Kierkegaard is 
here making a purely personal addition to the sacred text. He is not just amplifying principles 
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already there; he is adding a new principle” (247). Those amplifications that go beyond 
quantitative increase and do not leave the quality intact must therefore be regarded as a different 
kind of amplification. 
In Shakespeare and the Arts of Language, Russ McDonald discusses Shakespeare and his 
contemporaries’ involvement in the amplification of the English vernacular: “Revelling in the 
new possibilities of their language, writers (and readers) took pleasure in repetition, variation, 
exemplification, synonymy, and a host of other specific forms of verbal multiplication” (27). In 
fact, the Latin term copia (“fullness or variety of statement”), McDonald observes, becomes 
interchangeable with the art of rhetoric in the early modern period (27). And Patricia Parker 
shows how this rhetorical device, with its different contexts, shapes the early modern text. In 
Literary Fat Ladies, Parker identifies the word dilation as a Renaissance equivalent for rhetorical 
amplification. “Dilation,” writes Parker, is “the ‘opening’ of a closed text to make it ‘increase 
and multiply’ and to transform its brevity into a discourse ‘at large’” (15). 
In addition to the different “resonances” of “dilation” that Parker finds in Renaissance 
texts (15–17), concentrating on Othello, she uncovers a connection between rhetorical 
amplification (“dilation”) and judicial accusation (“delation”) (82–83). Parker draws attention to 
“honest” Iago’s manner of opening up the matter of Desdemona’s supposed infidelity in the 
Temptation Scene—“those pauses, single words, and pregnant phrases which seem to suggest 
something secret or withheld”—which Othello describes as “close dilations working from the 
heart / That passion cannot rule” (3.3.122–23). Elsewhere, Parker notes that the adjective close in 
Othello’s formulation means “secret” or “private” and “partial glimpses of something closed or 
hid” (“Othello and Hamlet” 61). On one hand, Iago is secretly exposing and expanding upon 
Desdemona’s secret to Othello. On the other, it is impossible for Iago to bring the secret matter 
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completely before Othello’s eyes: “But how? How satisfied, my lord? / Would you the 
supervision grossly gape on? / Behold her topped?” (3.3.391–93). To satisfy his lord, the only 
“ocular proof” (357) that Iago can present to Othello is “imputation and strong circumstances” 
(403)—that is, accusation founded on convincing circumstantial evidence. 
All that Iago’s “dilation” can amount to is a partial manifestation of the concealed totality 
that he is tactfully striving to convey to Othello. “This honest creature doubtless / Sees and 
knows more, much more, than he unfolds” (3.3.241–42). Rhetorical amplification, in other 
words, operates synecdochically. In his Description of Ancient Rhetoric, Friedrich Nietzsche 
points out the synecdoche (the “encompassing”) at work in the rhetorical essence of language in 
general: “Language never expresses something completely but displays only a characteristic 
which appears to be prominent to it [language]” (23). Hamlet’s account of his grief over the 
death of his father to his mother is an even clearer example of amplification as synecdochic 
representation: his “inky cloak,” “customary suits of solemn black,” “windy suspiration of forced 
breath,” “fruitful river in the eye,” and “dejected ’havior of the visage” are all unable to “denote 
… truly” what he has “within which passes show” (1.2.77–85). In “Dilation and Delay,” Parker 
demonstrates that divisio or partitio is “the principal means of dilating a discourse” (521–23). 
After the partition of his outward grief into its different parts, Hamlet regrettably admits that the 
grief he can express would never be the accurate account of his grief “within.” Thus, expatiation, 
despite its extension in length and increase in the number of representations, is still only a part of 
a whole that remains forever unknown. 
Basic amplification (repetition infused with difference and deferral), considering that it 
functions quantitatively, does not have an opposite that would decrease its object. Quantitative 
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decrease, not to speak of the matter at all, would amount to silence and forgetfulness.18 Even 
rhetorical figures such as aposiopesis and paralipsis, which deal with silence, strategically 
highlight and draw attention to their subject matter.19 The moral interpretation that is critical, 
although still a quantitative increase, qualitatively diminishes its subject matter. Thus, in his 
essay on Othello, Burke describes Iago’s machinations in the Temptation Scene as the translation 
of “neutral” to “grim” (191). Moral degradation is the opposite to what Burke calls amplification 
“by dignification” (A Rhetoric of Motives 69). According to Joel Fineman in Shakespeare’s 
Perjured Eye, that praise is “extraordinary language” is evident in the addition of the prefix epi- 
to the bringing to light of the deictic in the Greek word epideictic; the epi- points to the “extra,” 
the “supplementary,” included in the “showing speech” (5–6). Moral interpretation, therefore, 
																																								 																				
18 A dramatic rendition of such silence occurs in Timon of Athens. The disappointed Timon first 
leaves Athens to no longer be in contact with his unfaithful friends. Then, he even puts an end to 
his insults in isolation—and finally dies. As Russ McDonald, in “The Language of Tragedy,” 
puts it: “Since the evil of flatterers, or ‘mouth-friends’, is the focus of the first half of Timon of 
Athens, it is not surprising that Timon should figure his suicide as a rejection of speech: ‘Lips, let 
sour words go by and language end’” (45). 
19 Aposiopesis is a deliberate interruption in speech prompted by shame, fear, or anger. A famous 
example is the pause in the middle of Mark Antony’s funeral oration in order to spotlight the 
atrocity committed against Julius Caesar. And paralipsis (what Burke translates as “Say the 
Word”) is the accentuating of a topic “under the guise of asking that it be avoided”—Burke’s 
example is the shrewd manner by which Iago introduces the idea of jealousy to Othello 
(“Othello” 193). 
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entails a qualitative change (either dignifying or degrading) added to amplification in its basic 
form as the elaborate interpretation of its object. And the two rhetorical figures that epitomize 
moral dignification and degradation are paradiastole and meiosis.20 
In what follows, I hope to identify amplification as moral degradation in Hamlet’s 
conscious thinking. Moreover, as I will show, although moral belittlement develops from critical 
reasoning, it is not that critical reasoning is absent from moral extolment, but that reason 
functions differently in these two processes of amplification. In the former, critical reasoning is 
used to sully a character or characteristic. The latter, however, aims for acceptance and 
recognition, which initially has no need for critical reasoning. But a plea for acceptance cannot 
remain uncritical, for it must criticize criticism, it must reason against being reasoned against. In 
amplification by dignification, critical reasoning, which occurs at a second stage, turns against 
itself so as to plea for acceptance a second time. The rebuttal (refutatio), one could argue, serves 
a similar purpose in a rhetorical speech. Located after the confirmation (probatio), the rebuttal 
anticipates and fends off opposition to the claim argued for in the previous part. “Confutation,” 
writes Thomas Wilson, “is a dissoluing, or wyping away of all such reasons as make against vs” 
(The Art of Rhetoric 9). In this part of the speech, with the help of the “places of Logique,” 
Wilson explains, “wit may finde out bywaies to escape” (129). As reinforcement for the 
probatio, the refutatio is an escape from being reasoned against. And among the rhetorical 
																																								 																				
20 Paradiastole and meiosis propose an acceptable or unacceptable rendition of a quality. 
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figures, anthypophora exemplifies such keeping critical reason at bay.21 The “Figure of 
Response,” according to George Puttenham, “is when we will seem to ask a question to the intent 
we will answer it ourselves, and is a figure of argument and also of amplification”: not only do 
we “spend much language … to amplify and enlarge our tale,” but by “proponing such matter as 
our adversary might object and then to answer it ourselves, we do unfurnish and prevent him of 
such help as he would otherwise have used for himself” (The Art of English Poesy 289). Thus, in 
amplification by dignification, even criticism—as the negation of opposition—serves 
acceptance. It is double affirmation. And I will identify this manner of double affirmation in 
Claudius’s demand for the acceptance of his kingship. 
Furthermore, meiotic expatiation presupposes the badness of its object, and the 
amplification is an attempt to reason the validation of this badness. Rhetorical invention is used 
to provide proof so as to confirm guilt. This is the case with Desdemona’s supposed guilt: 
Othello demands “a living reason” (3.3.406) from Iago; Iago is to “so prove it / That the 
probation bear no hinge nor loop / To hang a doubt on” (361–63). Iago’s “probation,” probatio, 
confirmation, aiming for certainty, is “To spy into abuses” and “Shape faults” (146–47) in order 
to “prove” Desdemona “a whore” (356). Hamlet similarly sets on his vengeful quest to verify 
Claudius’s “occulted guilt” (3.2.73). In paradiastolic expatiation, on the other hand, critical 
reasoning comes not in the form of proof but rather prudent advice. The focus in meiotic 
expatiation on proving with certainty an already established (or, supposed) guilt explains why it 
																																								 																				
21 Incidentally, Burke discusses this figure and its risk immediately before amplification. The 
risk involves the audience jumping in with a response of their own to the orator’s question before 
the orator has a chance to state his desired response (A Rhetoric of Motives 68–69). 
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seems similar to judicial oratory. From this point of view, paradiastolic expatiation seems 
similar to deliberative oratory. In fact, Aristotle’s Rhetoric highlights this similarity between 
praise and deliberation: what is praiseworthy, stated in the form of propositions, can be used as 
material for deliberative oratory; hence, “when you want to set out proposals in deliberation, see 
what you would praise” (81). 
The current situation is never that bad from the standpoint of paradiastolic expatiation. 
As I will show, Claudius employs this form of rhetoric to conceal his crimes and console Hamlet. 
Another case in point is Othello’s speech addressed to the Duke in the opening Act of the play 
(1.3.128–69). On trial, Othello is asked to defend himself by expatiating upon the “process” of 
wooing Desdemona, just as Desdemona had “with a greedy ear” asked him to expatiate upon his 
“pilgrimage.” With his “dilation” within a “dilation,” with the partitioned and partial account of 
his “history” that won him the approval of Desdemona, Othello wins the approval of the Duke 
(“I think this tale would win my daughter too” [171]). It is no wonder, then, that Othello’s 
dilation, wanting critical reasoning, is confused with “witchcraft.” Not yet complete, the 
amplification of Othello’s “story” requires its second affirmation. Othello fails to address the 
opposition. It is the Duke, immediately after Othello’s narrative, who alleviates the severity of 
the domestic conflict (“take up this mangled matter at the best” [172]) and counsels Brabantio 
with sententious words of wisdom, 
When remedies are past, the griefs are ended 
By seeing the worst, which late on hopes depended. 
To mourn a mischief that is past and gone 
Is the next way to draw new mischief on. 
What cannot be preserved, when Fortune takes, 
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Patience her injury a mockery makes. 
The robbed that smiles steals something from the thief; 
He robs himself that spends a bootless grief. (201–08) 
After the expansive exposure of the secret—the secret of Othello’s “history” and the secret 
marriage—the Duke reasons with Desdemona’s father to let go of his objection to it. It behooves 
the aggrieved plaintiff to patiently accept what is “past and gone.” Not only is the secret now 
declared by the Duke as acceptable, any objection to it is now unacceptable. 
 What I hope to ultimately demonstrate in this chapter is the difference between Hamlet’s 
use of meiosis and Iago’s use of meiosis. In the previous chapter, I have shown that Iago 
humiliates others (Desdemona, Othello, and Cassio, in particular) with the intention of opening 
eyes. It has become an impulse for him to be constantly vigilant, to constantly alert others. He 
believes that beneath the surface there is always ugliness. And it is his duty to shed light on the 
ugliness. He is a seeker of truth—but the ugly truth. For him, depth and perversion have become 
synonymous. And he is always tempted to expose the ugliness and perversion. This is not a 
conscious choice. His humility is proof why this is not a conscious choice. Even his humility has 
become impulsive. He is afraid of an ugly truth to ever actualize. He is truly shocked every time 
he learns of a violent confrontation between Othello and Desdemona: “Can he be angry?” 
(3.4.126), “Do not weep, do not weep. Alas the day!” (4.2.123). In these scenes, he is not his 
usual talkative self. And in the final scene, after learning of Desdemona’s death, he turns silent: 
“Demand me nothing. What you know, you know: / From this time forth I never will speak 
word” (5.2.296–97). Iago’s humility, I believe, is a shield to distance himself from the other. It is 
a defence mechanism to avoid the ugly anger of the other. Humiliating others and humility, 
belittling others and himself, in short, are impulsive attempts to expose and postpone the ugly 
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truth. It is in this sense that Iago embodies meiotic expatiation. He delays and expands on what 
he degrades. 
Hamlet, however, is not simply a seeker of truth. Hamlet seeks virtue—for himself and 
Denmark. But he does not allow himself to believe that either he or Denmark is virtuous, for he 
does not want to end up like his father, blind to the corruption that has permeated Denmark, 
blind even to the corruption in his own family. Hamlet is constantly vigilant. He constantly alerts 
others. But his intention is not only to open eyes; it is also to encourage virtue. He belittles others 
and himself (even life, and the world) to rid himself and Denmark of corruption. Moreover, I 
believe that this is an act. For Hamlet, meiosis is a conscious act. Hamlet consciously acts out the 
role of the moralizer. Moreover, Hamlet does not wish to delay the truth or delay angering 
others. In fact, throughout the plot, he repeatedly angers Claudius (and others) with his attempts 
to discredit the king. What Hamlet delays is the urge to act on his revelations. Hamlet delays his 
desire for revenge. Thus, for Hamlet, meiotic expatiation is a rhetorical means to actively 
practice patience. A clear indication of this tendency in Hamlet occurs when he cites 
(incompletely) the proverb, “While the grass grows, the horse starves” (3.2.345). Hamlet 
interrupts himself when referring to this proverb that incentivizes immediate action. I believe that 
Hamlet’s use of aposiopesis here is a manifestation of his disgust toward and suppression of the 
urge for immediate vengeance that is troubling him.22 
But before turning to Hamlet and Claudius’s rhetoric, with reference to Wilson’s Art of 
Rhetoric (particularly because of the inclusion of extended examples for the different types of 
																																								 																				
22 I will revisit the applications of the figure aposiopesis in the final chapter when discussing 
King Lear’s irresponsibility. 
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amplification), I will analyze the mechanism the orator may use to dignify or disgrace a topic. In 
addition to the features that I have already noted, we will see that the systems of valuation set up 
by paradiastolic and meiotic expatiation have different understanding of concepts closely tied to 
morality, such as responsibility and punishment. 
Moral amplification plays an essential role in the education of the orator during the 
Renaissance. But every instruction in treatises of rhetoric is but a formulized manner of thought. 
Moral interpretation is not merely a tool for rhetorical persuasion. Whether an innate tendency or 
an acquired habit, it is a way of thinking. In the second section, I will show how Shakespeare 
dramatizes the conflict that arises from the collision of these two modes of moral amplification 
in Hamlet. The king and the prince are doomed to be at odds with one another because they 
embody irreconcilable moral perspectives. 
 
PRIDE AND REPUTATION 
“Praise,” writes Francis Bacon, “is the Reflection of Vertue: But it is as the Glasse or 
Bodie which giveth the Reflection” (“Of Praise” 157). One point is immediately obvious in 
Bacon’s definition: putting aside the object of praise, praise is a reflection, a pleasant, acceptable 
repetition. A question arises here: If virtue is already that which that is praiseworthy, why does it 
need to be praised again? To be merely a pleasant repetition of something that is already pleasant 
would contradict the essential function of praise, which, as Bacon states, “giveth” pleasantness to 
its object. Looking at it from a different angle, the question may be asked thus: What is virtue 
without praise? How can virtue be the external object of which praise is a reflection, which 
praise reflects, if it does not exist if there is no praise? Putting aside virtue, we are still able to 
comprehend praise. But putting aside praise, virtue is inconceivable. Virtue cannot exist prior to 
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praise. What stands before the mirror of praise is not virtue; virtue is what the mirror shows. The 
pleasant repetition of praise is the making of virtue. “Praise is the Reflection of Vertue”—
reflection in the sense of repetition, but also in the sense of conception. Praise is a mode of 
reflection, a mode of thinking, a mode of image-making, that creates virtue. There is yet another 
sense of reflection that we must consider in Bacon’s definition: virtue, the pleasant and artificial 
image in the mirror of praise, must be the reverse of what it reflects. What virtue reflects cannot 
be artificial. Nor can it be pleasant (or unpleasant). What praise molds into virtue is indifferent 
nature. Changing the nature of nature, this human artifact is an exalted lie about nature for 
nature. To narrow down nature, which is loaded with very different connotations, we must take 
into account that virtue is concerned with human characteristics—Bacon writes that praise deals 
with “a Man’s selfe” or “a Man’s Office or Profession” (158). We must, accordingly, take nature 
to refer to human nature. Thus, to paraphrase Bacon’s definition, praise is the recognizing of 
human nature pleasantly, praise is the making known of human nature framed as an ask for its 
acceptance. Holding up a mirror to human nature, those who praise, the makers of virtue, are 
apologists for human nature. 
Praise, therefore, a form of amplification, is an affirmative attitude toward what is (in 
human nature). Praise is an amplification of nature in the sense that it makes the most (out) of 
nature. It is beyond the scope of this study to determine whether that which is praised is in the 
essence of being human or acquired as a habit. I am not interested, in other words, in the 
naturalness or artificiality of the human characteristic itself, in whether it is nature or second 
nature. What I am interested in is that from praise ensues a palatable rendition of a human 
characteristic that exists and is noticeably repeated. It is the existence and repetition of this 
particular characteristic that praise recognizes and instructs us to embrace. More specifically, I 
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am interested in the process of praise, the rhetorical process of recognition and instruction to 
embrace, which I will trace in Wilson’s Art of Rhetoric. I will show that it is not that praise 
constructs virtue and dispraise vice. No virtue can emerge without its attending vice, and no vice 
without its virtue. Praise and dispraise are two different attitudes, two different systems of 
valuation, that propose their own virtue and vice. In praise, there is the vice that, through 
contrast, reinforces the significance of the virtue. And having identified how praise and dispraise 
operate, in the following section of the essay, I will show Shakespeare’s dramatic embodiment of 
these two attitudes in Hamlet. 
“Among all the figures of Rhetorique,” Wilson argues in the Second Book of his Art of 
Rhetoric, “there is no one that so much helpeth forward an Oration, and beautifieth the same with 
such delightfull ornaments, as doth amplification” (132). And the most effective kind of 
amplification, Wilson continues, is praise and dispraise. For praise, Wilson offers the 
“commending” of a person’s “lowlinesse” as example (133); and for dispraise, the “rebuk[ing]” 
of “backbiters and slaunderers” (133–34). We must take into account that the “lowlinesse” that is 
commended and the “euill tongue” that is rebuked are conspicuous qualities in the person being 
praised or dispraised. Thus, to amplify these qualities is to urge the person into a particular 
relation to the way he is. The amplification, a biased mirror, presents to the person under 
deliberation a partial view of himself. However, to understand the process of Wilson’s praise and 
dispraise, we must not content ourselves with the mere translation of “lowlinesse” into the more 
pleasant terms of “gentle behauiour” and “charitie,” and the display of the “poyson” of an “euill 
tongue” as worse than murdering and stealing. Nor must we think that these two examples are 
unrelated. 
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The main topic at issue in both of Wilson’s examples is “companie.” In question is our 
attitude toward our living together. An exercise in argumentum in utramque partem, what is to 
be decided here is the affirmation or negation of the communal nature of life. To affirm 
communality is not to cause communality, for it is already there—indifferent and ingrained. 
“Beastes and birdes” even, which are “without reason,” “shroude and … flocke together.” Nor is 
negating communality, needless to say, putting an end to it. Affirmation and negation are means 
of empowerment and ennoblement in that they separate those “endued” with reason from beasts 
and birds by assigning responsibility for what must be. And to assign responsibility, to turn what 
must be into a choice, entails reward and punishment. From affirmation and negation, 
accordingly, emerge two sets of virtue and vice. 
We are destined to live together. “Mortall man” is inevitably bound to others. Our destiny 
is boundedness. A destiny bounded to others, and a destiny bounded by mortality, by time. We 
are bound to temporarily live together. To praise this bind is to actively transform it into a 
“profitable” endeavour, to “declare at large how commendable and how profitable a thing gentle 
behauiour is.” To praise this bind is also to warn against loss: “How hatefull and how harmefull a 
proude disdainfull man is, and how beastly a nature he hath, that being but a man, thinketh 
himselfe better then any other man is.” We are bound for a temporary life of “lowlinesse.” No 
one is above another. No one is higher than another. And a “noble Gentleman” chooses to profit 
from his “lowlinesse,” from his equality with others. Active humility, humility that is willed, is 
profitable, whereas pride is harmful. But what is the profit? And what do the proud lose? Time. 
“[I]f lowlinesse and charitie maintaine life, what a beast is he that through hatred will purchase 
death?” The amplification of “lowlinesse” into “gentle behauiour” amplifies life. Friendliness 
actively pursued extends life; hostility shortens it. Virtue in praise is the transformation of a 
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must-be into an ought-to-be, and its reward is a brief extension of life. The most profound must-
be, therefore, is mortality. Praise briefly delays death. In this particular instance of praise, it is 
the acceptance of our “lowlinesse” (that is: our togetherness and equality) that promises a better 
and longer life. 
The virtue of humility, therefore, is slightly vicious. It requires a small amount of self-
acceptance. The acceptance of one’s “lowlinesse” is still self-acceptance. And if one has the 
choice to slightly transgress in order to be virtuous, one has also the choice to transgress 
excessively. The proud are those who choose to overindulge in self-acceptance. From the point 
of view of the humble, overindulgence in self-acceptance is a turning against one’s community. 
The non-compliant (that is: the excessively vicious) are like sheep or cattle that “stray,” that 
“striue one against an other.” Set against friendly co-operation, hostile competition is marked by 
lack of restraint. The vice in praise is an extreme state of the virtue. The proud, consequently, 
“will purchase death” and are “worthie the vilest death of all.” Etymologically meaning to run 
after, to hunt, to chase, the word purchase also connotes responsibility. Consider Shakespeare’s 
use of the word in Antony and Cleopatra. To appease the irate Octavius and in response to his 
claim that Mark Antony is “th’abstract of all faults / That all men follow,” Lepidus says: 
I must not think there are 
Evils enough to darken all his goodness. 
His faults in him seem as the spots of heaven, 
More fiery by night’s blackness—hereditary, 
Rather than purchased, what he cannot change, 
Than what he chooses. (1.4.9–15) 
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Not a hereditary must-be, what is purchased is chosen. Thus, according to the humble, the choice 
of the proud—their hostility to their community—not only precipitates death but deserves “the 
vilest death of all” as punishment. With the virtue of humility comes the desire to strike down the 
proud—the “Dogges” ready to bite the sheep or cattle that “stray,” that “striue one against an 
other.” 
The skilled orator should also be competent at finding fault with this envious insistence 
on togetherness and equality. From the dispraise of “companie” stems a new value: reputation, “a 
mans good name.” But notice that in dispraise, Wilson starts with the censure of his audience, 
the censure of a particular tendency in the audience, whereas praise starts with acceptance. 
Dispraise is censuring recognition, a censuring mirror to human nature: “[I]f you would rebuke 
one that giueth eare to backbiters and slaunderers, you must declare what a great mischiefe an 
euill tongue is, what a poyson it is, yea, what a murder to take a mans good name form him.” The 
envious insistence on togetherness and equality, a virtue in the previous example, is no longer 
presented positively; here, it is meiotically translated as verbal attack against others, as the 
poisonous tongue that sullies the reputation of others. Notice also that the verbal act of dispraise 
is itself a form of verbal attack. The dispraise assumes the form of its referent. The orator, in 
other words, is as self-critical as he is critical of others in that he shares the unacceptable 
tendency. But what distinguishes the orator from his audience is his critical awareness. The 
dispraise contains the acknowledgement of the viciousness—the “poyson”—of his and their 
tendency. In dispraise, there is condescension. The orator is and is not like his audience. His 
dispraise unites and separates: criticism functions simultaneously as (self-)belittling 
identification and drive for distinction. The orator exemplifies virtue thus: like his audience, the 
orator “seeketh to obscure and darken” the “estimation” of others; but he holds his audience 
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responsible (and deserving “worthie death”) for not adopting his critical stance, for not choosing 
to be otherwise. The pride of those with a good name is rooted in their choice to be otherwise, in 
their unwillingness to be their envious selves. While in the previous example, the virtuous are 
torn between friendliness and envy; in this example, they are torn between self-contempt and 
distinction. The reputable have their critical weapon turned toward themselves, for a man’s good 
reputation depends on his constant negation of the “euill tongue” of his own envy. Dispraise is 
the translation of a must-be into an ought-not-to-be. The depreciating image in the mirror of 
dispraise incites a turning away from the self. The dispraise asks for an averting from and 
aversion to the self, the pursuit of which hopes to proudly achieve a total riddance of the vicious 
self. Finally, the orator amplifies his argument by presenting the “euill tongue” that steals our 
good name as worse than the thief that steals our purse and the murderer that steals our life. The 
dispraise hopes to inoculate its audience against loss—ironically, through the loss of the self. 
In sum, the virtues of maintaining friendly relations and maintaining an enduring 
respectable reputation are two different renditions of the same property of life. As is now 
evident, dispraise develops from a shift in perspective in praise. The chidden in praise are able to 
transform their state into a praiseworthy endeavour. The vice of pride in one becomes the virtue 
of a good name in the other. Shakespeare’s Iago, in the prime of his scheming, makes use of this 
particular instance of argument on both sides of a case. Needing Cassio to execute his plot, Iago 
urges him to reconcile with Othello. To goad Cassio to re-establish friendly relations with the 
general—“to recover the general again” (2.3.249)—Iago argues against the importance of 
reputation: “Reputation is an idle and most false imposition, oft got without merit and lost 
without deserving” (246–47). Reputation has the “most false” appearance of permanence. Later, 
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however, to excite the violent jealousy of proud Othello, Iago speaks of the importance of 
reputation: 
Good name in man and woman, dear my lord, 
Is the immediate jewel of their souls. 
Who steals my purse, steals trash: ’tis something, nothing; 
’Twas mine, ’tis his, and has been slave to thousands. 
But he that filches from me my good name 
Robs me of that which not enriches him 
And makes me poor indeed. (3.3.154–60) 
This time, Iago distinguishes reputation, the “jewel” of the soul, from impermanent “trash.” This 
is an example of deceptive persuasion by means of praise and dispraise. With sinister purposes, 
Iago is able to shift from one perspective to another.23 But Shakespeare’s Hamlet, as I will 
demonstrate in the following section, is one whose mode of thinking is dominated by dispraise. 
																																								 																				
23 With regard to Iago’s unsettling ability to argue in utramque partem, Emily Donahoe, in “In 
Utramque Partem: Arguing Both Sides of the Question in Othello,” writes: 
While rhetoric primarily provides Othello with a pleasing, ornamented style of speech, it 
is, for Iago, a malleable medium that allows him to think and speak in many different 
voices. Though Iago’s speech is not, like Othello’s, ornamental, not apparently rhetorical, 
he possesses the ability to speak spontaneously and persuasively on any subject, to see all 
sides of an issue at once, arguing both sides of any question. (320–21) 
Donahoe argues that the main cause of Othello’s downfall is his inability to perform the 




In Act 1, Scene 4, waiting for the Ghost to appear, and hearing the “kettledrum and 
trumpet … bray out” (11), Hamlet and Horatio engage in a conversation regarding the custom of 
excessive drinking in Denmark. Hamlet describes the custom thus: 
But to my mind, though I am native here 
And to the manner born, it is a custom 
More honored in the breach than the observance. 
This heavy-headed revel east and west 
Makes us traduced and taxed of other nations: 
They clepe us drunkards and with swinish phrase 
Soil our addition, and indeed it takes 
From our achievements, though performed at height, 
The pith and marrow of our attribute. 
																																								 																				
in simple, confident declaratives and imperatives” (322), Othello lacks the mental habit of taking 
into account different possibilities. “Othello’s incomplete understanding of rhetoric,” Donahoe 
concludes, “leaves him vulnerable to the invisible, unadorned rhetoric of Iago” (328). Moreover, 
Donahoe points out that among Shakespeare’s plays, Othello “contain[s] the highest number and 
proportion of question marks, with a question mark roughly every six or seven lines,” which is 
another indication that the central theme of this tragedy is doubt (314). It is indeed ironic that a 
play deeply engaged with the rhetorical art of questioning presents a protagonist who lacks this 
art. 
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So oft it chances in particular men 
That for some vicious mole of nature in them, 
As in their birth wherein they are not guilty— 
Since nature cannot choose his origin— 
By the o’er-growth of some complexion 
Oft breaking down the pales and forts of reason, 
Or by some habit that too much o’er-leavens 
The form of plausive manners—that these men, 
Carrying, I say, the stamp of one defect— 
Being nature’s livery or fortune’s star— 
His virtues else, be they as pure as grace, 
As infinite as man may undergo, 
Shall in the general censure take corruption 
From that particular fault: the dram of eale 
Doth all the noble substance of a doubt 
To his own scandal. (14–38) 
Hamlet’s objection to this “native” custom, which is interrupted by the Ghost’s entrance, consists 
of three parts. First, he proposes that although he himself is “to the manner born,” the “breach” 
of the custom is more honourable than its “observance.” Next, the reason for this sober 
denunciation is that the Danes are “traduced and taxed” by “other nations” “east and west” for 
being “swinish” “drunkards,” regardless of the “height” of any “achievements.” Finally, to 
strengthen his argument, he compares the Danes, who observe this custom, to those whose 
virtues, “be they as pure as grace, / As infinite as man may undergo,” due to “some vicious mole 
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of nature” or “some habit that too much o’er-leavens / The form of plausive manners,” are “in 
the general censure” overlooked because of that “dram of eale.” Whether a natural “mole” or an 
acquired “habit”—that is, whether the work of “nature” or “fortune”—this custom is a “scandal” 
to which “all the noble substance” pales in comparison. 
In the course of translating this custom into a vice, Hamlet establishes an opposition 
between the ignorant “observance” of the custom and its sensible “breach.” Danish “heavy-
headed revel” is meiotically reproached. The meiosis of the custom, then, entails the meiosis of 
those who, though “not guilty,” carry the “stamp” of this “defect.” The condescending meiosis of 
those who are fated (by “nature” or “fortune”) to be shackled to the custom but choose not to 
pine for release from it, then, leads to the praise of those who find fault with the custom and 
honour its infraction. The implication of Hamlet’s meiotic translation is that virtue consists of not 
only the repudiation of the custom but the repudiation of himself. In Hamlet’s critical reasoning, 
the Danish are rendered liable for a custom into which they are born (“nature cannot choose his 
origin”), a custom to which Hamlet himself is subject. Incidentally, two scenes earlier, in their 
first encounter in the play, glad to see Horatio, Hamlet offers to “teach” his friend how to drink 
like a Dane (1.2.175). And at the end of the play, Claudius’s fatal plot with Laertes to eliminate 
Hamlet relies on his certainty that Hamlet drinks: 
When in your motion you are hot and dry, 
As make your bouts more violent to that end, 
And that he calls for drink, I’ll have prepared him 
A chalice for the nonce whereon but sipping, 
If he by chance escape your venomed stuck, 
Our purpose may hold there. (4.4.156–61) 
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His moral reflection on this custom, then, does not mean that he does partake. It only means that 
he does so unwillingly. 
Hamlet sets himself apart by his proud unwillingness. That is to say, he distinguishes 
himself from the rest of Denmark by his desire to reason himself out of his “native” custom. To 
do so, he must desire to be a non-Dane, he must desire not be his Danish self. In Hamlet’s critical 
reasoning, the reason for his disapproval of the Danish custom is the non-Danish disapproval of 
it “east and west.” Concerned with their reputation abroad, Hamlet sides with “the general 
censure” from beyond the borders of Denmark. The Danish lack Hamlet’s reasoning, which is a 
criticism, from within and without, of their custom. Not only the blind adherence to the custom 
but the custom itself (Hamlet is after all discussing the effects of excessive drinking) are 
responsible for “breaking down the pales and forts of reason” in Denmark. Hamlet holds the 
Danish accountable for the custom and its effect: lack of reason, not being critical of their own 
custom. In Hamlet’s critical reasoning, therefore, reason is criticism. Reason is praiseworthy 
meiosis. Hamlet, on one hand, for not being able to “choose his origin,” identifies with his fellow 
countrymen in being born into this shameful custom; but on the other, he separates himself from 
them in joining “other nations” in denigrating his “native” custom. At this point, he is and is not 
a Dane.24 Finding himself incapable of priding himself on the unreasonable ways of his country, 
																																								 																				
24 In “Wonder and Nostalgia in Hamlet” Judith Anderson remarks that “the home Hamlet 
recognizes and for which he is nostalgic in a positive way is Wittenberg, not Denmark. His 
disaffection from Denmark is evident in his distressed relation to his current family; his criticism 
of Danish customs, including the celebratory toasting that is endemic in Nordic culture; and in 
his explicit desire to return ‘to school in Wittenberg’” (364). 
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he prides himself on his reasonable indignation at them. In contrast to his confident declaration 
in the concluding Act of the play, “This is I, Hamlet the Dane” (5.1.236–37), in the opening Act, 
Hamlet finds honour in being ashamed of being a Dane. Virtue, therefore, according to Hamlet, 
is the reasonable but impossible escape from himself. Reasonable though it may be, virtue is the 
impossible wish to not be himself. 
We must take into account Hamlet’s meiotic repetitions of this one custom: “vicious 
mole,” “defect,” “fault,” and “dram of eale.” He is truly disturbed by a single vice that would 
corrupt the reputation of the whole nation. Hamlet seeks a pure and uncorrupted name. Like 
Brutus in Julius Caesar, Hamlet desires an honourable, immaculate name. He seeks for himself 
and Denmark a state of virtue. Hamlet’s moral reflection on the custom of drinking can be 
viewed as a sign of his pursuit of purity, cleanliness, and righteousness: “The time is out of joint: 
oh, cursed spite / That ever I was born to set it right” (1.5.189–90). Upon his return, he finds 
Denmark “out of joint” and believes it his noble duty to “set it right.” And the means to achieve 
this state of purity is meiotic shame. Shameful awareness of one’s instincts and habits, he 
believes, will lead to self-control. Hamlet’s nobility is founded on such self-awareness and self-
control. 
To get a clearer idea of the process of Hamlet’s honourable shaming of the Danish 
custom, it is worth going over an earlier conversation he has with Claudius and Gertrude. Scene 
2 begins with Claudius’s speech regarding his replacement of Old Hamlet. The speech that 
Stephen Greenblatt, in Shakespeare’s Freedom, describes as “businesslike, confident, decisive, 
careful, and politically astute” (80). Claudius, according to Greenblatt, is Shakespeare’s example 
of “genuine skills at governance” (80). To ensure a smooth transition of power, Claudius claims 
ownership of Old Hamlet’s Queen and lands. Claudius’s political move is mainly aimed at those 
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“Holding a weak supposal of our worth / Or thinking by our late dear brother’s death / Our state 
to be disjoint and out of frame” (1.2.18–20). Claudius does not only have Norway’s young 
Fortinbras in mind. To secure his authority, he must reckon with two disgruntled princes. To 
disarm the aggrieved Fortinbras, Claudius reminds Norway of the “bands of law” (24). With the 
“delated articles” (38) of his letter to the king of Norway, Claudius asks for recognition and the 
removal of the threat that Fortinbras is posing. 
And to disarm the aggrieved Hamlet, whom he now refers to as his own “son” (64), 
Claudius promises him that his time to rule Denmark will come: 
We pray you throw to earth 
This unprevailing woe and think of us 
As of a father, for let the world take note 
You are the most immediate to our throne, 
And with no less nobility of love 
Than that which dearest father bears his son 
Do I impart toward you. (106–12) 
Claudius’s speech is a demand for acceptance, the acceptance of his kingship, which he finds 
challenged from within and without.25 The new King establishes an opposition between those 
who “freely” (15) welcome his authority and those who “pester” (22) it. He has “thanks” (16) for 
the former. With the latter, he must reason. Whereas for Hamlet, reason is criticism from within 
																																								 																				
25 Focusing on the King’s marriage to his brother’s wife, McDonald writes that Claudius 
“calculates his balances, contrasts, pairings, rhythmic alignments, and aural polish to make his 
questionable marriage more acceptable to the Danish court” (45). 
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and without, for Claudius, reason, which relies on contractual laws and promises, is a response to 
“peevish opposition” (100); it is the disarmament of criticism from within and without. Whereas 
for Hamlet, reason is criticizing those who do not criticize, for Claudius, it is criticizing those 
who do: “Fie, ’tis a fault to heaven, / A fault against the dead, a fault to nature, / To reason most 
absurd” (101–03). For Claudius, reason is to fault reason and expose its absurdity. Despite all of 
his efforts to steer clear of criticism, Claudius must still criticize criticism (from without). 
Affirmation is not free from negation, for it negates opposition in its wake. Demand for 
acceptance is unreasonable in the sense that it pays no heed to reason, but also in the sense that it 
reasons itself out of being reasoned against. Virtue, according to the King, is the unquestioning 
acceptance of his authority (“gentle and unforced accord” [123]), which then questions away 
those who question it. According to the “peevish” Prince, on the other hand, virtue emerges from 
questioning authority (the authority of a custom, for example). And this is Claudius’s greatest 
weakness: in his pursuit of power, he contends with the opposition using a weapon of which he 
does not approve and with which he is not as familiar as his opponent, for it is Hamlet who has 
reason on his side. 
In contrast to Hamlet’s private broodings, Claudius confidently and publicly presents his 
authority to Hamlet as possessing the certainty and inevitability of a law of nature, the same law 
of nature that is disturbing Hamlet: “your father lost a father, / That father lost, lost his” (89–90). 
On the surface, the speech portrays a concerned uncle consoling a mourning nephew. But 
Claudius employs the necessity of coming to terms with the “common theme” of the “death of 
fathers” (103–04) so as to enforce the necessity of coming to terms with his kingship. Claudius 
presents his kingship as destined as the natural rule of death. His attitude toward his rule is: “This 
must be so” (106). According to himself, in other words, Claudius is not responsible for his 
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kingship, for it has been dictated by fate. What Claudius is responsible for is making the most of 
this opportunity (by claiming ownership of Old Hamlet’s Queen, lands, and even son). And it is 
the responsibility of those within and without Denmark to accept his kingship, for whom he has 
“thanks.” Furthermore, to reaffirm his position, the new King resists the resistance—those who 
choose not to submit. Who would question the ineluctability of mortality? “A heart unfortified or 
mind impatient, / An understanding simple and unschooled” (96–97). Who, accordingly, would 
challenge Claudius’s rule, which “must be and is as common” (98) as death? Only “a will most 
incorrect to heaven” (95). Only Hamlet, who chooses “obstinate condolement” (93) over 
acceptance. 
In alliance with the new King, Gertrude presents a similar argument to her 
unaccommodating son: 
Good Hamlet, cast thy nighted color off 
And let thine eye look like a friend on Denmark. 
Do not forever with thy veiled lids 
Seek for thy noble father in the dust— 
Thou know’st ’tis common, all that lives must die, 
Passing through nature to eternity. (68–73) 
Gertrude’s “Denmark” refers to Claudius. It also refers to the whole of Denmark, which has 
yielded to Claudius.26 Being a “friend” to Denmark is not only being like the “common” Dane, 
acquiescent and unprotesting, in accepting Claudius’s replacement of Old Hamlet, but also as 
																																								 																				
26 Recall that Hamlet’s speech on Denmark’s custom of drinking starts as a condemnation of the 
King’s “wassail” (1.4.9), and then expands into the condemnation of the whole of Denmark. 
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“common” as the fact that “all that lives must die.” Gertrude’s “common,” like Claudius’s 
“common,” implies compliance with what is fated to be. “If it be,” Gertrude then asks, “Why 
seems it so particular with thee?” (1.2.74–75). To question—more specifically, to question with 
why—is to suggest responsibility.27 Gertrude’s question intimates that Hamlet has control over 
his “nighted color” and “veiled lids,” that Hamlet possesses the autonomy to choose between 
“look[ing] like” the “common” and “seem[ing]” “particular.” Gertrude’s question rebukes 
Hamlet for choosing the latter. Hamlet, in response, objects not so much to the “common” but 
rather to possessing the power not to object to the “common”: “Nay, it is. I know not ‘seems’” 
(76). He is as powerless to “cast … off” being “particular” as he is to “seem” “particular.” 
Hamlet is “particular.” As Harold Rosenberg puts it in The Tradition of the New, Hamlet “thinks 
too much not because he is an intellectual but because it is impossible for him to do anything 
else” (147). 
There are further distinctions between Hamlet and Claudius’s ways of thinking. In 
Hamlet’s speech regarding the custom that rules over Denmark, to dignify the “breach” of the 
custom and “soil” its “observance,” Hamlet moves from the criticism of its “observance” to the 
praise of its “breach.” Only after criticizing an unreasonable vice does he praise a reasonable 
virtue. Hamlet’s thinking begins with (self-)accusation.28 In Claudius’s speech regarding his own 
																																								 																				
27 Recall Claudius’s question: “what we know must be and is as common / As any the most 
vulgar thing to sense, / Why should we in our peevish opposition / Take it to heart?” (1.2.98–
101). 
28 Northrop Frye, in his lecture notes on the play, observes that “Hamlet’s views of Polonius, of 
his mother’s sin in marrying Claudius, of the treachery of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, while 
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rule over Denmark, however, Claudius moves from the praise of those who “have freely gone / 
With this affair along” (1.2.15–16) to the criticism of those whose “stubbornness” is “impious,” 
“unmanly,” and “incorrect” (94–95). Here, the “unmanly” vice is subsequent to the virtue. In 
one, the construction of vice comes first, in the other, second. Claudius’s disapproval of the 
opposition within and without functions as reassertion of his royal status. For Claudius, 
criticism—as the negation of internal and external negation—serves as a secondary affirmation 
of himself.29 
Moreover, Claudius’s argument (like that of Gertrude) rests on the law of nature that “all 
that lives must die.” Reference to this property of life implies that since death is inevitable, since 
life is ephemeral, it behooves one not to become attached to what lives and dies. Hamlet is 
implored to put an end to his mourning and let go of his pointless longing for his dead father “in 
the dust.” Impermanence being the premise of the argument, detachment is its prescriptive 
conclusion. 
The detachment that Claudius advocates requires further analysis, especially in its 
relationship with his demand for acceptance. This problem should be looked at from two angles: 
the new King’s expectation of the Danes (and non-Danes) and his own attitude toward his 
																																								 																				
they may often be reasonably close to what we’re likely to accept, are surcharged with Hamlet’s 
melancholy—that is, they’re sick. He sees what’s there, but there’s an emotional excess in his 
perception that’s reflected back to him” (83). 
29 Frye argues that “except for his crime,” Claudius is “healthy”; and “even with his cause,” 
Hamlet is “sick” (93). Also, it is worth mentioning that Frye sees Claudius’s crime as the reason 
for his excessive drinking (93). 
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temporary rule. Claudius claims that it is “incorrect” to become emotionally connected to what is 
known to have a transient existence. He even acknowledges the fact that his time to rule will run 
its course and come to an end (and the young Prince is “the most immediate” to the throne). Yet, 
his status as King is necessarily accompanied with the obligation that all of Denmark be 
dependent on him. What is more, later in the play, in his confessional soliloquy, Claudius 
bemoans that he is unable to pray for forgiveness because he is not willing to part with the 
rewards of his crime: 
Whereto serves mercy 
But to confront the visage of offence? 
And what’s in prayer but this twofold force, 
To be forestalled ere we come to fall, 
Or pardon’d being down? Then I’ll look up. 
My fault is past, but, oh, what form of prayer 
Can serve my turn? Forgive me my foul murder? 
That cannot be, since I am still possessed 
Of those effects for which I did the murder— 
My crown, mine own ambition, and my queen. 
May one be pardoned and retain th’offense?30 (3.3.46–56) 
																																								 																				
30 With regard to this speech, Peter Mack, in “Learning and Transforming Conventional 
Wisdom,” writes that Claudius “amplifies the power of grace by presenting pictures of the depth 
of bloodguilt and the radiance of heaven’s cleansing. But then he imagines what he would say 
and realizes that it will not suffice” (442). Through this amplification, Mack argues, Claudius 
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The problem can be stated thus: How does one “freely” submit to what one does not become 
attached to? It is not that detachment from what is transient cancels out submission to it. On the 
contrary, detachment from what is transient allows for transient submission to it. Such 
detachment, then, is not the same as resignation. It is the acceptance of impermanence. Thus, 
asking Denmark to come to terms with the termination of Old Hamlet’s rule (and life), Claudius 
necessarily suggests the eventual termination of his own rule. Only by asking Denmark not to 
become permanently attached to him is it possible for him to ask for recognition. The acceptance 
that Claudius demands presupposes its own transience. The demand for the acceptance of the 
newly appointed King, that is to say, is necessarily accompanied with the law of replaceability, 
which works for and against the new King. 
In the sphere of politics, this is a recurring theme in Shakespeare’s tragedies. Political 
figures are enraged at the fickleness of the public. Coriolanus, for instance, considers this aspect 
of the commoners as their most obnoxious quality: “With every minute you do change a mind / 
And call him noble that was now your hate, / Him vile that was your garland” (1.1.173–75). 
Julius Caesar begins with the tribunes berating the plebeians for having forgotten Pompey 
(“Knew you not Pompey?” [1.1.36]) and celebrating Julius Caesar’s ascent to power. And in 
Antony and Cleopatra, Mark Antony is furious that the “slippery” (1.2.180) plebeians, in 
memory of Pompey, have started to support his son. Outside of politics, in Othello, Shakespeare 
amplifies this theme at length in a domestic setting. What devastates Desdemona’s father and 
then husband is their inability to accept that Desdemona does not belong to either of them—what 
																																								 																				
confronts a paradox: “He knows that he needs to be forgiven, yet he cannot fulfil the requirement 
of repentance in order to be in a position to ask for forgiveness” (442). 
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Burke describes as “manly miserliness” (“Othello” 166). The slipping away of Desdemona from 
the clutch of the father and husband’s desire to possess indefinitely is meiotically translated as 
infidelity. Angry at the loss of her daughter to Othello, Desdemona’s father warns the son-in-
law: “Look to her, Moor, if thou hast eyes to see: / She has deceived her father, and may thee” 
(1.3.289–90). And later Iago makes reference to this statement in order to stir Othello’s sense of 
possessiveness (3.3.204). In turn, Othello expresses his anger: “O curse of marriage, / That we 
can call these delicate creatures ours / And not their appetites” (266–68). Othello’s anger, like 
that of the Roman politicians, is frustration at inevitable loss, frustration at impermanence. 
Hamlet feels the same way about Denmark’s acceptance of the replacement of his father. 
Claudius and Gertrude’s uneasiness with Hamlet is his prolonged mourning. His long speeches 
throughout the play are another symptom of his tendency to fixate. Slavoj Žižek writes that this 
tragedy is Shakespeare’s “ultimate play about obsession” (How to Read Lacan 35). “’Tis sweet 
and commendable in your nature,” Claudius tells Hamlet, “To give these mourning duties to your 
father” (1.2.87–88). Hamlet, according to his uncle, is “bound / In filial obligation for some term 
/ To do obsequious sorrow” (90–92). But he is not to “persever / In obstinate condolement” (92–
93). “Do not forever,” Gertrude similarly admonishes her son, “Seek for thy noble father in the 
dust.” And this is the danger that Hamlet faces. He must be careful not to allow his meiotic 
tendencies to stop being an active pursuit. He must be careful not to become either obsessive or 
indifferent. 
Even before confronting the Ghost, even before being presented with the thought of his 
father being murdered secretly, Hamlet is deeply worried about the corruption that has taken 
over Denmark. Hamlet’s fate, being critically particular, being particularly critical, is sealed 
despite the revelation of the Ghost, not because of it. As Claudius is fated to be King, Hamlet is 
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fated to defy him—“The time is out of joint: oh, cursed spite / That ever I was born to set it 
right” (1.5.189–90). The “breach” of Claudius’s rule, that is to say, is as determined as its 
“observance.” The Ghost only encourages Hamlet’s hidden drive by offering him (questionable) 
grounds for his questioning nature. Why else would Hamlet interrupt the Ghost—exactly when it 
accuses Claudius—with “Oh, my prophetic soul!” (1.5.41)? And why else, after its departure, 
would Hamlet agree with Horatio’s observation, “There needs no ghost, my lord, come from the 
grave / To tell us this” (127–28)? 
Unlike Denmark, Hamlet is not capable of short-term mourning. That is, unlike Denmark, 
Hamlet is not capable of turning a blind eye to corruption. The description of his grief over the 
death of his father to his mother is worth examining: 
’Tis not alone my inky cloak, cold mother, 
Nor customary suits of solemn black, 
Nor windy suspiration of forced breath, 
No, nor the fruitful river in the eye, 
Nor the dejected ’havior of the visage, 
Together with all forms, modes, shapes of grief 
That can denote me truly. These indeed seem, 
For they are actions that a man might play, 
But I have that within which passes show— 
These but the trappings and the suits of woe. (1.2.77–86) 
The exterior, superficial “forms, modes, shapes,” of mourning his father are but a “show,” a 
synecdochic manifestation of an unexplainable “woe” “within.” Hamlet is, in the words of Lynn 
Enterline in Shakespeare’s Schoolroom, “plagued” by his “limitations,” by “his inability to find 
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words adequate” to describe his “woe” (127). Moreover, here, there is a subtle attack against 
Denmark’s insincere “show” of mourning—insincere in that it has come to an end. As Bruce 
Danner observes, “In this strained insistence on his own sincerity, Hamlet employs the topos of 
inexpressibility to elevate his mourning, even as his dismissal of its exterior form constitutes a 
veiled contempt for the courtiers’ ‘show’ of mourning, quickly abandoned after the marriage” 
(“Speaking Daggers” 31). Submitting to Claudius’s demand for acceptance would require 
Hamlet to accept a corrupt Denmark, which is not in the particular prince’s nature. 
More grievous, outside of politics, is Hamlet’s deep disgust at his mother’s fickleness. 
Hamlet is more particular about the relation between being in mourning and being “particular” in 
his first soliloquy (1.2.129–59), which is articulated immediately before Horatio approaches him 
to inform him of the Ghost. The soliloquy is an approbation of his “excellent” father and an 
opprobrium of the “wicked speed” of his mother’s “incestuous” replacement of his father with 
someone as unworthy as Claudius (“she … married with my uncle, / My father’s brother, but no 
more like my father / Than I to Hercules”). Hamlet is obsessed with the irreplaceability of his 
father and furious at Gertrude and Claudius’s audacity to attempt to replace him. In Janet 
Adelman’s words in Suffocating Mothers, Hamlet is disturbed by his mother’s “undiscriminating 
sexuality” (13), her “indifferent voraciousness” (20). The “unrighteous” Gertrude is worse than 
the “beast that wants discourse of reason” because, rather than mourning “longer,” she chooses 
to still find an “appetite” for the “uses” of this “unweeded garden.” As Tanya Pollard observes, 
Gertrude’s “insufficient mourning” is “one of Hamlet’s most vehement fixations” (“What’s 
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Hecuba to Shakespeare?” 1079).31 One respect in which Hamlet differs from Othello is that the 
former complicates the theme of impermanence with incest. The meticulously righteous Hamlet 
is not so much disturbed by his mother’s “undiscriminating” and “indifferent” lust as her 
incestuous lust. The thought that Gertrude, in order to maintain her status as queen, would marry 
any man that would be king disturbs Hamlet, especially since he desires the throne himself. 
Hamlet’s political ambitions aside, he now associates the crown with incest.32 
Another clear example of Hamlet practicing meiotic shaming for the purpose of moral 
purity occurs when he approaches his mother in Act 3, Scene 4. Here, he demands that Gertrude 
look into a “glass” to observe her “inmost part” (19–20). In Julius Caesar, Cassius uses the 
																																								 																				
31 Jacques Lacan, in his essay “Desire and the Interpretation of Desire in Hamlet,” argues that 
Gertrude’s desire, her “instinctive voracity,” which prevents her from choosing between Old 
Hamlet and Claudius, manifests itself in Hamlet: “This desire, of the mother, is essentially 
manifested in the fact that, confronted on one hand with an eminent, idealized, exalted object—
his father—and on the other with the degraded, despicable object Claudius, the criminal and 
adulterous brother, Hamlet does not choose” (12). 
32 Perhaps it would have been easier for Hamlet to accept Claudius’s kingship had Claudius not 
attempted to replace Old Hamlet by taking the place of Gertrude’s husband and Hamlet’s father. 
Perhaps Hamlet would have respected Claudius more had Claudius attempted to become a self-
sufficient, independent king. It is an extremely difficult task for Hamlet to step out from his 
father’s shadow, especially because they share the same name. Hamlet despises his uncle 
because, even in the absence of this difficulty, Claudius chooses to literally take the place of his 
brother. 
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“glass” (1.2.68) differently. Cassius encourages Brutus to see the “shadow” of his “hidden 
worthiness” (57–58). But Hamlet wants to show Gertrude the “black and grieved spots” of her 
“soul” (3.4.89–90). Hamlet believes he must instill a sense of shame in her to prevent her from 
committing more sin.33 To “live the purer” (159), Hamlet instructs his mother to let shame take 
over her “heart” (157) through repetition: 
Assume a virtue if you have it not. 
That monster custom, who all sense doth eat, 
Of habits devil, is angel yet in this, 
That to the use of actions fair and good 
He likewise gives a frock or livery 
																																								 																				
33 In his essay “Introduction to These Paintings,” D. H. Lawrence contends that Hamlet’s horror 
is a manifestation of the English Renaissance horror of sexual life. “The real ‘mortal coil’ in 
Hamlet,” writes Lawrence “is all sexual” (185). “Hamlet is overpowered by horrible revulsion 
from his physical connection with his mother, which makes him recoil in similar revulsion from 
Ophelia, and almost from his father even as a ghost” (186). And this horror is rooted in the 
Elizabethan “overmastering fear” of syphilis and its consequences. Syphilis, or the pox, “entered 
the blood of the nation, particularly of the upper classes, who had more chance of infection. And 
after it had entered the blood, it entered the consciousness, and it hit the vital imagination” (187). 
It was not only the horrible disease that frightened the period but the possibility of its 
transmission from fathers. “I am certain,” Lawrence argues, “that some of Shakespeare’s father-
murder complex, some of Hamlet’s horror of his mother, of his uncle, of all old men came from 
the feeling that fathers may transmit syphilis, or syphilis-consequences, to children” (189). 
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That aptly is put on. Refrain tonight, 
And that shall lend a kind of easiness 
To the next abstinence, the next more easy. 
For use almost can change the stamp of nature, 
And either lodge the devil, or throw him out 
With wondrous potency. (161–71) 
To “change the stamp of nature,” Hamlet encourages the repetition of “abstinence” motivated by 
a sense of shame. The repetition that Hamlet instructs is not simply a quantitative increase. This 
quantitative increase is accompanied with qualitative diminishment. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Virtue, for Hamlet, is a conscious act. And it requires the meiotic translation of “the 
stamp of nature.” Hamlet has a tendency to dispraise, a tendency to meiotically translate “all the 
uses of this world” as “weary, stale, flat, and unprofitable” (1.2.133–34). When he returns to 
Denmark, he is disappointed to find that the rest of Denmark do not share his disgust with 
corruption—his uncle’s greed and his mother’s lust are specially disgusting to him. This is why 
he shuns Ophelia and asks her to never marry or have children: 
Get thee to a nunnery! Why wouldst thou be a breeder of sinners? I am myself indifferent 
honest, but yet I could accuse me of such things that it were better my mother had not 
borne me. I am very proud, revengeful, ambitious, with more offences at my beck than I 
have thoughts to put them in, imagination to give them shape, or time to act them in. 
What should such fellows as I do crawling between earth and heaven? We are arrant 
knaves—believe none of us. Go thy ways to a nunnery. (3.1.119–27) 
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These words reveal that for Hamlet virtue is a conscious act. Although he is “indifferent honest,” 
he can never rid himself of his “proud, revengeful, ambitious” nature. Hamlet’s meiotic 
moralizing is a conscious strategy to delay his “proud, revengeful, ambitious” nature. Had he not 
been ambitious, he would not be, in the words of Ophelia, “the courtier’s, soldier’s, scholar’s 
eye, tongue, sword, / Th’expectation and rose of the fair state, / The glass of fashion and the 
mold of form, / Th’observed of all observers” (147–51). And he is fully aware that “virtue cannot 
so inoculate our old stock but we shall relish of it” (115–16). Unlike Iago, Hamlet does not 
believe that beneath the surface there is only ugliness. For Hamlet, virtue is the postponement of 
the passions beneath through an act of degrading them. And the passion that Hamlet struggles 
















The Craft of Virtue in Shakespeare’s Rome 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Cicero, the spokesman for Roman republicanism, opens his De Inventione by comparing 
the good and bad that results from the art of rhetoric, and concludes that the good outweighs the 
bad: “men of eloquence” cause “disasters,” to be sure, but eloquence has also founded cities, put 
out “the flames of a multitude of wars,” and established “the strongest alliances and most sacred 
friendships” (3). And as to the origin of rhetoric, Cicero refers to a time without law or order, 
when individuals relied chiefly on their “physical strength” (5). It was a man gifted with 
persuasion, Cicero surmises, that converted “wild savages into a kind and gentle folk”: “Men 
were scattered in the fields and hidden in sylvan retreats (silvestribus abditos) when he 
assembled and gathered them in accordance with a plan, he introduced them to every useful and 
honourable occupation” (7). This view of rhetoric influenced many Renaissance writers.34 
Thomas Wilson, for instance, in the preface to his treatise on the art of rhetoric, reiterates the 
same idea of the origin of eloquence, “Some liued by spoyle: some like brute beastes grased 
vpon the ground: some went naked: some roomed like Woodoses: none did any thing by reason, 
but most did what they could by manhood” (xliii–xliv). Then one endowed with “the gift of 
vtteraunce” turned “wilde” into “sober,” “cruell” into “gentle,” “fooles” into “wise,” and 
																																								 																				
34 For discussion of the influence of Cicero’s link between rhetoric and civility on Renaissance 
writers such as Thomas Wilson, see Cathy Shrank, “Civil Tongues: Language, Law and 
Reformation.” 
	 92 
“beastes” into “men” (xliv). In “Shakespeare and Language,” Jonathan Hope describes the 
Renaissance conception of language thus: “Inasmuch as it allowed humans to make evident their 
ability to reason, it was a divine gift, distinguishing humanity from, and elevating it above, the 
rest of creation” (77). It is this gift, Hope explains, that is able to “raise the monstrous to the level 
of the human” (77). Similarly, Russ McDonald, in “The Language of Tragedy,” writes that the 
Renaissance “inherited from the earlier Tudor humanists a faith in eloquence and in the power of 
language to educate, to civilize, and thus to help redeem the fallen race” (44). 
Shakespeare’s Brutus re-enacts this tale of the origin of rhetoric after the assassination of 
Julius Caesar. The honourable orator has a plan: to appease the “multitude,” who are “beside 
themselves with fear” (3.1.181–82), by justifying the murder with reasons that are “full of good 
regard” (226) lest the act be viewed a “savage spectacle” (225).35 Through Brutus, the slaughter 
of Julius Caesar, “like richest alchemy, / Will change to virtue and to worthiness” (1.3.158–60). 
This transformative power of rhetoric, turning primitivism into sociability, shall serve as the 
basis for my reading of Shakespeare’s three tragedies set in the beginning and end of the Roman 
Republic. 
Continuing my reading of inconsiderate tragic heroes, I will move from Shakespeare’s 
modern Venice to his ancient Rome. In the Roman tragedies, Shakespeare presents heroes who, 
notwithstanding their greatness, are in one way or another indiscreetly immature. Coriolanus, 
Julius Caesar, and Mark Antony share a certain blindness that is offensive; they are inconsiderate 
of others. The impulsive sense of superiority that they exude is beyond the patrician disdain for 
																																								 																				
35 The English word savage comes from the Latin silvaticus (meaning “of the woods”), which 
Cicero uses to describe man not yet civilized through eloquence. 
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the plebeian. Coriolanus cannot restrain his “soaring insolence” (2.1.242) in the forum or on the 
battlefield. Cassius is infuriated that he “must bend his body / If Caesar carelessly but nod on 
him” (1.2.117–18). Mark Antony’s “voluptuousness” (1.4.26) ruins two marriages, his political 
alliance with Octavius and Lepidus, and his respect among the soldiers he leads to disgraceful 
defeat again and again. While the city is indebted to the accomplishments of its celebrated 
heroes, it cannot tolerate their incivility. In response, Rome develops specific virtues to suppress 
the tragic flaws of these difficult men. Volumnia intends to pacify Coriolanus’s unrestrained 
anger by teaching him humility and politeness. Brutus and the conspirators want freedom from 
the loyalty that Julius Caesar demands. Mark Antony’s indulgence is opposed by Octavius’s 
willpower. But each tragedy dramatizes its hero’s stubborn resistance to the patient virtue, which 
ultimately leads to his downfall. 
In this chapter, as point of departure, I will examine two opposing demands made in each 
play in order to juxtapose the hero’s hamartia with the social virtue to which he will not yield. In 
Coriolanus, which takes place at the dawn of the Republic, the demanding mother has raised her 
son to relentlessly pursue military honour. The first act of the play depicts Caius Martius 
fearlessly defeating the Volscian army in the city of Corioli, for which he is given the title 
“Coriolanus.” Now at the height of his career, upon his return to Rome, his mother demands 
political honour. The arrogant soldier must learn to put aside his angry contempt for the 
plebeians that he untiringly insults and treat them “mildly” (3.2.142). In Julius Caesar, which 
portrays the final days of the Republic, there is a similar clash of discordant demands made by 
the two female characters—Portia and Calphurnia. These worried women have an important 
presence only in the second act of the play, in which they fear for their husbands. In the first 
scene, Portia insists on unconditional trust from Brutus; and in the second scene, Calphurnia 
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urges Julius Caesar to exercise prudence and be wary of those around him. And in Antony and 
Cleopatra, which is set during the transition from Republic to Empire, the two demands are 
made by the queen of Egypt and the future emperor of Rome. Cleopatra pulls Mark Antony 
toward extravagance, while Octavius pulls him toward restraint.36 
What I hope to show through these juxtapositions is, first, that Rome’s virtues are 
rhetorical constructs as opposed to the drives of its heroes, which are devoid of design. Whatever 
the hero’s marked feature, it is natural in the sense that it is free of artifice; it is passionate in the 
sense that it is thoughtless and uncalculated. Consider, for instance, Coriolanus in the midst of 
battle impulsively and impatiently asking his superior to engage with the enemy: 
I do beseech you 
By all the battles wherein we have fought, 
By th’ blood we have shed together, by th’ vows 
We have made to endure friends, that you directly 
Set me against Aufidius and his Antiates, 
And that you not delay the present, but, 
Filling the air with swords advanced and darts, 
We prove this very hour. (1.6.55–62; emphasis added) 
Coriolanus’s need to humiliate, Julius Caesar’s need to be respected, and Mark Antony’s need 
for gratification are all incautious and impervious to tact or strategy. In short, they are 
																																								 																				
36 Linda Charnes, in Notorious Identity, argues that “the real battle” in Antony and Cleopatra is 
between Octavius and Cleopatra (112). Charnes adds that “both Octavius and Cleopatra 
understand how susceptible Antony is to attacks on his ‘manhood’” (112). 
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unrhetorical. The virtue that the hero defies, in contrast, is achieved by means of manipulation 
and misrepresentation. The humility of Menenius is duplicitous. The independence of the 
conspirators is envious and comes at the price of disloyalty and deception. And in his pursuit of 
control, Octavius plots against all those in power. These virtues are deliberate and goal-oriented; 
they are planned with foresight. This polarity between calculation and impulse is manifest in 
Antony and Cleopatra: Octavius refers to Mark Antony’s scandalous adultery with Cleopatra as 
“present pleasure” (1.4.32). For Octavius, as Gail Kern Paster puts it, this affair “signifies an 
immersion in the present moment and irrational surrender to the demands of the body” (“The 
Tragic Subject and Its Passions” 151). However, the idea of Mark Antony marrying his sister 
Octavia as a political exigency is “studied” and “ruminated”—it is “not a present thought” 
(2.2.146–47). Ultimately, Mark Antony finds that he is unable to outsmart his rival. “If thou dost 
play with him at any game, / Thou art sure to lose” (2.3.24–25), the soothsayer warns him. Both 
Mark Antony and Cleopatra find no other way for Octavius to be “unpolicied” (5.2.304) than 
suicide. 
 Inspecting how these prominent figures who represent their society (Cassius, for 
example), I will demonstrate that behind their social objective there are two motives: a certain 
sensitive intolerance and greed for power. These two forces are a perverted version of the 
impatient desire for greatness that they despise in the hero. The conspirators are driven by an 
impatience of their own to oppress Julius Caesar. It is through Brutus that they are compelled to 
tame their own impatience, their need for bloodthirsty revenge. Consider Brutus’s independence 
of thought in his response to Cassius: 
What you would work me to, I have some aim. 
How I have thought of this, and of these times, 
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I shall recount hereafter. For this present, 
I would not, so with love I might entreat you, 
Be any further moved. What you have said, 
I will consider; what you have to say, 
I will with patience hear, and find a time 
Both meet to hear and answer such high things. (1.2.163–70; emphasis added) 
Brutus delays the “present” urgency to plot against Julius Caesar. He urges Cassius to wait for 
another time to discuss this pressing problem. Brutus does not disagree with Cassius that Julius 
Caesar is becoming a problem for the Republic, he disagrees with Cassius’s aggressive manner 
of describing the problem. Brutus must think further by himself, and he demands that Cassius 
does the same. What Brutus’s noble patience reveals is that Julius Caesar’s impatience must not 
be suppressed by an impatient conspiracy. The plot must be patiently thought out. The “savage 
spectacle” that Brutus avoids is to counteract impatience with impatience. And what is even 
more noble about Brutus is that delaying the plot to act against Julius Caesar shows that while he 
comes to the realization that it is necessary to bring Julius Caesar down, he appreciates that 
Julius Caesar’s greatness is due to his impatience. Brutus admires the great man that he must 
defeat.37 “It must be by his death” (2.1.10) because the awe-inspiring Julius Caesar could not 
																																								 																				
37 Nietzsche calls Brutus’s virtue “Independence of the soul” (The Gay Science 150). “No 
sacrifice can be too great for that,” Nietzsche expands, “one must be capable of sacrificing one’s 
dearest friend for it, even if he should also be the most glorious human being, an ornament of the 
world, a genius without peer—if one loves freedom as the freedom of great souls and he 
threatens this kind of freedom” (150). 
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have inspired awe without his impatient drive for distinction. Similarly, in Coriolanus, I will 
show, Volumnia admires how anger has served her son on the battlefield. But she detests the 
tribunes’ revengeful manner of banishing Coriolanus. And finally, by the end of the story, 
Volumnia comes to terms with the fact that there is no longer any place for her aggressive son in 
the Republic. 
 In the first chapter, I have demonstrated that a certain kind of anxiety stimulates the 
moral values of Venice. The Venetians fear direct contact with the unknown that lies beyond the 
borders of their civilized community. And they associate this unknown with darkness, blackness, 
and barbarity. In this chapter, I will demonstrate that Rome’s virtues, in these three plays, in spite 
of all the sleight of tongue that goes into their making, are also prompted by anxiety. This marks 
the difference between Cassius and Julius Caesar. One impatience is spiteful, the other proud. 
One impatience is fearful, the other hubiristic. The hero is recklessly undiplomatic because of his 
hubris; that is, in his unbridled expression of his drive, he is uninhibited by fear. The Romans 
dread being the object of their hero’s drive; they cannot bear to be its recipient. Coriolanus 
constantly threatens others. The ruling class of the Republic, throughout the play, constantly 
fears being threatened (first by the insurrection of the plebeians, then by Coriolanus himself). It 
is in response to this fear that they beseech Coriolanus to practice humility. And Octavius 
practices self-control from fear of being driven by passion and hence losing control. What 
Octavius cannot tolerate in Mark Antony is the free expression of his desires. 
 
INVECTIVE AND CIVILITY IN CORIOLANUS 
Coriolanus cannot endear himself to others because he has grown accustomed to the 
hostility of war. And he has become an aggressive warrior because he was deprived of being 
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loved at an early age. To toughen up her daughter-in-law as they wait for news from Coriolanus, 
the cold Volumnia instructs Virgilia to behave toward her husband in the same manner she has 
raised her son: “If my son were my husband, I should freelier rejoice in that absence wherein he 
won honor than in the embracements of his bed where he would show most love” (1.3.2–5). 
Volumnia began preparing her son for the life of a courageous soldier “when youth with 
comeliness plucked all gaze his way” (6–7). The young and attractive boy was forbidden 
affection and social interaction; he was plunged into the opposite: the rage and loneliness of 
“cruel war” (12). A clear indication of Volumnia’s determination occurs when, after her 
indignation toward the tribunes gets out of hand, she refuses to calm herself by dining with 
Menenius Agrippa; instead, she contends that “anger’s my meat. I sup upon myself / And so 
shall starve with feeding” (4.2.50–51). Paul Cantor, in Shakespeare’s Rome, observes that while 
“eating and drinking are clearly convivial activities, ways of bringing people together” in Antony 
and Cleopatra, “the rejection of eating and drinking in Coriolanus is explicitly associated with 
the rejection of human company” (33). And in Suffocating Mothers, Janet Adelman remarks, 
“We might suspect her of having been as niggardly in providing food for her son as she is for 
herself, or rather suspect her of insisting that he too be self-sufficient, that he feed only on his 
own anger” (148). And to please his demanding mother (according to whom blood “becomes a 
man” [1.3.36]), the rude bully came to prominence at the age of sixteen “when with his 
Amazonian chin he drove / The bristled lips before him” (2.2.88–89), and has responded to his 
mother’s request ever since with vigour and enthusiasm. Of course, this is not to suggest that the 
mother is to be blamed for Coriolanus’s insolence. Volumnia herself has been responding to a 
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call from her city, which requires soldiers who do not shy away from expressing their fury.38 She 
has honourably met Rome’s demand by building what Stephen Greenblatt, in Shakespeare’s 
Freedom, calls an “unstoppable war machine” (108). And Rome has benefitted from the growth 
of this ambitious boy into what Michael Hattaway calls “an icon of magnificence” (“Tragedy and 
Political Authority” 117). 
 I argue that beneath Volumnia’s adamant coldness toward her son is an irrational fear of 
being dependent. Volumnia raises her son to never be needy or dependent. To do so, she has him 
suffer the dangers of battle from an early age. It is through hardship that Coriolanus becomes an 
independent warrior. This is clear from the “precepts” that the mother used in order to educate 
and embolden the son, in order to “make invincible / The heart that conned them”: “extremities 
was the trier of spirits,” “common chances common men could bear,” “when the sea was calm, 
all boats alike / Showed mastership in floating,” and “fortune’s blows / When most struck home, 
being gentle wounded craves / A noble cunning” (4.1.4–11). Notice that Coriolanus uses the past 
tense to reiterate these proverbs. He understands that Rome has changed, that his past education 
leaves him unprepared for a social life in the city. 
The political landscape in Rome changes drastically once Coriolanus thwarts its external 
enemies. His services are no longer needed in the field, but in the forum. Instead of passionate 
warriors, the Republic now needs effective politicians who can negotiate peace. Volumnia 
appreciates this shift and immediately adapts. Moments before Coriolanus’s arrival from battle, 
Volumnia thanks the gods for her son’s wounds of war and hopes that for these wounds he will 
																																								 																				
38 Volumnia’s loyalty to Rome is even more evident at the end of the play, when she sacrifices 
her son for the sake of Rome. 
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be rewarded the position of consulship: “There will be large cicatrices to show the people when 
he shall stand for his place” (2.1.136–37). After she greets her “good soldier” (160), Volumnia 
makes her new demand: “I have lived / To see inherited my very wishes / And the buildings of 
my fancy. Only / There’s one thing wanting, which I doubt not but / Our Rome will cast upon 
thee” (186–90). She calls on her son to seek honour hereafter within the city by being elected by 
the “general louts” (3.2.66) as consul. The only obstacle is that the “vengeance proud” (2.2.5) 
Coriolanus is required to “remember / A kinder value of the people than / He hath hereto prized 
them at” (55–57). 
What is now valued in Rome is politeness, even if it is insincere. There are two key 
encounters between the mother and the son that clearly demonstrate this change in values. 
Coriolanus and Volumnia meet after he has aggravated the plebeians by insulting them (3.2). The 
two meet again after his banishment from Rome (5.3). In both cases, the bully is reprimanded by 
his mother for not getting along with others. In the first meeting, Volumnia instructs the 
disgruntled Coriolanus on the “use of anger / To better vantage” (3.2.30–31) and “the inheritance 
of their loves” (68). In the second meeting, Volumnia chastises Coriolanus for persisting in 
holding a grudge against Rome: “Think’st thou it honorable for a noble man / Still to remember 
wrongs?” (5.3.154–55). Being political is Rome’s new virtue. More precisely, the aristocrats 
must humble themselves, even if they are to “dissemble” (3.2.62), in order to win the hearts of 
the commoners. The warrior is enjoined to please and gain the approval of those he abhors, to 
restrain his “frown” and instead “spend a fawn upon ’em” (67). This tragedy, therefore, as 
Katherine Maus puts it in her introduction to the play, “is not merely about a heroic individual 
but about the community from which he springs and how it is to be governed” (2933). 
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Katharine Craik, in “Staging Rhetorical Vividness in Coriolanus,” points out that while 
scholars disagree about whether Coriolanus is an eloquent orator or an inarticulate soldier, they 
seem to agree that his “accomplishments or deficiencies as an orator lie at the heart of the 
drama” (143). Feigned deference is no easy task for Coriolanus. “Would you have me false to 
my nature?” (3.2.14–15), the overbearing soldier asks. Coriolanus refuses to “perform a part” 
(3.2.109). The mother must teach the belligerent boy diplomacy—or, to use her own word, 
“policy” (42). She entreats Coriolanus to 
Go to them with this bonnet in thy hand, 
And thus far having stretched it—here be with them, 
Thy knee bussing the stones; for in such business 
Action is eloquence, and the eyes of th’ignorant 
More learned than the ears—waving thy head, 
Which often thus correcting thy stout heart, 
Now humble as the ripest mulberry 
That will not hold the handling; or say to them 
Thou art their soldier and, being bred in broils, 
Hast not the soft way which, thou dost confess, 
Were fit for thee to use as they to claim 
In asking their good loves, but thou wilt frame 
Thyself, forsooth, hereafter theirs so far 
As thou hast power and person. (73–86) 
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This passage can be viewed as a guide to the art of humility. It is artful because it is not natural.39 
The change that Coriolanus is asked to come to terms with is to use pleasing words rather than 
violence to win over the plebeians. The “policy” that Volumnia demands from Coriolanus entails 
“such words that are but roted in / Your tongue, though but bastards and syllables / Of no 
allowance to your bosom’s truth” (3.2.55–57). Coriolanus should regard winning over the public 
as if he is conquering a town using “gentle words” (59). But, as Cathy Shrank remarks in 
“Civility and the City in Coriolanus,” this soldier is unable “to obey the fundamental rule 
regulating rhetoric: the need for decorum, suiting your language to the time, place, matter, and 
audience” (419).	And McDonald argues that in stark contrast to the voluble Hamlet, “who loves 
words,” the reticent Coriolanus “despises language so thoroughly that he cannot move into the 
parliamentary realm of politics” (“The Language of Tragedy” 45). This soldier, McDonald 
continues, 
confesses that, while he sought out warfare, he “fled from words,” and he objects to the 
recitation of his deeds, resents hearing his “nothings monstered.” This last phrase 
captures his mistrust of language, specifically its inherent failure to represent the world 
accurately. The man of action cannot tolerate the slippage or lack of correspondence 
between sign and signified. (45) 
Coriolanus, in other words, detests the artificiality of language. 
 To better understand the nature of the political politeness that Volumnia demands, it is 
necessary to understand why Coriolanus obdurately refuses to submit to it. Volumnia’s speech 
																																								 																				
39 Craik claims that it is Coriolanus’s “failure as an actor, rather than as an orator,” that leads to 
his downfall (162). 
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on humility cited above makes use of what George Puttenham, in The Art of English Poesy, calls 
the “Figure of Excuse.” Puttenham defines dicaeologia (literally meaning “a plea in defense”) 
thus: “Sometimes our error is so manifest, or we be so hardly pressed with our adversaries, as we 
cannot deny the fault laid unto our charge; in which case it is good policy to excuse it by some 
allowable pretext” (315).40 To make peace with his aggrieved audience, Coriolanus is to offer 
them an excuse for his impoliteness. It is interesting that while Volumnia instructs her son to 
dishonestly wheedle the public into accepting him as their leader, the vindication she 
recommends is honest. He must apologize for “being bred in broils”—that is, he must apologize 
for who he is.41 Coriolanus has from an early age become uncompromisingly accustomed to 
																																								 																				
40 The connection between the “Figure of Excuse” and the “Figure of Extenuation” is worth 
pointing out. Among the applications of meiosis (the “Disabler” or the “Figure of Extenuation”), 
according to Puttenham, is “to excuse a fault, and to make an offense seem less than it is” (305). 
Puttenham presents both of these figures as “sententious” (or, rhetorical) figures. However, the 
main difference between the two figures is that while the “Figure of Excuse” gives a reason, the 
“Figure of Extenuation” presents as reasonable. Dicaeologia justifies a wrongdoing by offering 
an “allowable pretext.” Meiosis translates the wrongdoing into something “allowable.” As 
Puttenham puts it, meiosis “excuse[s] a fault … by giving a term more favorable and of less 
vehemence than the truth requires” (305). 
41 There is another instance of dicaeologia when Menenius calms the tribunes by offering them 
the same excuse: “Consider this: he has been bred i’ th’ wars / Since a’ could draw a sword, and 
is ill schooled / In bolted language; meal and bran together / He throws without distinction” 
(3.1.318–21). The unrefined soldier is incapable of “bolted language” because he is accustomed 
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degrading others. What is more, he is praised, “brow-bound with the oak” (2.2.95), and granted 
an honourable title for humiliating the enemies of Rome on the battlefield “where he did / Run 
reeking o’er the lives of men as if / ’Twere perpetual spoil” (115–17). Belittling others has 
become this soldier’s second nature. As Menenius explains, Coriolanus “talks like a knell, and 
his hum is a battery” (5.4.21). “Battle,” writes Maus, “is Coriolanus’s model for identity 
formation” (2937). Now he is summoned to belittle himself in public, to which he will not 
capitulate. Volumnia is essentially asking her son to direct his drive to diminish others toward 
himself, to internalize his anger.42 
Furthermore, Coriolanus the bully is not at all afraid of a bully like himself. In fact, he 
craves to grapple with his equal, Tullus Aufidius: “Were half to half the world by th’ears and he / 
Upon my party, I’d revolt to make / Only my wars with him. He is a lion / That I am proud to 
hunt” (1.1.224–27). Likewise, Aufidius desires nothing more than the opportunity to be “beard to 
beard” (1.10.10) with his worthy adversary. Coriolanus will not humble himself to an opponent 
because he does not dread combat. It is this proud fearlessness (his hubris) that ultimately kills 
him—abandoned by Rome and surrounded by Aufidius and his men, Coriolanus loses his 
temper. To Aufidius’s “boy of tears” (5.6.100), Coriolanus retorts, 
																																								 																				
to war. Since food is central to the plebeians’ protest, Menenius’s argument that Coriolanus 
cannot distinguish between “meal” and “bran” (what is edible and what is not) is a fitting 
analogy. 
42 In “Shakespeare’s Classical Tragedies,” Coppélia Kahn observes that Coriolanus is 
Shakespeare’s “least inward hero: he has little if any self-knowledge, and only one soliloquy” 
(218). 
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“Boy”! False hound! 
If you have writ your annals true, ‘tis there 
That, like an eagle in a dovecote, I 
Fluttered your Volscians in Corioles. 
Alone I did it. “Boy”! (111–15) 
Not even under such horrific circumstances does the proud soldier practice policy. 
 But I argue that there is an even stronger reason why Coriolanus refuses to practice 
diplomacy. He does not accept his mother’s policy because he has been raised to despise the 
policy of Menenius. There is a fundamental difference between the humility that his mother 
instructs him to practice and the humility that Menenius practices. Volumnia’s humility still has 
independence as its ideal goal. Menenius, on the other hand, as his famous fable of the belly 
(1.1) demonstrates, intends to keep the starving civilians inferior and subdued. Neither Volumnia 
nor any other patrician is genuinely humble. However, although both Volumnia and Menenius 
practice false humility, there is a perversion in the humility of the latter. Menenius humbles 
himself to the plebeians only to instill in them even further the belief that they must depend on 
the aristocracy: 
The senators of Rome are this good belly, 
And you the mutinous members. For examine 
Their counsels and their cares, digest things rightly 
Touching the weal o’th’ common, you shall find 
No public benefit which you receive 
But it proceeds or comes from them to you 
And no way from yourselves. (1.1.139–45) 
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According to this fable, the plebeians must never free themselves from the patricians. They must 
never desire independence. Kenneth Burke, therefore, in “Coriolanus—and the Delights of 
Faction,” is wrong to equate Menenius’s covert animosity toward the commoners with the 
animosity that Coriolanus blatantly trumpets “and out of his noble carelessness lets them plainly 
see’t” (2.2.13–14). Burke claims that the “function” of Menenius is “to uphold circumspectly, 
‘reasonably’, much the same position that Coriolanus must represent exorbitantly” (194). The 
difference between their hostility toward the commoners, however, is not a difference in degree 
but a difference in kind. Coriolanus is disgusted by the commoners because they are not as 
independent as him. And this is the theme of his insults when he approaches them in the opening 
scene.43 In short, Coriolanus will not humble himself because he is too afraid that humility will 
lead to a relationship of dependency. And here develops the fundamental difference between the 
tragic hero and the rest of the nobility: “I had rather be their servant in my way / Than sway with 
them in theirs” (2.1.191–92). The “lonely dragon” (4.1.30) chooses to persevere with his wrath 
than to adopt, in the words of Burke, “the wiles of peaceful persuasion” (189) that Volumnia or 
Menenius observe, even if his inflexibility is answered with exile—“I shall be loved when I am 
lacked” (4.1.15).44 As Greenblatt observes, it is Coriolanus’s reluctance to practice “the humble 
																																								 																				
43	Moreover, Menenius is shocked when he learns that the plebeians have been granted “five 
tribunes to defend their vulgar wisdoms” (1.1.206). This clearly shows that Menenius—and his 
fable of the belly—does not speak for Rome. 
44	Burke observes how the three meanings of the term hubris perfectly characterize Coriolanus: 
“pride,” “excess,” and “an insulting air of superiority, deemed punishable by death” (187). 
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soliciting of votes and hence the acknowledgment of dependency” that leads to his banishment, 
which the arrogant warrior views as “a declaration of independence” (107–08). 
What is more, with ruthless enemies similar to its own Coriolanus, Rome shares this fear 
of being dependent on another. Rome’s greatest fear is to be intimidated, to be dominated. 
Throughout the play, the city is constantly threatened from without and within. The clearest 
manifestation of Rome’s anxiety occurs in the final act of the play. When the city is under attack, 
in desperation the patricians nervously argue over who should be sent to plead with Coriolanus 
to refrain from war. After Cominius (Coriolanus’s former general) fails, Menenius suggests the 
tribunes, “Go, you that banished him; / A mile before his tent fall down and knee / The way into 
his mercy” (5.1.4–6). Instead of the tribunes, Menenius himself goes to Coriolanus and comes 
back “with a cracked heart” (5.3.9). Finally, the women and the child are sent to disarm 
Coriolanus. 
The scene where Coriolanus—despite all of his manly efforts to stand his ground (“Not 
of a woman’s tenderness to be” [5.3.129])—decides not to assail Rome, contains what Burke 
calls a “fatal peripety” (192), because the Volscians will no longer have any use for him 
following this decision. However, it is not only the hero who undergoes a significant reversal: 
the three women who have come to dissuade him advance from being “more unfortunate than all 
living women” (97) to women “who have won a happy victory to Rome” (186)—an 
accomplishment Cominius and Menenius failed to achieve. “Ladies,” Coriolanus compliments 
them, “you deserve / To have a temple built you. All the swords / In Italy and her confederate 
arms / Could not have made this peace” (206–09). In this scene, Volumnia successfully stages 
the art of humility that she earlier failed to teach her son. The opening act of “this most noble 
mother of the world” (49) is a response to Coriolanus kneeling before her: 
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Oh, stand up blessed, 
Whilst with no softer cushion than the flint 
I kneel before thee, and unproperly 
Show duty as mistaken all this while 
Between the child and parent. (52–56) 
She shames her son with modesty that is beyond propriety, and she emphasizes this by 
describing the act as she performs it. “In kneeling to her son,” Coppélia Kahn remarks in Roman 
Shakespeare, “she reverses the usual gesture of indebtedness only to evoke more pointedly the 
unusual totality of his debt to her so that he will capitulate to her” (157). Volumnia then speaks 
on behalf of their grief-stricken appearance: “Should we be silent and not speak, our raiment / 
And state of bodies would bewray what life / We have led since thy exile” (94–96). This 
maneuver is significant because it is exactly that which the arrogant son would not humble 
himself to carry out—namely, laying bare his wounds. And at the end, she once more resorts to 
kneeling; this time she has them all follow her lead: 
Down, ladies. Let us shame him with our knees. 
To his surname Coriolanus ’longs more pride 
Than pity to our prayers. Down! An end; 
This is the last. So, we will home to Rome 
And die among our neighbors. Nay, behold’s. 
This boy, that cannot tell what he would have 
But kneels and holds up hands for fellowship, 
Does reason our petition with more strength 
Than thou hast to deny’t. (169–77) 
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Volumnia strengthens the “petition” with a group enactment of the gesture of prayer—on their 
knees with their hands held up supplicating for “fellowship.” 
It is noteworthy that Volumnia’s “suit” is for Coriolanus to “reconcile” the two sides so 
that “the Volsces / May say, ‘This mercy we have showed’, the Romans, / ‘This we received’, 
and each in either side / Give the all-hail to thee and cry, ‘Be blessed / For making up this 
peace!’” (135–40). She does not ask Coriolanus to return to the Roman army to fend off its 
enemy: “If it were so that our request did tend / To save the Romans, thereby to destroy / The 
Volsces whom you serve, you might condemn us, / As poisonous of your honor” (132–35). This 
subtle conciliator is not objecting to Coriolanus’s campaign against Rome. She is objecting to 
any form of hostility whatsoever. Volumnia even expresses her desire to die if Rome and 
Coriolanus engage in battle (120–25). The blueprint for the rhetorical strategy that Volumnia 
employs here can be found among the “common topics” in Aristotle’s Rhetoric. Aristotle places 
two contrasting situations side by side. A mother forbids her son to become a public speaker for 
fear of people hating him for speaking what is just, and the gods hating him for speaking what is 
unjust. The same mother then encourages her son to become a public speaker, for the gods would 
love him when he speaks what is just, and the people would love him when he speaks what is 
unjust. Aristotle uses the word blaisosis to describe this dilemma where “good and evil follow 
either of two things, each opposite to each” (179). In both situations, the thought of an alternative 
outcome is unequivocally ruled out. The former contrives a deadlock in which nothing but bad 
can result from the act that the mother would have the son not do. To stop him, the mother 
thrusts the son into a shameful stalemate—moving forward, the son will only incur wrath and 
disappointment. When one’s intentions foreshadow only disdain, withdrawal becomes the one 
gesture that does not lead to such an outcome. And conversely, in the latter, nothing but good can 
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come from what the mother wishes for her son. A similar double bind constitutes the complaint 
that leads off Volumnia’s speech. Regardless of the outcome of the war, the actions of 
Coriolanus will place these women unavoidably on the side of the vanquished: 
Alack, or we must lose 
The country, our dear nurse, or else thy person, 
Our comfort in the country. We must find 
An evident calamity, though we had 
Our wish which side should win. For either thou 
Must as a foreign recreant be led 
With manacles through our streets, or else 
Triumphantly tread on thy country’s ruin 
And bear the palm for having bravely shed 
Thy wife and children’s blood. (109–18) 
Coriolanus’s “rages and revenges” (85) will hurt no one more than those closest to him. 
In the first half of her speech, the disapproving mother berates the warrior for the 
suffering he will cause his family: “to poor we / Thine enmity’s most capital” (103–04). In the 
second part, the mother visualizes the ignominious fate her son would inflict upon himself were 
he to go through with the invasion of his city: 
if thou conquer Rome, the benefit 
Which thou shalt thereby reap is such a name 
Whose repetition will be dogged with curses, 
Whose chronicle thus writ: “The man was noble, 
But with his last attempt he wiped it out, 
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Destroyed his country, and his name remains 
To th’ensuing age abhorred.” (142–48) 
Again, this argument opens by evoking the thought that “The end of war’s uncertain” (141). But 
what is not uncertain is that Coriolanus’s enmity will harm himself no matter how the assault 
turns out—the harm this time being his own reputation in history. Michael West and Myron 
Silberstein note that Volumnia’s rhetoric consists of the “copious, openhanded exemplification 
of the consequences” (322). To prevent war, Volumnia argues that whether Coriolanus triumphs 
or not, what is beyond doubt is that he will bring shame upon himself and his family. In sum, 
Volumnia’s act of humility in this scene preserves the independence of all parties involved. 
 
FAITH AND REASON IN JULIUS CAESAR 
In Julius Caesar, there is a different virtue that the Republic hopes to install. Here, 
Calphurnia and Portia, in their resistance to their husbands, reveal the nature of this virtue. 
Among Shakespeare’s Roman tragedies, women have the smallest role in this play. Aside from 
the second act, the two women are mentioned only twice. In the first act, during the festival of 
Lupercalia, which was believed to bring about health and fertility, and which took place on 
February 15 (one month before the assassination), Julius Caesar brings Calphurnia to the event 
hoping that she will be purged of her “sterile curse” (1.2.9). And in the fourth act, in the middle 
of their heated argument, Brutus brings up the death of Portia to Cassius (4.3.146), which cools 
off their quarrel.45 But in the second act, the women are free to speak because it takes place in 
																																								 																				
45 What astonishes Cassius, and what puts an end to the furious altercation, is Brutus’s 
performance of patience. Brutus acts out the patience necessary to accept the passing away of his 
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their homes. Before the assassination, the two wives sense danger, and what they have in 
common is their insistence that their husbands not leave the safety of their homes. But, as Robert 
Miola notes in Shakespeare’s Rome, they are “tragically unrecognized and unappreciated” (97). 
Kahn suggests that “Portia and Calphurnia worry and warn husbands who actually share at least 
some of their fears but who, once those fears are voiced by women, gain as it were a heroic 
warrant to override them” (99). The purpose of this section is to examine the fears of the wives 
in order to shed light on the agon between the husbands, and ultimately to uncover the virtue that 
the conspiracy wishes to cultivate. 
After the conspirators leave their orchard, Portia confronts Brutus about his recent 
“ungentle” (2.1.242) behaviour toward her. This is the same complaint Cassius makes earlier: 
Brutus, I do observe you now of late. 
I have not from your eyes that gentleness 
And show of love as I was wont to have. 
You bear too stubborn and too strange a hand 
																																								 																				
wife. He stages the act of consoling himself: “With meditating that she must die once, / I have 
the patience to endure it now” (4.3.190–91). And immediately after, Cassius admits that he can 
never practice such patience: “I have as much of this in art as you, / But yet my nature could not 
bear it so” (193–94). Nietzsche believes that the function of tragedy is to delight the audience 
with pleasant speeches at moments when characters are “in the most difficult situations,” when 
“life approaches the abyss and a real human being would usually lose his head and certainly his 
fine language” (The Gay Science 80). If Nietzsche is correct about the function of tragedy, I 
believe Brutus’s performance of patience at this point serves as an excellent example. 
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Over your friend that loves you. (1.2.32–36) 
Although Portia is worried that Brutus’s inwardness does not “let you eat, nor talk, nor sleep” 
(2.1.252), her main concern is that Brutus does not share his thoughts with her, “Make me 
acquainted with your cause of grief” (256). What is important for Portia is not the “sick offence” 
that Brutus has been plotting with other men, but that he has refused to confide to her the plot, 
“Which by the right and virtue of my place / I ought to know of” (268–70). Portia makes her 
argument by reminding Brutus of his duty as a husband: 
And upon my knees 
I charm you, by my once-commended beauty, 
By all your vows of love, and that great vow 
Which did incorporate and make us one, 
That you unfold to me, your self, your half, 
Why you are heavy. (270–75) 
It is a vow that must compel this private man to unfold his “counsels” (298). What Portia 
demands is to be treated as a friend. “Within the bond of marriage” (280), there must be no 
secrets, especially in this marriage where the wife has proven her “constancy” (299). 
However, Brutus has already shown that he has no interest in vows of friendship or 
constancy. After all, he is on the verge of betraying the strongest bond to which he is tied, the 
one between himself and Julius Caesar, “the foremost man of all this world” (4.3.22).46 And a 
																																								 																				
46 For discussions of the father-son relationship between Julius Caesar and Brutus, see Harold 
Bloom, Shakespeare: The Invention of the Human, 108–09; and Garry Wills, Rome and 
Rhetoric, 120–23. 
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little earlier, when Casca asks the conspirators to “swear our resolution,” Brutus vehemently 
objects, “No, not an oath” (2.1.112–13). In a passionate speech (113–39), Brutus persuades the 
“secret Romans” not to “palter” in their decision to rebel against “high-sighted tyranny,” not 
because of a promise that they make to one another but because “the time’s abuse” calls for this 
rebellion. He urges them to consider Julius Caesar’s dictatorship as “fire” and “spur” for their 
resolve, and to 
not stain 
The even virtue of our enterprise, 
Nor th’ insuppressive mettle of our spirits, 
To think that or our cause or our performance 
Did need an oath. 
Brutus presses each man to base his commitment on his own interpretation of the oppressive 
circumstances that are threatening their Republic. An oath, Brutus asserts, begets dependency 
that is convenient only for the weak: “Swear priests and cowards and men cautelous, / Old feeble 
carrions, and such suffering souls / That welcome wrongs” (128–30).47 As mentioned earlier, 
what Brutus values is patience, patient thinking. A bond of friendship (whether with his wife or 
the senators) must be thoughtfully acted out every time the occasion arises. Is not the sole 
																																								 																				
47 It is worth adding here that in The Test Drive, Avital Ronell describes the oath thus: “when 
you made a vow of loyalty (no doubt time-canceling and eternal), you were in the throes of 
passion, in a hysterical conversion scene, you flung yourself at someone’s knee – at God, an 
ideal, a country, a thinking or its thinker – and made an oath of eternal loyalty to this entity” 
(307). 
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objective of the conspiracy to abolish dependency? Thus, these “brothers” of the Republic are 
not to be committed to one another.48 This is the kind of man from whom Portia expects constant 
loyalty to a vow. In “Antony in Behalf of the Play,” Kenneth Burke points out that Portia appears 
in the play to show “her deep affection” for her husband “only at those moments when he is 
sinisterly engaged”: “her love is conveyed by her misgivings” (335). Doubt rattles this woman 
who asks for constant faith. 
 In stark contrast, Calphurnia scolds her husband for refusing to take heed of “warnings 
and portents / And evils imminent” (2.2.80–81): the soothsayer who warns Julius Caesar at the 
festival to “Beware the Ides of March” (1.2.18); the ghastly weather disconcerting Rome just 
before the appointed day; the augurers’ advice that Julius Caesar not “stir forth today” (2.2.38); 
and of course, Calphurnia’s dream. “I never stood on ceremonies,” Calphurnia broods, “Yet now 
they fright me” (13–14). The essence of Calphurnia’s request is for her husband to put aside his 
blind conviction that he is invincible. “The fault in Caesar,” writes Marjorie Garber in 
Shakespeare After All, “is that he does not sufficiently recognize his own human vulnerability” 
(417). In his usual haughty manner, speaking of himself in the third person (illeism), Julius 
Caesar shrugs off his wife’s panic: 
Caesar should be a beast without a heart 
If he should stay at home today for fear. 
No, Caesar shall not. Danger knows full well 
That Caesar is more dangerous than he. 
																																								 																				
48 The word “brother” is applied to the relationship between Brutus and Cassius nine times 
throughout the play. 
	 116 
We are two lions littered in one day, 
And I the elder and more terrible; 
And Caesar shall go forth. (42–48) 
Calphurnia wants her husband to pay more attention to his surroundings. She beseeches Julius 
Caesar to be prudent: “Your wisdom is consumed in confidence” (49). Like Coriolanus, 
however, Julius Caesar is stubbornly fearless and proud, and will not bend to a feminine voice of 
caution. What distinguishes Julius Caesar from Brutus is that he expects unconditional loyalty 
from others. Julius Caesar demands constant, unshakeable vows. Brutus pesters himself with 
“busy care” (2.1.232), while Julius Caesar pesters others with his careless nod (1.2.118). Is this 
not the mark of imminent tyranny? Julius Caesar wants “supremacy,” Maus argues in her 
introduction to the play, “because he yearns for the unqualified homage of others” (1687). He 
does not scrutinize present circumstances or lose sleep about the future like Brutus; instead, he 
has faith that everything will turn out in his favour. When the conspirators arrive at his house 
unexpectedly, he still has no clue of the plot against him; more importantly, he believes that 
these patriotic defenders of the Republic have come, “like friends” (2.2.128), to escort him to the 
Senate to “give this day a crown to mighty Caesar” (94). 
It is important to understand why Julius Caesar disregards all of these ominous signs—it 
is not from a lack of intelligence. Julius Caesar believes that he possesses the same constancy 
that Portia seeks in Brutus (“I am constant as the Northern Star, / Of whose true-fixed and resting 
quality / There is no fellow in the firmament” [3.1.61–63]). Consistent with his preoccupation 
with fidelity, Julius Caesar does not base his decisions on signs because signs are unreliable. 
They are unreliable because they can be interpreted in different, even contradictory, ways. But 
Brutus, as shown earlier, relies heavily on the personal interpretation of signs. An example of 
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action prompted by interpretation occurs when Brutus convinces himself that Julius Caesar’s 
murder is necessary: finding no compelling reason in “the thing he is,” he decides to “fashion” 
one for himself (2.1.10–34). As Harold Bloom explains in Shakespeare: The Invention of the 
Human, Brutus chooses to concoct his own “anxious fiction, and then believe in its plausibility” 
(108). And in Rome and Rhetoric, Garry Wills argues that a “hypothetical” is treated as an 
“inevitability,” and Brutus “commits an actual assassination in the name of that hypothetical 
tyranny” (65). 
Quintilian, in the fifth book of The Orator’s Education, distinguishes this type of 
“necessary” conclusion from the “generally true but not necessary” conclusion (2: 407). 
Similarly, in the section explaining arguments drawn from cause and effect in his Topica, Cicero 
describes two types of causes: in the first, the “efficient” cause, without doubt, leads to the 
effect; in the second, the cause only contributes to the materialization of the effect (145). To 
invent a solid argument, Cicero instructs, the orator must fabricate an irrefutable cause: only 
when the cause is “efficient” can the orator “make an infallible inference to what is brought 
about by this cause” (147). 
Let us recall how Brutus interprets the act of murder. To justify themselves to “the 
common eyes” (2.1.179), they are to “be sacrificers, but not butchers” (166), “kill him boldly, 
but not wrathfully” (172), “carve him as a dish fit for the gods, / Not hew him as a carcass fit for 
hounds” (173–74), and be “purgers, not murderers” (180). As David Daniell observes in his 
introduction to the play, “killing Caesar is dressed up as something strategic (‘boldly’) and then 
culinary (‘carve’), as at a superior junket (‘a dish fit for the gods’)” (54). In all of these, Brutus is 
employing the rhetorical figure paradiastole. Puttenham writes that paradiastole (or, the “curry-
favel”) is “when we make the best of a bad thing, or turn a signification to the more plausible 
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sense” for the purposes of “flattery, or soothing, or excusing” (269). Such conversion is in fact a 
form of amplification. In A Rhetoric of Motives, Burke calls attention to the operation of 
amplification not only through “extension” and “intensification” but also through “dignification” 
(69). Paradiastole, therefore, attributes dignity to the act that it describes. This explains why 
Thomas Wilson, in The Arte of Rhetoric, mentions this strategy not among the figures but under 
the heading of “The deuision of amplification” (139). Of course, this is not to say that Julius 
Caesar is incompetent at interpretation. His reading of the “lean and hungry look” (1.2.194) of 
Cassius is possibly the most accurate interpretation in this play. Julius Caesar sees right through 
the envy of him who “looks / Quite through the deeds of men” (202–03): “Such men as he be 
never at heart’s ease / Whiles they behold a greater than themselves, / And therefore are they 
very dangerous” (208–10). But Julius Caesar confides his evaluation of Cassius to Mark Antony 
without the rhetorical urgency to act: “I rather tell thee what is to be feared / Than what I fear” 
(211–12). In addition to denying that he is afraid, Julius Caesar’s unrhetorical interpretation is 
merely a keen observation. It does not inspire action. 
Shakespeare’s Cicero points to this susceptibility of signs to being interpreted freely as he 
tries to calm the superstitious Casca, who is terrified by the storm: “men may construe things 
after their fashion, / Clean from the purpose of the things themselves” (1.3.34–35). Interestingly, 
immediately after Cicero exits, Cassius enters and, by taking advantage of Casca’s terror, talks 
Casca into joining the conspiracy against Julius Caesar: after implying that “the true cause” (62) 
of the storm is to portend “some monstrous state” (71), Cassius compares the frightful weather to 
Julius Caesar: 
Now could I, Casca, name to thee a man 
Most like this dreadful night 
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That thunders, lightens, opens graves, and roars 
As doth the lion in the Capitol; 
A man no mightier than thyself or me 
In personal action, yet prodigious grown 
And fearful, as these strange eruptions are. (72–78) 
But perhaps the best instance of a sign that is misinterpreted for persuasive purposes is 
Calphurnia’s dream of Julius Caesar’s bloody statue (77–79). For Calphurnia, the dream 
forewarns death. To discredit her, Decius Brutus proposes the opposite, life: 
This dream is all amiss interpreted; 
It was a vision fair and fortunate. 
Your statue spouting blood in many pipes, 
In which so many smiling Romans bathed, 
Signifies that from you great Rome shall suck  
Reviving blood, and that great men shall press 
For tinctures, stains, relics, and cognizance. 
This by Calphurnia’s dream is signified.49 (83–90) 
In his book on dreams, The Interpretation of Dreams, Sigmund Freud, before describing his own 
theory of dreams, rejects two conventional forms of dream interpretation, the “symbolic” method 
																																								 																				
49 Miola suggests another connection between Portia and Julius Caesar: they both turn from their 
respective sexual identities (96). Just as Portia denies her womanhood by asserting that she is 
“stronger than my sex” (2.1.296), Julius Caesar identifies with Decius Brutus’s image of the 
nourishing mother of Rome. 
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and the “decoding” method. Both interpretations of Calphurnia’s dream are instances of the 
former, which “considers the content of the dream as a whole and seeks to replace it by another 
content which is intelligible and in certain respects analogous to the original one” (122). Freud 
rejects this method because it has no rules—it is “incapable of being laid down on general lines” 
(123). “Success,” writes Freud, “must be a question of hitting on a clever idea, of direct 
intuition” (122). No limits exist for the interpreter in staking a claim to the correct meaning of 
the dream. This is the problem Julius Caesar faces when he is presented with antithetical 
meanings of the same sign. Ultimately, Julius Caesar leaves with the conspirators because he 
trusts their promise that he will be given the crown. While Brutus rejects a constant oath, Julius 
Caesar relies on the faithfulness of his “brothers.” 
 Julius Caesar dismisses his wife’s “fears” as “foolish” (2.2.105). But Calphurnia is 
basically asking Julius Caesar to think of himself, to be patient, to set limits on his pursuit of 
greatness. Portia, on the other hand, asks to be included (in the conspiracy). She wants Brutus to 
observe the vows of their marriage. Portia desires to be considered as an equal friend. In short, 
she demands to be loved. And it is Portia who provides insight into the virtue that the 
conspirators strive to accomplish. 
Cassius instigates the conspiracy by alarming Brutus that he has no “mirrors as will turn / 
Your hidden worthiness into your eye, / That you might see your shadow” (1.2.56–58). It is 
wished in Rome, Cassius insists, “that noble Brutus had his eyes” (62). To discredit Brutus’s 
relationship with Julius Caesar, Cassius asks Brutus to reflect on his own name: 
“Brutus” and “Caesar”—what should be in that “Caesar”? 
Why should that name be sounded more than yours? 
Write them together, yours is as fair a name; 
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Sound them, it doth become the mouth as well; 
Weigh them, it is as heavy; conjure with ’em, 
“Brutus” will start a spirit as soon as “Caesar.” (142–47) 
And to hint at the necessity of eliminating Julius Caesar, Cassius makes reference to Brutus’s 
ancestor (also named Brutus) who helped found the Republic by putting an end to the tyranny of 
the Tarquins: “Oh, you and I have heard our fathers say / There was a Brutus once that would 
have brooked / Th’eternal devil to keep his state in Rome / As easily as a king” (158–61). To 
summarize, Cassius advises Brutus to be faithful to himself and his name rather than to his 
allegiance to Julius Caesar. Throughout his speech, Cassius, like Iago, employs meiosis. Cassius 
diminishes Julius Caesar to change Brutus’s perception of him. But there is something more 
noteworthy about Cassius’s accounts of Julius Caesar’s weaknesses. The manner of describing 
his own abilities betrays a deep uneasiness with the fact that he has always been neglected. In 
Cassius, there is a strong need to be loved. In fact, the conspiracy can be viewed as Cassius’s 
desperate attempt to establish friendship. After all, Cassius does begin by complaining about the 
distance he feels between himself and Brutus: 
Brutus, I do observe you now of late. 
I have not from your eyes that gentleness 
And show of love as I was wont to have. 
You bear too stubborn and too strange a hand 
Over your friend that loves you. 
And Cassius’s animosity toward Julius Caesar is because Julius Caesar does not love others as a 
friend should. Julius Caesar is no friend to the Republic. 
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The self-reliant Brutus, however, will not be persuaded by another man; he must evaluate 
the situation on his own. As René Girard observes in A Theater of Envy, Brutus “rejects all 
suggestions and decides everything all by himself” (189). In keeping with his character, when 
alone, Brutus deliberates over the danger Julius Caesar’s rise to power poses. Distraught by the 
thought of the “sting” (2.1.16) that Julius Caesar will acquire by being crowned, Brutus 
concludes that Julius Caesar is “a serpent’s egg / Which, hatched, would as his kind grow 
mischievous, / And kill him in the shell” (32–34). 
The type of reliance on friendship that the conspirators advocate is a reaction to the 
reliance that Julius Caesar demands from others. What truly frightens these patricians who are 
envious of Julius Caesar is the breaking of the vows of brotherly friendship that holds the 
Republic together.50 Cassius expresses this fear thus: “I had as lief not be as live to be / In awe of 
																																								 																				
50 In “‘Continuall Factions’: Politics, Friendship, and History in Julius Caesar,” Philip Styrt 
argues that in this play, the word “friend” is “divorced from its affective meaning” and signifies 
“political affiliation”—it is the word “lover” that points to “personal connection” (286–87). 
“Consistently,” writes Styrt, “those who share a faction are referred to as ‘friends’, while those 
who are linked only by ties of affection, personal attachment, or what we would traditionally call 
friendship are referred to as ‘lovers’” (293). Further, Styrt claims that Brutus and Cassius are 
both friends and lovers, and “their relationship demonstrates the difficulty of keeping both of 
those bonds tight at once” (304). (In their first scene together, Cassius presents himself to Brutus 
as “your friend that loves you” [1.2.36].) Their quarrel in the fourth act derives, according to 
Styrt, from the “disagreement about the boundaries between the political and the personal” (305). 
And they resolve the quarrel when “they are back to distinguishing between love and politics” 
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such a thing as I myself” (1.2.95–96). But with the assassination of Julius Caesar, ironically, it is 
not only that “ambition’s debt is paid” (3.1.84). “Domestic fury and fierce civil strife” (265) 
ensue because loyalty dies in the Republic. The plebeians, who, in the opening scene, are 
censured for blindly honouring any patrician in power, turn against all patricians. Girard notes 
that “After listening to Brutus, then to Mark Antony, the crowd reacts by collectively putting to 
death an unfortunate bystander, Cinna, in a grotesque parody of what the conspirators themselves 
have done” (194). Mark Antony, who shakes hands with the conspirators, very soon breaks his 
“compact” (3.1.217) and later considers betraying his “slight unmeritable” (4.1.12) ally. He does 
not relish the thought of allocating a third of Rome to Lepidus: “Is it fit, / The threefold world 
divided, he should stand / One of the three to share it?” (13–15). The triumvirs compile a list of 
those who must die, a list that includes a brother and a nephew. They also intend to go over 
Julius Caesar’s will again in order to “cut off some charge in legacies” (4.1.9). And Cassius 
becomes “A hot friend cooling” (4.2.19) who shuns “free and friendly conference” (17), later 
admitting that his “heart is thirsty for that noble pledge” (4.3.159). This is the heavy price that 
																																								 																				
(306). Styrt concludes thus: “By demonstrating what happens when Brutus and Cassius blur the 
line between these two types of bonds, Shakespeare shows us how the two ought to be kept 
separate if one wants to function in this political world” (306). In other words, their affection for 
one another cannot interfere with their calculated political alliance. But I do not believe that 
Brutus and Cassius put aside their love for one another to be able to resolve their political 
differences, their different political aspirations. Rather, I believe that only after resolving their 
political differences are they able to feel affection for one another. Only then are they able to 
form a brotherly partnership. 
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the Republic pays to suppress Julius Caesar’s dictatorship: from fear of submission, these 
“brothers” lose friendship and become self-centred. It is now every man for himself. 
 
GRATIFICATION AND MASTERY IN ANTONY AND CLEOPATRA 
The fate of Rome after the civil war is dramatized in Antony and Cleopatra. In this 
tragedy, there is a different type of hero and a different type of virtue to which the hero does not 
surrender. Cantor highlights the polarity between the “nonerotic, austere atmosphere” in the 
Rome of Coriolanus and Julius Caesar and the “pervasive erotic atmosphere” in Antony and 
Cleopatra (22). Shakespeare already indicates how Mark Antony stands out in Rome in Julius 
Caesar. The surreptitious meeting of the patricians the night before the assassination is 
contrasted with Mark Antony’s vigil of pleasure. Julius Caesar expresses his surprise when he 
sees Mark Antony awake early in the morning: “See, Antony that revels long a-nights / Is 
notwithstanding up” (2.2.116–17). The striking feature that qualifies Mark Antony as a tragic 
hero is his unquenchable desire. That lust is an important theme in this play is underscored by the 
names of Mark Antony’s followers: Philo and Eros. Roman women, however, are no match for 
him. What is expected of women in the Republic is clearly represented in Coriolanus. Virgilia is 
praised for her “gracious silence” (2.1.164) and, like Calphurnia and Portia, is admonished for 
expressing her worry about the safety of her husband. And the noblewoman Valeria is praised as 
“The moon of Rome, chaste as the icicle / That’s curdied by the frost from purest snow / And 
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hangs on Dian’s temple” (5.3.65–67).51 Similarly, in Antony and Cleopatra, the woman offered 
to Mark Antony is Octavia, “Whose virtue and whose general graces speak / That which none 
else can utter” (2.2.138–39). The “sober” and “dull” (5.2.53–54) Octavia, however, with her 
“holy, cold, and still conversation” (2.6.121–22), will not suffice. Mark Antony must seek 
satisfaction elsewhere.52 Since Rome is now on the threshold of becoming an empire, the action 
of this inter-national play is no longer bound in Italy, and self-indulgence is imported into 
																																								 																				
51 Coppélia Kahn, in “Shakespeare’s Classical Tragedies,” contends that women’s chastity in 
ancient Rome was an accomplishment of Rome’s predominant cultural ideal of manly virtue 
(virtus): 
Though women seem “socially peripheral” to the patriarchal Roman state, they are 
actually “symbolically central” to it, by means of their chastity. Chastity isn’t a freely 
willed practice or a trait natural to women; rather, it arises from their acculturation to 
patriarchal control over their reproductive power—their wombs. Through the national 
cult of Vesta, virgin goddess of the hearth, Rome made such control sacred and identified 
it with the very continuity of the state. (210) 
52 It is worth mentioning that Titus Andronicus, which is set in the later days of the Roman 
Empire, contains the same dichotomy between the virtuous Roman noblewoman and the 
lecherous foreign temptress. Titus’s daughter, “Rome’s royal mistress” (1.1.244) Lavinia (who is 
more chaste than Lucrece [2.1.109–10]), is juxtaposed with Titus’s captive, the queen of the 
Goths Tamora (who, while married to the emperor Saturninus, seduces Aaron the Moor [2.3] and 
bears his child). 
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Roman culture from beyond its borders.53 Philo explains that his general “reneges all temper / 
And is become the bellows and the fan / To cool a gypsy’s lust” (1.1.8–10). And when back in 
Rome, Enobarbus brags to his engrossed colleagues how they “stayed well by’t in Egypt” 
(2.2.188) with excessive sleeping, drinking, eating, and sexual intercourse. In “Celebrating 
Idleness,” Abigail Scherer describes Shakespeare’s Egypt as “a holiday world, ruled by a queen 
devoted to the glorification of play” (277). The conflict in this tragedy arises from Mark 
Antony’s reaction to the clash between a call for extravagance from abroad and a call for 
abstinence from home. 
Mark Antony’s “space” (1.1.35) is in Egypt because Cleopatra entices him to give free 
rein to his desires. The qualities of the lure of this “enchanting queen” (1.2.127) are highlighted 
throughout the play. First, the gratifying of desire is boundless. Bloom notes that “Cleopatra and 
Antony do not bore each other, and clearly they are bored, erotically and otherwise, by everyone 
else in their world” (549). Enobarbus’s tantalizing account of Cleopatra (2.2.203–17), who 
“beggared all description,” confirms that this “rare Egyptian” (230) is beyond the Roman 
imagination. The licentious Roman must travel to exotic lands for gratification that cannot be 
“reckoned” (1.1.15). The play opens with a description of Mark Antony’s “dotage,” which 
“O’erflows the measure” (1.1.1–2). Mark Antony can never have enough of Cleopatra’s “infinite 
variety” (2.2.248). Enorbarbus knows too well that not even the political marriage with 
																																								 																				
53 In “Antony and Cleopatra: Empire, Globalization, and the Clash of Civilizations,” Cantor 
argues that in this play “Shakespeare seems more interested in the Egyptianizing of Rome than in 
the Romanizing of Egypt. Rome has conquered Egypt militarily, but Egypt seems to be 
conquering Rome culturally” (69).	
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Octavius’s sister can keep Mark Antony in Rome away from his “Egyptian dish” (2.6.122). Mark 
Antony will always return for more: “Other women cloy / The appetites they feed, but she makes 
hungry / Where most she satisfies” (2.2.248–50). 
Passion is also unpredictable, which explains Cleopatra’s whimsical nature. In his 
introduction to the play, Walter Cohen points to the “restlessness” that dominates the play 
(2775). To no avail, Charmian advises her queen that in order not to lose Mark Antony, she 
should refrain from constantly frustrating him: “In each thing give him way. Cross him in 
nothing” (1.3.9). Later, again with no success, she asks her queen to “keep yourself within 
yourself” (2.5.76). Cleopatra’s capriciousness exceeds mere unaccountable changes of mood. 
She entertains Octavius’s offer to give up Mark Antony (3.13), and twice she has the Egyptian 
fleet abandon Mark Antony in the midst of battle (3.10; 4.12). Cleopatra’s betrayal is not 
portrayed as a political act; Mark Antony regrets his reliance on the fickle queen: 
Oh, this false soul of Egypt! This grave charm, 
Whose eye becked forth my wars and called them home, 
Whose bosom was my crownet, my chief end, 
Like a right gypsy, hath at fast and loose 
Beguiled me to the very heart of loss. (4.12.25–29) 
In Egypt, it is the queen who fearlessly shows erratic behaviour. In Rome, however, fickleness is 
attributed to the people, not the ruler. Octavius likens the “common body” to “a vagabond flag 
upon the stream,” which “Goes to and back, lackeying the varying tide / To rot itself with 
motion” (1.4.44–47). 
Moreover, unrestrained indulgence inevitably leads to humiliation. Octavius praises Mark 
Antony’s past austerity (1.4.56–71). He recalls a time when Mark Antony endured “famine” with 
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“patience,” when he was forced to “drink / The stale of horses and the gilded puddle,” when his 
“palate” had to “deign / The roughest berry on the rudest hedge.” And this hardship “Was borne 
so like a soldier.” But now, Mark Antony’s reputation as a leader is constantly undermined 
because of his shameless conduct in Egypt.54 He is no longer respected among Romans; back 
home, he is regarded as “th’abstract of all faults / That all men follow” (1.4.9–10). He repeatedly 
disgraces himself before his soldiers: “Experience, manhood, honor ne’er before / Did violate so 
itself” (3.10.22–23). His faithful follower Enobarbus finally deserts him: “The loyalty well held 
to fools does make / Our faith mere folly” (3.13.42–43). Even his attempt at suicide turns into an 
embarrassing spectacle: “How, not dead? Not dead?” (4.14.103); he then implores the guards to 
“dispatch” him: “I have done my work ill, friends. Oh, make an end / Of what I have begun” 
(104–06). What is more, Shakespeare further emphasizes Mark Antony’s “basement” (57) by not 
having him make it to the final act—he dies immediately before the fifth act and the tragedy 
concludes without its hero. 
There is another feature of the grand love affair between Mark Antony and Cleopatra that 
Burke, in his essay “Shakespearean Persuasion,” explains in detail: the “imperiousness of love” 
(21). “In even the meanest love,” Burke asserts, “the lover, however deviously or unconsciously, 
feels in some way ‘ennobled’” (21). Janette Dillon agrees that the “declaration” of their love is 
“self-conscious and monumentalising” (Shakespeare’s Tragedies 128). There is a perfect 
																																								 																				
54 For discussion of Cleopatra’s “facetiousness” (for example, she dresses Mark Antony in her 
clothes and instructs her diver to put salt-fish on his hook), see James Hirsh, “Rome and Egypt in 
Antony and Cleopatra.” 
	 129 
articulation of such aggrandizement when Mark Antony, “stirred by Cleopatra” (1.1.44), 
glamorizes their lovemaking: 
Let Rome in Tiber melt and the wide arch 
Of the ranged empire fall! Here is my space. 
Kingdoms are clay. Our dungy earth alike 
Feeds beast as man. The nobleness of life 
Is to do thus, when such a mutual pair 
And such a twain can do’t, in which I bind— 
On pain of punishment—the world to weet 
We stand up peerless. (34–41) 
In sum, Mark Antony, who “would make his will / Lord of his reason” (3.13.3–4), can never sate 
his appetite for the royal seductress, despite her volatile temperament and his own degradation. 
Egypt draws Mark Antony to “idleness” (1.2.129); Rome, on the other hand, demands 
attention to duty. Mark Antony has neglected his responsibilities to his partners: what offends 
Octavius more than Mark Antony’s “lascivious wassails” (4.1.56) is his “foils when we do bear / 
So great weight in his lightness” (24–25). Rome has been in turmoil during Mark Antony’s stay 
in Egypt. Before her death, Fulvia, Mark Antony’s wife, to force him to return to Rome, wages 
war against Octavius (2.2.101–02). So does Mark Antony’s brother. And Pompey, counting on 
the “amorous surfeiter” (2.1.34) to remain in Egypt, has raised an army against Octavius and 
Lepidus. Therefore, it is Mark Antony’s failure to keep his affairs at home in check as a result of 
his lustful nature that has upset his relationship with his fellow triumvirs: 
If he filled 
His vacancy with his voluptuousness, 
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Full surfeits and the dryness of his bones 
Call on him for’t. But to confound such time 
That drums him from his sport and speaks as loud 
As his own state and ours, ’tis to be chid 
As we rate boys who, being mature in knowledge, 
Pawn their experience to their present pleasure 
And so rebel to judgment. (1.4.25–33) 
Octavius hopes that Mark Antony’s “shames” will “drive him to Rome” (72–73). What Rome 
demands of Mark Antony is the restraint of his desires. 
In a seemingly unimportant scene (3.1), Shakespeare shows how these Romans observe 
this code of behaviour. After conquering the Parthians and slaying their prince, Ventidius is 
tempted by his soldier to push even further and gain more victory in the absence of his captain. 
Ventidius, however, refrains, “I have done enough” (12). “Better to leave undone,” Ventidius 
instructs his soldier, “than by our deed / Acquire too high a fame when him we serve’s away” 
(14–15). The temperate fighter fears surpassing his superior should letting loose his “ambition” 
(22) lead to “too great an act” (13). Instead, 
I’ll humbly signify what in his name— 
That magical word of war—we have effected; 
How with his banners and his well-paid ranks 
The ne’er-yet-beaten horse of Parthia 
We have jaded out o’th’ field. (31–35) 
In contrast to the impulsive profligacy of Egypt, the dutiful Romans value abstention. Rome 
fosters mastery over passion. Miola refers to this by pointing out that Cleopatra mocks the 
	 131 
Roman institutions of marriage, government, and law, “all appearing absurdly pompous from 
Egypt’s hedonistic perspective” (119). 
Whereas the “ne’er-lust-wearied” (2.1.39) Mark Antony is driven by the desire for 
pleasure, Octavius seeks dominance—the very quality necessary to build an empire. To prevent 
Mark Antony from returning to Egypt, Octavius has him marry his sister. Through this 
“unslipping knot” (2.2.135), Octavius intends to hold a firmer grasp on Mark Antony—recall 
that the word “slippery” is used earlier in the play to describe the fickleness of the common 
people (1.2.180). Octavius makes clear that his sister’s role is “To join our kingdoms and our 
hearts, and never / Fly off our loves again” (2.2.161–62). And before the brother and sister 
separate, Octavius warns Mark Antony that “You take from me a great part of myself. / Use me 
well in’t” (3.2.24–25).55 Furthermore, a little after the truce with Pompey, Octavius attacks and 
murders Pompey, and then has Lepidus arrested to keep the spoils for himself (3.5). The only 
threat remaining becomes Mark Antony once he returns to Cleopatra. And after the death of 
Mark Antony, Octavius becomes “Sole sir o’th’ world” (5.2.119). The political realism of 
Octavius serves as a foil for the passionate romanticism of Mark Antony. 
It is clear that Octavius incessantly covets power. In the banquet scene, to Mark Antony’s 
frivolous “Be a child o’th’ time,” he soberly replies “Possess it” (2.7.100–01). Possession—both 
in the form of self-possession and the possession of others—is his virtue. However, Octavius is 
not unruly like Mark Antony. The power that he covets is acquired in a controlled manner 
																																								 																				
55 Octavia is soon afflicted with a fate similar to Volumnia’s. She faces a conflict in which she 
finds it difficult to take sides: “Husband win, win brother, / Prays and destroys the prayer—no 
midway / Twixt these extremes at all” (3.4.18–20). 
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because his virtue is propelled by the fear of its opposite: not being in command. During their 
“wild disguise” (125), the “high-colored” (4) Lepidus is carried off the ship and the revengeful 
Pompey gives up the opportunity to “be lord of all the world” (63), but Octavius worries about 
giving in to excess: “It’s monstrous labor when I wash my brain / And it grow fouler” (99–100). 
The ascetic “had rather fast from all four days / Than drink so much in one” (102–03). And 
finally, it is Octavius who puts an end to the drunken feast: “Our graver business / Frowns at this 
levity” (121–22). Octavius, who has an authoritative presence in every scene in which he 
appears, speaks only four times in this scene, three of which are to state his aversion to 
inebriation, and the other time to ridicule the inebriated Lepidus. 
But Mark Antony, who is “already / Traduced for levity” (3.7.12–13), does not share 
Octavius’s fear of not being in control and the humiliation that stems from it. Once more, it is 
pride and fearlessness that precipitates the hero’s downfall. To compensate for lacking Mark 
Antony’s military experience, the young Octavius micromanages the conditions of their 
confrontation by challenging him at sea. In spite of his soldiers’ rational objections that they are 
fully “prepared for land” (41), Mark Antony’s pride forbids him to decline the challenge, simply 
because Octavius “dares us to’t” (30). After the disgraceful defeat, Mark Antony upbraids 
himself (“Hark, the land bids me tread no more upon’t. / It is ashamed to bear me” [3.11.1–2]) 
and orders his men to no longer follow him “for indeed I have lost command” (23). Enobarbus 
rightly observes that it is the “itch of his affection” that “nicked his captainship” (3.13.7–8). 
Mark Antony recklessly loses himself under the influence of his fatal infatuation: 
Egypt, thou knew’st too well 
My heart was to thy rudder tied by th’ strings, 
And thou shouldst tow me after. O’er my spirit 
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Thy full supremacy thou knew’st and that 
Thy beck might from the bidding of the gods 
Command me. (3.11.56–61) 
Octavius’s virtue of self-command aims to elude exactly such loss of command. The obsession 
of this “universal landlord” (3.13.72) with control is a response to his fear of losing it. 
Shakespeare could not have chosen a more fitting virtue to characterize the first emperor of the 
Roman Empire: taken to its extreme, the virtue of self-mastery grows into the lust to rule. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The virtues that are cleverly devised in these tragedies are not randomly chosen; they 
correspond to the exigencies of the political context in each play, exigencies that gain 
momentum by the threat that the impolitic heroes pose. Shakespeare shows that after the 
overthrow of the Tarquin Kingdom, Rome’s guard against the rise of another monarchy does not 
lower for over four centuries. In the budding Republic of Coriolanus, the resistance to monarchy 
is presented through the point of view of the plebeians, who are to elect consuls, and their 
tribunes (also elected by the plebeians), who are to protect them from the consuls. Thus, winning 
the “voices” of the public amicably in elections (whether for consulship or the tribunes of the 
plebs) becomes an aspiration in the Republic. This government is an amalgamation of democracy 
and aristocracy. And Julius Caesar presents the resistance from the point of view of the 
patricians. To stop any one of their own from rising above the rest, this class insists on an 
envious equality. Considered together, Coriolanus and Julius Caesar betray the inherent anxiety 
of autocracy that shapes republican values—an autocracy that would have little regard for the 
commoners and demand full compliance from the aristocrats. But this fear no longer presides 
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over the Rome of Antony and Cleopatra. Rome’s military advances beyond the borders of Italy 
(starting long before the dissolution of the Republic) generate a new anxiety that fuels its 
imperial enterprise of world domination: the influence of foreign civilizations. The more Rome 
conquers, the more it fears being conquered and the more it conquers as a result of its fear. What 
better metaphor for this vicious circle that swells to excess than abstinence from indulgence? 
And thus begins the long-lasting Roman Empire. 
 More relevant to the present discussion, like his Othello, Shakespeare’s Roman tragedies 
portray a problematic relationship between an unashamedly inconsiderate and overly confident 
hero and a calculating community. The once-admired hero is finally expelled from the 
community after he unflinchingly refuses to adopt the caution and prudence of the pragmatic 















The Burden of Friendship: Demanding Generosity in Julius Caesar and Timon of Athens 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Shakespeare speaks to us about friendship through two characters that we would least 
expect: the tyrant Julius Caesar and the misanthrope Timon. In what follows, I will show that the 
two of them embody the desire to impress others—Timon by means of helping other Athenians 
out, Julius Caesar by means of his great accomplishments for Rome. And generosity, they both 
find, is a sure way to be loved by others. In both plays, the hero is loved by his city for his 
unqualified generosity. 
 In the previous chapter, I have examined Julius Caesar’s brazen disregard for the opinion 
of his peers. Julius Caesar sees himself as “constant as the Northern Star” (3.1.61)—above all 
other Romans. And the senators of the Republic have grown irate because Julius Caesar does not 
acknowledge them as equals. Their frustration and fear sow the seeds of the conspiracy against 
“the foremost man of all this world” (4.3.22). Another manifestation of Julius Caesar’s 
indifference, as I have explained in the third chapter, is his refusal to take heed of all of the signs 
that tell him not to leave his house on the Ides of March. He discounts even his wife’s caring 
foreboding of imminent disaster. In this chapter, I shall concentrate on a different aspect of Julius 
Caesar’s indifference: his incautious magnanimity. Not only was Julius Caesar generous to his 
soldiers and the citizens of Rome, but he had a perilous tendency to forgive his enemies. In the 
first section of the chapter, I will go through a number of texts from before, during, and after 
Shakespeare’s time to show that the historical figure Julius Caesar has been recognized for his 
generous and forgiving character as much as his ambition. And Shakespeare is no exception. 
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This is why I believe juxtaposing Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar with his Timon will prove fruitful. 
Although the generous side of Julius Caesar is not portrayed directly, the moment of peripety in 
the play, which takes place in the forum scene after the assassination, rests on Julius Caesar’s 
magnanimity. 
But Shakespeare demonstrates that one who has become inclined to give freely also 
expects to be given freely. Julius Caesar and Timon share a blind faith in the friendship of others. 
While the hero is celebrated for his propensity for utter giving, his downfall is elicited by his 
propensity for utter wanting. The hero is cast out because of his heavy expectations, his 
unconditional expectations that guarantee no return. Julius Caesar demands unconditional 
loyalty. And in absolute poverty and heavily in debt, Timon asks for money. The social contract 
is at odds with the hero’s burdensome expectation, hence the collective murder of Julius Caesar 
and the collective refusal to lend money to Timon. To state this in another way, the city fears an 
ask that foregoes the satisfaction of restitution. Thus, in the second section, I will show how 
Brutus and the conspirators have Julius Caesar pay back the debt accrued by his ambition. And 
in response, Mark Antony has the citizens of Rome repay Julius Caesar’s generosity by uniting 
against Brutus and the conspirators. And in the third section, I will analyze Timon’s similar 
demanding generosity. 
As I will explain in what follows, society’s unfriendly response to Julius Caesar and 
Timon’s neglect of the law of reciprocity neglects their earlier friendly magnanimity. Unconcern 
for gratitude is itself another failure to reciprocate. That which is expelled, therefore, 
resurfaces—albeit in an altered form. The return of Julius Caesar as a ghost serves to inform 
Brutus that suppression is not elimination. The preservation of the sanctity of the law of 
reciprocity in Rome and Athens comes at the price of ingratitude. In both plays, debts are 
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unforgivingly settled in reverence to the law. “Did not great Julius bleed for justice’ sake?” 
(4.3.19), proclaims Brutus. And the strict senators in Athens confidently declare that they “are 
for law” (3.6.85). This unrelenting desire for justice, however, blinds them to all that they have 
received from their hero. They then suffer the wrath of the generous but demanding hero. Mark 
Antony, in the name of Julius Caesar, turns the mob against the conspirators, and Timon finances 
Alcibiades’s war against the senators. Ultimately, I argue that, in both plays, it is the need for 
genuine friendship, the need to be truly loved that is brought to tragic conclusion. It is brought to 
tragic conclusion because the type of friendship that Julius Caesar and Timon seek is ultimately 
inconsiderate. 
 
THE MAGNANIMOUS JULIUS CAESAR 
It is well known that the Renaissance admired the historical figure Julius Caesar. In his 
portrayal of this great historical figure, Shakespeare chooses to omit a large portion of the 
qualities that contributed to Julius Caesar’s greatness. His tragedy portrays the final days of 
Julius Caesar’s life, focusing on his physical disabilities and the arrogant ambition that led to his 
violent assassination. In the introduction to the play, S. P. Cerasano points out that “Shakespeare 
leaves out Caesar’s early and middle career, his military victories, the conflict with Pompey 
following his legendary crossing of the Rubicon, the infamous affair with Cleopatra, and his 
concerted attempts to curry favor with the common people” (xix). There is an important item 
missing in this list: Julius Caesar’s magnanimity. 
Adrian Goldsworthy, in his biography of Julius Caesar, writes that he was “utterly 
ruthless,” to be sure, but he was also “kind, generous and inclined to forget grudges and turn 
enemies into friends” (3). Julius Caesar’s popularity in Rome rested on “his readiness to forgive 
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and his willingness to do favours” (217). And as a military leader, Julius Caesar referred to his 
troops as “comrades” (commilitones) rather than “men” or “soldiers”: “He and they were all 
good Romans, serving the Republic by fighting against its enemies, and also winning glory and 
plunder along the way, which he took care to share with them most generously” (235). “Mutual 
trust,” Goldsworthy continues, “grew up gradually between the commander, his officers, and 
soldiers as they came to know and rely on each other” (235). Furthermore, after the civil war 
with Pompey, Julius Caesar forgave those who had sided with his enemy, and “the pardoned 
Pompeians were allowed back into public life and some treated very well indeed” (515)—
including Brutus and Cassius. Regardless of Julius Caesar’s political motives, one cannot 
disregard the natural liberality of his character with which he treated others. Goldsworthy 
contends that the ulterior motive of Julius Caesar’s “lifelong backing for popular causes” was to 
persuade Romans to accept his dictatorship; nonetheless, “there was a generosity about Caesar’s 
behaviour that was matched by no other Roman who came to power in similar circumstances,” 
and “he did implement a number of measures that were in the interest of a wide part of the 
population” (515). 
Renaissance writers appreciated both sides of Julius Caesar: his political ambition and his 
admirable generosity. In The Art of English Poesy, for instance, when discussing the importance 
of decorum in poetry, George Puttenham mentions “the magnanimity and honorable ambition of 
Caesar” as the first examples of subject matters that are “stately and high, and require a style to 
be lifted up and advanced by choice of words, phrases, sentences, and figures, high, lofty, 
eloquent and magnific in proportion” (236). In his essay on friendship, among the “fruits” of 
friendship, Francis Bacon commends Julius Caesar’s friendship to Decimus Brutus as an 
exemplar of the Latin phrase participes curarum (meaning “sharers of cares”). And in the 
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character sketch “Imago Civilis Julii Caesaris,” Bacon writes of Julius Caesar’s political 
ambition thus: 
And assuredly in his private wishes he cared more for power than reputation. For he 
sought reputation and fame not for themselves, but as instruments of power. By natural 
impulse therefore, not by any moral guiding, he aspired to the supreme authority; and 
aspired rather to possess it than to be thought worthy of it: a thing which gave him favour 
with the people, who had no dignity of their own; but with the nobles and great persons, 
who wished also to preserve their own dignity, procured him the reputation of 
covetousness and boldness. (36) 
More importantly, Bacon ends the essay claiming that “the desire of popularity” was the cause of 
Julius Caesar’s “advancement” and “destruction,” “For there is nothing so popular as the 
forgiveness of enemies: and this it was which, whether it were virtue or art, cost him his life” 
(41). And Michel de Montaigne, in his essay “Of Books,” writes that Julius Caesar “particularly 
deserves to be studied, not for the knowledge of the history only, but for himself, so great an 
excellence and perfection he has above all the rest” (355). Montaigne praises Julius Caesar’s 
manner of “speaking of his enemies with so much sincerity in his judgment” but faults “the 
ordure of his pestilent ambition” (355). 
Shakespeare’s main source of the play also highlights Julius Caesar’s magnanimity as 
much as his ambition. Plutarch explains that Julius Caesar outdid all great Romans before and 
during his time, 
One he surpassed in the difficulty of the regions where he waged his wars; another in the 
great extent of country which he acquired; another in the multitude and might of the 
enemies over whom he was victorious; another in the savage manners and perfidious 
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dispositions of the people whom he conciliated; another in his reasonableness and 
mildness towards his captives; another still in the gifts and favours which he bestowed 
upon his soldiers; and all in the fact that he fought the most battles and killed the most 
enemies. (7: 479) 
There are many similar references throughout Plutarch’s account of Julius Caesar’s life that 
couple ambition and generosity. For instance, Julius Caesar was a source of inspiration to his 
soldiers,  
in the first place, because he showed, by his unsparing bestowal of rewards and honours, 
that he was not amassing wealth from his wars for his own luxury or for any life of ease, 
but that he treasured it up carefully as a common prize for deeds of valour, and had no 
greater share in the wealth than he offered to the deserving among his soldiers; and in the 
second place, by willingly undergoing every danger and refusing no toil. (7: 483) 
He won “political influence in consequence of his lavish hospitality and the general splendour of 
his mode of life,” and he won “much good will from the common people for the friendliness of 
his manners in intercourse with them” (7: 449). He had the habit of courting “the people with 
banquets and distributions of grain, and his soldiers with newly planted colonies” (7: 577). 
Plutarch also mentions Julius Caesar’s “wonderful clemency” (7: 527). After his victory over 
Pompey, “Most of those who were taken alive Caesar incorporated in his legions, and to many 
men of prominence he granted immunity” (7: 553). Not only that, “to some he even gave 
honours and offices besides, as to Brutus and Cassius, both of whom were now praetors. The 
statues of Pompey, too, which had been thrown down, he would not suffer to remain so, but set 
them up again” (7: 575). 
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 In conclusion, what I take from these different sources is that Julius Caesar was 
motivated by what Bacon calls “desire of popularity.” By means of brave military 
accomplishments and acts of generosity and forgiveness, Julius Caesar sought after a name to be 
admired by all. And I interpret Bacon’s claim that “reputation and fame” for Julius Caesar were 
“but as instruments of power,” that Julius Caesar “cared more for power than reputation,” thus: 
Julius Caesar’s desire for power was an inevitable consequence of his desire for reputation. That 
Julius Caesar “aspired to the supreme authority,” that Julius Caesar inclined toward dictatorship, 
was due to his hubristically unrestrained drive to be monumentally impressive, during his own 
lifetime and “many ages hence.” And his name does become monumental posthumously—it 
serves as the title of succeeding dictators of Rome. 
 
OUTSTANDING DEBTS 
This juxtaposition of the ambition and generosity that is commonly attributed to Julius 
Caesar has fascinated many writers, including Shakespeare. “Far from sucking the blood of his 
people,” writes David Daniell in his introduction to the tragedy, “as a typical tyrant did, and as 
Shakespeare’s Richard III and Macbeth do, Caesar wants ‘great Rome’ to suck his ‘Reviving 
blood’” (36). And although Shakespeare does not present the generous side of Julius Caesar, he 
does make use of his generosity in the development of his tragedy. After the assassination, the 
speeches of Brutus and Mark Antony to the mob hinge on the opposition between ambition and 
generosity—while Brutus’s speech is a meiotic presentation of Julius Caesar’s ambition, Mark 
Antony’s speech, which marks the turning point in the play, is a paradiastolic presentation of his 
generosity. 
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When Julius Caesar falls, Cinna shouts, “Liberty! Freedom! Tyranny is dead!” (3.1.79). 
Then Cassius cries out, “Liberty, freedom, and enfranchisement” (82). Then Brutus, “Peace, 
freedom, and liberty!” (111). This is what they plan to announce to the public. And the “knot” 
(119) of them hope to be remembered “in states unborn and accents yet unknown” (114) as “men 
that gave their country liberty” (120). In the following scene, when Brutus confronts the angry 
plebeians, the gist of his argument appears at the centre of his speech in the form of a chiastic 
rhetorical question: “Had you rather Caesar were living and die all slaves, than that Caesar were 
dead, to live all freemen?” (3.2.21–23). Through this chiasmus, the speaker offers but two 
choices, one desirable, the other not. And the rhetorical question, which sneakily pronounces its 
answer in such a conspicuous manner that it renders the interlocutor’s attempt at voicing the 
answer fatuous and redundant, further reinforces the desirable choice. In Rome and Rhetoric, 
Garry Wills describes Brutus’s rhetorical strategy as “questioning as bullying” (53). And Don 
Kraemer explains that Brutus’s “begging of the questions and bludgeoning with the answers” 
appear in “the form of the conditional,” but “they are effectively imperative, as befits his ethos of 
absolute authority” (171). Thus, it is crucial that not only the people but also “many ages hence” 
(3.1.112) know that Julius Caesar is murdered for freedom. Julius Caesar pays for his ambition 
so that Rome can be delivered from his bondage. Brutus’s first words after Julius Caesar is 
stabbed to death are: “People and senators, be not affrighted. / Fly not, stand still. Ambition’s 
debt is paid” (83–84). The people and senators of Rome are “affrighted” because Julius Caesar 
owes a debt, and now they need no longer be “affrighted” because Julius Caesar pays his debt 
with his death. 
Indeed, what sort of debt does Julius Caesar owe that can only be paid with the debtor’s 
death? This is no ordinary debt. It is ambition’s debt, and ambition has the future inscribed into 
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it. Nicholas Royle, in “Julius Caesar and the Democracy to Come,” writes that this play is about 
“attempts to predict and seize the future” (222). Julius Caesar’s debt is one that has not yet 
transpired, and yet it is due. Rome is “affrighted” that the ambitious Julius Caesar will owe a 
debt. This is the crime for which Julius Caesar pays heavily: 
It must be by his death; and for my part 
I know no personal cause to spurn at him 
But for the general. He would be crowned: 
How that might change his nature, there’s the question. 
It is the bright day that brings forth the adder, 
And that craves wary walking. Crown him that, 
And then I grant we put a sting in him 
That at his will he may do danger with. 
Th’abuse of greatness is when it disjoins 
Remorse from power; and to speak truth of Caesar, 
I have not known when his affections swayed 
More than his reason. But ’tis a common proof 
That lowliness is young ambition’s ladder, 
Whereto the climber upward turns his face; 
But when he once attains the upmost round 
He then unto the ladder turns his back, 
Looks in the clouds, scorning the base degrees 
By which he did ascend. So Caesar may; 
Then, lest he may, prevent. And, since the quarrel 
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Will bear no color for the thing he is, 
Fashion it thus: that what he is, augmented, 
Would run to these and these extremities. 
And therefore think him as a serpent’s egg 
Which, hatched, would as his kind grow mischievous, 
And kill him in the shell. (2.1.10–34) 
This speech is an excellent example of self-persuasion. Brutus presents to himself reasoning after 
reasoning that Julius Caesar may grow dangerous. With modal verbs such as “would,” “may,” 
and “might,” the core of his argument is prediction. Employing energeia, the speaker is bringing 
before his own eyes the possibility of danger. The “thing” that Julius Caesar is currently poses no 
threat. The fear is what Julius Caesar will become in the future. Brutus is warning himself so as 
to stir up the courage to act. The plot to assassinate Julius Caesar, in other words, is a preventive 
measure, not a curative one—“lest he may, prevent.” 
Shakespeare takes the essence of Brutus’s private rationalization of Julius Caesar’s 
assassination from Plutarch: as the enemies of Julius Caesar observed that his influence “had 
become great and hard to subvert, and aimed directly at a complete revolution in the state, they 
perceived that no beginnings should be considered too small to be quickly made great by 
continuance, after contempt of them has left them unobstructed” (7: 449). The conspiracy is a 
pre-emptive measure against Julius Caesar rising the ladder of ambition. And as Wayne Rebhorn 
observes in “The Crisis of the Aristocracy in Julius Caesar,” for the Roman senators (as well as 
the tribunes), Julius Caesar’s “ascent” would entail “their personal, degrading fall” (88). Plutarch 
beautifully captures the nature of this ambition, 
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Caesar’s many successes … did not divert his natural spirit of enterprise and ambition to 
the enjoyment of what he had laboriously achieved, but served as fuel and incentive for 
future achievements, and begat in him plans for greater deeds and a passion for fresh 
glory, as though he had used up what he already had. What he felt was therefore nothing 
else than emulation of himself, as if he had been another man, and a sort of rivalry 
between what he had done and what he purposed to do. (7: 577) 
This is the side of Julius Caesar that Shakespeare depicts in his play. Julius Caesar may possibly 
have sensed this urge for “future achievements” many times throughout his triumphant career, 
but Shakespeare turns its last occurrence into material for tragedy: his intention to dissolve the 
Republic and establish a monarchy. What is significant in Brutus’s future-oriented deliberative 
speech is that he acknowledges that Julius Caesar does not wish to take the crown. Julius Caesar 
“would be crowned”; that is, he wishes to be given the crown. Note also how Brutus ponders 
over the threat giving Julius Caesar a crown would pose: “Crown him that, / And then I grant we 
put a sting in him / That at his will he may do danger with.” Unlike Claudius (in Hamlet) or 
Antonio (in The Tempest), Julius Caesar is not one who would usurp the crown from his brothers 
in the senate. Instead, Julius Caesar wants to be given the crown willingly. He believes that he 
deserves the crown, that his accomplishments and generosity have earned him the right to rule 
over Rome. This is why he has Mark Antony offer him the crown in public. It breaks his heart 
when he finds that the public do not accept him as king. His seizure is a manifestation of his 
disappointment. 
Let us look at Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar more closely. His first appearance in the play 
begins with a cry, “Calphurnia.” In the noise and commotion of a festival that celebrates the 
foundation of the city of Rome and its very first king, Julius Caesar calls for his wife. He wants 
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the barren Calphurnia to be touched by Mark Antony in the “holy chase” (1.2.8) of Lupercalia, 
and he wants Mark Antony to “leave no ceremony out” (11). Julius Caesar wants to set up a 
dynastic rule in Rome, but he will not simply seize it. He wants a crown to be bestowed upon 
him—willingly. He has Mark Antony offer it to him three times in order to test the crowd. And 
as he leaves the festival disappointed, Julius Caesar confides in Mark Antony that he wants “men 
about me that are fat, / Sleek-headed men, and such as sleep a-nights” (192–93). He wants 
cheerful and carefree friends, like Mark Antony, who are not “dangerous” (195). He does not 
want the “spare” (201) Cassius, who, unbeknownst to Julius Caesar, does not attend the festival 
in order to plot against him with Brutus. And to be able to hear Mark Antony’s opinion on the 
matter, Julius Caesar wants him to come to his other side, because he is deaf in one ear. In the 
brief role that he has in the play, the Julius Caesar that Shakespeare displays is full of wants. 
Rather than merely emphasizing his neediness, Shakespeare is also drawing attention to his 
demanding nature, as does Cassius as he talks Brutus into the conspiracy, “Ye gods, it doth 
amaze me / A man of such a feeble temper should / So get the start of the majestic world / And 
bear the palm alone” (1.2.128–31). The ambition that worries Rome is in fact expectation. Julius 
Caesar expects too much of those around him. Such expectation is worrisome because it sows the 
seeds of a debt that does not honour the equalizing rules of exchange, a debt in which the debtor 
is only given and refuses to give back. “It must be by his death,” therefore, because Julius Caesar 
does not respect the custom of reciprocity, which, according to Friedrich Nietzsche in his 
Genealogy of Morality, is “the oldest and most primitive” relationship (49). It is the “will to 
reciprocity,” Nietzsche asserts, that forms the community (106). The great Julius Caesar, who is 
known in history for his generosity, is murdered by his community because he does not observe 
its foundational contractual relationship. 
	 147 
 To summarize, the Romans fear that a crowned Julius Caesar will “soar above the view 
of men” and keep the rest of Rome in “servile fearfulness” (1.1.73–74). The conspirators, who 
regard themselves as Julius Caesar’s equals, refuse to give their loyalty when there is no prospect 
of compensation: “I had as lief not be as live to be / In awe of such a thing as I myself” (1.2.95–
96). That they settle the debt before the contractual relationship is violated clearly demonstrates 
the extent of their fear of a debt that is not settled. The Republic will under no circumstance 
tolerate such transgression. This intolerance is the basis of Brutus’s argument in his concluding 
rhetorical questions to the mob: “Who is here so base that would be a bondman? If any, speak, 
for him have I offended. Who is here so rude that would not be a Roman? If any, speak, for him 
have I offended. Who is here so vile that will not love his country? If any, speak, for him have I 
offended” (3.2.27–31). And thus, ambition’s debt is paid. 
But this is not the only outstanding debt that is due in the Republic. Enter Mark Antony 
with Julius Caesar’s body. In the transition between Brutus and Mark Antony, Brutus announces 
that “The question of his death is enrolled in the Capitol, his glory not extenuated wherein he 
was worthy, nor his offenses enforced for which he suffered death” (3.2.34–37). The plebeians 
are summoned to “grace” Julius Caesar’s “corpse” and “glories” (54–55). The body that is earlier 
cut and pierced to pay back one debt must now demand compensation for another. This is truly 
an exact society, allowing no debt to go unnoticed. Brutus resolves the debt procured by Julius 
Caesar’s ambition, and the debt procured by his generosity is left for Mark Antony to resolve. He 
starts his speech with how Julius Caesar made Rome rich while he was alive, and ends it with 
how Julius Caesar will make Rome rich after his death. Julius Caesar’s will anticipates a new 
indebtedness: “To every Roman citizen he gives” (239). Mark Antony presses them to show their 
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gratitude; he capitalizes on Julius Caesar’s generosity to “stir” their “hearts and minds to mutiny 
and rage” (119–20).56 
The rhetorical strategy that Mark Antony employs is much more intense than the 
“bullying” tactic of Brutus. Brutus gives his audience the illusion of choice. His rhetorical 
questions induce the audience to believe that it has a say in the decision. As Kenneth Burke puts 
it in “Antony in Behalf of the Play,” 
Brutus … had asked the mob to weigh what he said, and to judge his statements as critics. 
But, as a matter of fact, he gave them no opportunity to follow his advice. He told them 
																																								 																				
56 In “Staging Rhetorical Vividness in Coriolanus,” Katharine Craik discusses Mark Antony’s 
use of evidentia. The terms evidentia and illustratio are Latin names for the rhetorical practice of 
bringing before the eyes. With the help of Julius Caesar’s body, Mark Antony paints a vivid 
picture of Julius Caesar’s greatness, which “impresses itself irresistibly on the plebeians so that 
they ‘feel / The dint of pity’” (148). Craik’s main argument revolves around the hyperbolic 
nature of evidentia in Coriolanus. To have maximum effect, such instances of evidentia must 
paint an exaggerated flattering description of their object—what Coriolanus himself dismisses as 
“acclamations hyperbolical” (1.9.51). With regard to Coriolanus, Craik contends that his biggest 
problem throughout the play is that, in the presence of others, he repeatedly fails to live up to the 
awe-inspiring accounts presented in his absence by characters such as Cominius. Coriolanus 
disappoints his audience every time he is asked to present himself as magnificent as he is earlier 
presented. Julius Caesar, however, does not have this problem. The plebeians must judge 
Brutus’s condemnation of Julius Caesar’s ambition and Mark Antony’s celebration of his 
magnanimity without the voice of Julius Caesar himself. 
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to choose, then he stated the issue in such a way that there was no choice. Those that love 
Rome, he said, must agree that Caesar should have been killed. Those that do not love 
Rome, should object. If there are any that do not love Rome, let them step forward in 
protest. No move—hence, the killing is endorsed. (338) 
More importantly, Brutus praises Julius Caesar’s generosity as he criticizes his ambition, “As 
Caesar loved me, I weep for him; as he was fortunate, I rejoice at it; as he was valiant, I honor 
him; but, as he was ambitious, I slew him. There is tears for his love; joy for his fortunes; honor 
for his valor; and death for his ambition” (3.2.23–27). Brutus does not present generosity and 
ambition to be exclusive of one another. 
In Mark Antony’s speech, on the other hand, Julius Caesar could not have been ambitious 
because he was generous—the two qualities cannot exist together. Misleadingly concurring with 
Brutus with what Marjorie Garber, in Shakespeare After All, calls the “mocking refrain” (412) of 
“Brutus is an honorable man,” Mark Antony uses the rhetorical question to argue that generosity 
cancels out ambition: 
He hath brought many captives home to Rome, 
Whose ransoms did the general coffers fill. 
Did this in Caesar seem ambitious? 
When that the poor have cried, Caesar hath wept; 
Ambition should be made of sterner stuff. 
Yet Brutus says he was ambitious, 
And Brutus is an honorable man. 
You all did see that on the Lupercal 
I thrice presented him a kingly crown, 
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Which he did thrice refuse. Was this ambition? (86–95) 
Wills points out that this method of questioning is Socratic, which aims to “reduce confidence, 
inducing disorientation, leading to aporia, a puzzled halt”; and the audience is forced into “a 
process of enquiry, a dialogue moving from one mental state to another” (86–87). Mark Antony 
does not offer a choice, not even a false one. His line of questioning paves the way for an 
illuminating moment of anagnorisis—“here I am to speak what I know” (3.2.99). In proper 
Socratic fashion, the citizens are humiliated into enlightenment, “You all did love him once, not 
without cause. / What cause withholds you, then, to mourn for him? / —O judgment! Thou art 
fled to brutish beasts, / And men have lost their reason” (100–03). The enlightenment is the 
remembrance of love; they are shamefully reminded that they were loved by Julius Caesar. The 
difference between the arguments of Brutus and Mark Antony is a clear indication that, as I 
argued earlier, Julius Caesar’s desire for power inevitably results from his desire for popularity. 
His generosity is an instrument for fame. From Julius Caesar’s own perspective, here represented 
by Mark Antony, he was not ambitious. Rather, Julius Caesar only sought the love of all 
Romans. Now an extension of Julius Caesar—what Burke calls “the plot-substitute for Caesar” 
(333)—Mark Antony demands love. 
The anagnorisis then sets in motion the peripety. Mark Antony turns the tables on the 
conspirators (especially Brutus) when he shows the crowd where 
the well-beloved Brutus stabbed, 
And as he plucked his cursed steel away, 
Mark how the blood of Caesar followed it, 
As rushing out of doors to be resolved 
If Brutus so unkindly knocked or no; 
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For Brutus, as you know, was Caesar’s angel. 
Judge, O you gods, how dearly Caesar loved him! 
This was the most unkindest cut of all; 
For when the noble Caesar saw him stab, 
Ingratitude, more strong than traitors’ arms, 
Quite vanquished him. (174–84) 
It is this account of Brutus’s ingratitude that infuriates the crowd: “Revenge! About! Seek! Burn! 
Fire! Kill! Slay! Let not a traitor live!” (202–03). Earlier, after Brutus’s speech, the citizens 
condone the death penalty for ambition. Now, they agree with Mark Antony that ingratitude 
deserves the same penalty. The reversal in this tragedy is from the censure of ambition to the 
censure of ingratitude. Like ambition, ingratitude is the failure to reciprocate. Ironically, Brutus 
and Mark Antony condemn the same transgression: being given without giving back. The two 
orators inveigh against indebtedness from opposing points of view. As Kraemer observes, the 
forum scene is “a dramatic rendering of argumentum in utramque partem (arguing both sides of 
the question)” (175). 
 This tragedy is about freedom—getting even to become free.57 Perhaps its most 
significant irony is that while these Romans prove that they are willing to do anything in order to 
be free, their most deep-seated anxiety is the act of freely giving. Rome is unforgivingly hostile 
																																								 																				
57 Even the suicides of Cassius and Brutus are committed for this purpose. Both men call out 
Julius Caesar’s name before they die. Cassius’s final words are: “Caesar, thou art revenged, / 
Even with the sword that killed thee” (5.3.45–46). And Brutus interprets being haunted by the 
ghost of Julius Caesar to mean that his “hour is come” (5.5.17–20). 
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to any man who turns a deaf ear to the law of reciprocity.58 The patricians betray the ambitious 
Julius Caesar to avoid the risk of being loyal to him without the return of their favour; the 
plebeians betray the conspirators not only because of their failure to requite Julius Caesar’s 
generosity but also because they themselves are now “heirs” to his generosity—their revolt is 
motivated by both revenge and gratitude. In both cases, the contractual relationship insures the 
closure that frees them from indebtedness. The plebeians turn against the conspirators not simply 
because Mark Antony surpasses Brutus in oratory. Each orator resolves a different debt: 
ambition does not come with the certainty of reimbursement, and the generous will guarantees 
the reimbursement for the rebellion. 
 
THE BOUNTIFUL TIMON 
Let us turn from Rome to Athens. The generosity that is absent in Julius Caesar is 
lavishly presented in Timon of Athens. There is no calculation in Timon’s generosity. As William 
Scott observes in “The Paradox of Timon’s Self-Cursing,” Timon is “generous in impulse” 
(295). Wilson Knight, in “The Pilgrimage of Hate,” calls Timon the “universal lover,” whose 
“charity is never cold, self-conscious, or dutiful” (240). Timon’s generosity has indeed become 
an “impulse” for him, and he is not simply a “universal lover.” Timon seeks to be universally 
loved. Timon is not simply a friend who befriends unconditionally; he is also a friend who seeks 
to be befriended unconditionally. “I never tasted Timon in my life,” notes an onlooker, “Nor 
came any of his bounties over me / To mark me for his friend” (3.2.72–74). This onlooker, 
																																								 																				
58 Pointing out the parallels between Brutus and Julius Caesar, Rebhorn observes that Brutus is 
“half-deaf just like Caesar” (89). 
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incidentally, is named “Stranger.” He is estranged from Timon because Timon does not “mark” 
him with his “bounties.” It is by means of “marking” others with his “bounties” that Timon 
strives to be universally loved. 
Timon’s first act in the play is to free a friend from “creditors most strait” (1.1.98). “I am 
not of that feather,” Timon declares, “to shake off / My friend when he must need me” (102–03). 
Timon then invites this friend to come to him after he is “enfranchised” (108) for further 
assistance, “’Tis not enough to help the feeble up / But to support him after” (109–10). And in 
the following scene, when the friend comes to pay Timon back, Timon refuses to accept his 
money, 
You mistake my love. 
I gave it freely ever, and there’s none 
Can truly say he gives if he receives. 
If our betters play at that game, we must not dare 
To imitate them. Faults that are rich are fair. (1.2.9–13) 
Many Athenians, whether in actual need or not, likewise come to “taste Lord Timon’s bounty” 
(1.1.265). In “Timon in Shakespeare’s Athens,” with regard to the Old Athenian who next 
approaches Timon to complain about his daughter falling in love with a poor servant, Robert 
Miola writes that Timon “displays his tragic inability to distinguish between true and false needs, 
between the deserving and undeserving” (24). Miola sees Timon’s act not as “the virtuous 
exercise of a charitable heart” but as “the vicious satisfaction of ‘fond desires’ for self-esteem 
through material possessions,” and Timon’s offer of money not as a “gift” but as a “bribe” (24). 
Miola reads this episode as a “vicious” economic transaction between Timon and the old 
“curmudgeon,” while in fact Timon is helping out the two lovers, which also benefits the Old 
	 154 
Athenian. As Hannah Crawforth, Sarah Dustagheer, and Jennifer Young observe in Shakespeare 
in London, it is after Timon informs the Old Athenian that the servant is an honest man who 
loves his daughter that Timon promises to help the servant (177). 
I argue that there is no “vicious” intention behind such generosity. Such unchecked 
dispensation is neither “vicious” nor the same as wastefulness. As Timon affirms, “No villainous 
bounty yet hath passed my heart. / Unwisely, not ignobly, have I given” (2.2.168–69). Timon’s 
generosity is indiscriminate, to be sure, but it is for the sake of love and friendship—“’tis a bond 
in men” (1.1.146). And Timon, with his wealth, wishes to strengthen this bond. A friend, 
according to Timon, gives gifts for a worthy cause. And what worthier cause than friendship 
itself? For Timon, friendship is the act of giving for the sake of friendship, hence its 
unconditional nature. His generosity is “unwise”; that is, imprudent, incautious, impolitic. This 
sort of uncalculated social behaviour unavoidably becomes inconsiderate. The high expectation 
that ensues from such inconsideration disregards social norms. It is indifferent toward the 
expectations of others. In other words, Timon has faith in the bond of friendship. It is his blind 
faith in friendship taken to its extremity that, on one hand, welcomes all, and on the other, 
becomes demanding and thus unwelcome. And from the point of view of those around him, his 
inconsideration and indifference appears “vicious.” 
The first act of the play focuses on characterizing Timon’s unconditional largesse. 
“Magic of bounty” (6) draws everyone to Timon’s free gifts. And, as Coppélia Kahn notes, 
according to Timon himself his magnanimity “needs no replenishment, it cannot be depleted, it 
has no limits” (39). One happy recipient praises Timon’s bounty thus: 
He pours it out. Plutus, the god of gold, 
Is but his steward. No meed but he repays 
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Sevenfold above itself; no gift to him 
But breeds the giver a return exceeding 
All use of quittance. (1.1.267–71) 
Ken Jackson claims that Timon “truly seeks the pure gift without exchange” (49). Anthony 
Dawson and Gretchen Minton, in their introduction, claim that Timon’s hospitality is “non-
reciprocal, and hence, in a crucial way, non-social” (73). These gifts are not given in 
recompense. Nor are they given with the expectation of recompense. But it is important to 
highlight that Timon’s “non-reciprocal” generosity is “non-social” in the sense that he gives 
blindly without the obligation of any contractual relationship. That is, he does not wish to secure 
the social bond of friendship through the calculated contract. Rather, he wishes to secure the 
“bond in men” through the reciprocal act of giving unconditionally. Timon envisions (vainly) a 
different sort of “non-reciprocal” relationship: a relationship that is absolutely, unconditionally 
reciprocal. That is what is “non-social” about his behaviour.59 
 With friendship Timon greets his guests, “Ceremony was but devised at first / To set a 
gloss on faint deeds, hollow welcomes, / Recanting goodness, sorry ere ’tis shown. / But where 
there is true friendship, there needs none” (1.2.16–19). According to Timon, “true friendship” is 
opposed to a “hollow” “ceremony” that is “devised” only “at first to set a gloss on … recanting 
goodness.” “Recanting goodness,” goodness that recants itself, goodness that chants itself back, 
goodness that calls back goodness. This is a perfect formulation for the remuneration that the 
																																								 																				
59 In “Shakespeare’s Classical Tragedies,” Coppélia Kahn observes that both Timon’s 
philanthropy and misanthropy “seem rooted in primitive fantasy rather than being rational 
responses to reality” (221). 
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economy of exchange exacts—the absolution of indebtedness. The type of friendship to which 
Timon is opposed is manifest when one of his creditors complains that Timon’s 
days and times are past, 
And my reliances on his fracted dates 
Have smit my credit. I love and honor him 
But must not break my back to heal his finger. 
Immediate are my needs, and my relief 
Must not be tossed and turned to me in words 
But find supply immediate. (2.1.21–27) 
The creditor bases “reliances” on dates. And due to the debtor’s “fracted dates,” there is an 
exaggerated urgency in his complaint. Since leniency on the debt would only heal the debtor’s 
finger but break the creditor’s back, the creditor insists on instant “relief” from the debt. 
Such largesse, such blindness, nevertheless, is dangerously incautious: “’Tis pity bounty 
had not eyes behind, / That man might ne’er be wretched for his mind” (1.2.158–59). And very 
soon, Timon, in Kahn’s words, “figuratively and literally, digs his own grave” (41). Is not 
Timon’s careless gift-giving similar to the careless “forgiveness of enemies” that Bacon 
identifies as the cause of Julius Caesar’s downfall? Timon’s friendship figures an altruism 
founded on faith that reciprocated friendship cannot accommodate. Reciprocated friendship, in 
contrast, is founded on the fear of not being repaid. Instead of faith, reciprocated friendship 
demands certainty. And in awe of Timon’s altruism, the citizens of Athens immediately reject its 
calling. This is the same awe that distances Cassius from Julius Caesar. And very soon, Julius 
Caesar is figuratively and literally cut from the Republic. 
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When Timon’s money runs out and he is pestered by creditors, Timon voices his 
confidence in the help of his friends: “Never speak or think / That Timon’s fortunes ’mong his 
friends can sink,” to which his steward Flavius responds, “I would I could not think it. That 
thought is bounty’s foe; / Being free itself, it thinks all others so” (2.2.224–27). Here, 
Shakespeare highlights this feature of free bounty (which foreshadows the protagonist’s 
downfall): blind faith in the free bounty of others. What Shakespeare presents in the first two 
acts of this play is what is missing in his Julius Caesar. Act three portrays a needy Timon full of 
wants. 
Like Julius Caesar, Timon, through intermediaries, tests the generosity of those who have 
in the past benefited from his generosity. Note how earlier Timon describes to Flavius his 
assurance of the generosity of others: “And in some sort these wants of mine are crowned / That 
I account them blessings. For by these / Shall I try friends. You shall perceive how you / Mistake 
my fortunes: I am wealthy in my friends” (2.2.176–79). Unlike the recipients of his gifts, he does 
not go to them himself; he sends his servants to ask for money. Timon expects to be given 
money willingly. Then we are shown three instances of rejection. Timon’s “mouth-friends” 
(3.6.88) refuse to help because they fear that their money will not be returned: “this is no time to 
lend money,” says one friend, “especially upon bare friendship without security” (3.1.37–38). As 
Kahn puts it, “Timon gave as a friend, and expects to borrow as a friend, but instead he is being 
treated like any debtor bound not by the ties of friendship but by the conditions of a legal 
contract” (50). And finally, just as Julius Caesar leaves the festival of the Lupa feeling betrayed 
by a Rome that does not trust him with a crown, Timon leaves an Athens that “girdles in those 
wolves” (4.1.2) who do not trust their money to him on “bare friendship” alone. “Broken by the 
discovery of his friends’ ingratitude,” Russ McDonald summarizes, “disillusioned with their 
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flattery, a victim finally of empty promises, Timon retreats into a desert cave” (The Arts of 
Language 186). 
Both societies obdurately resist being obligated to give freely. In the morning of the Ides 
of March, Julius Caesar believes that his guests are “like friends” (2.2.128) because of their 
(dishonest) promise to generously “give this day a crown to mighty Caesar” (94). Similarly, 
Timon’s guests are “like brothers” (1.2.99). “We are born to do benefits,” Timon declares, “and 
what better or properer can we call our own than the riches of our friends?” (97–98). While 
uncalculated generosity in another is celebrated, there is an aggressive resistance at the heart of 
these cities that is highly sensitive to the demand of being freely generous oneself, a resistance 
that wards off, in Athens, the “disease of all-shunned poverty” (4.2.14), and in Rome, “servile 
fearfulness.” The desire to not give to the other, in sum, is the aggressive reaction to the other’s 
desire to be given. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Timon and Julius Caesar give freely in the name of friendship. Such absolute freedom is 
rigorously inattentive to the enclosure imposed by the law of reciprocity. In the name of 
friendship and with the same rigorous inattention, they also become too demanding. While 
Athens and Rome value friendship, the friendship that Timon and Julius Caesar demand is a 
heavy ask. The city appreciates and enjoys the liberality but, from fear of an outstanding debt, 
cannot abide by the ambitious tyrannical demand. And ingratitude is necessarily a consequence 
of casting out their demanding friendship. The trauma of the tyranny suppresses the appreciation 




Sham’st thou to show thy dang’rous brow by night 
When evils are most free? Oh, then, by day 
Where wilt thou find a cavern dark enough 
To mask thy monstrous visage? Seek none, conspiracy. 
Hide it in smiles and affability. (2.1.77–82; emphasis added) 
The faithful Flavius recognizes the same secret in the “ingrateful seat / Of monstrous friends” 
(4.2.45–46; emphasis added). So does the onlooker: “oh, see the monstrousness of man / When 
he looks out in an ungrateful shape!” (3.2.67–68; emphasis added).60 Could not the fact that 
tyranny pushes generosity into oblivion be the reason why the playwright leaves the dictator’s 
																																								 																				
60 In Othello, it is jealousy that is associated with the “monstrous.” At the end of the first act, 
Iago devises his devious plot: “Hell and night / Must bring this monstrous birth to the world’s 
light” (1.3.381–82). In the third act, Othello falls prey to the “monster” in Iago’s thought 
(3.3.106) and is then gradually possessed by the “green-eyed monster” (164). But King Lear, like 
Timon, is devastated by the “Monster ingratitude!” (1.5.33). This “marble-hearted fiend,” Lear 
bewails, is “More hideous when thou show’st thee in a child / Than the sea-monster” (1.4.225–
27). Similarly, in Coriolanus, the plebeians who rebel against Coriolanus are referred to as the 
“monster” (3.1.92). One citizen deliberates over standing up to Coriolanus’s hostility in spite of 
his many services to Rome thus: “Ingratitude is monstrous, and for the multitude to be ingrateful 
were to make a monster of the multitude, of the which we, being members, should bring 
ourselves to be monstrous members” (2.3.9–12). 
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magnanimity out in Julius Caesar? The play is haunted by the forgetting of gratitude—just as 
























Shakespeare’s Tragic Rhetoric of Temptation 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapters, I have looked at a number of uses for the rhetorical figure 
meiosis. In what follows, I will look at this figure from the point of view of its opposite figure—
paradiastole. By focusing on the rhetoric of temptation in King Lear, Julius Caesar, Macbeth, 
and Othello, I will show that in order for temptation to appear attractive, it requires the 
dignifying translation of paradiastole. Moreover, we will see that paradiastole contains within 
itself the operation of meiosis. 
“I do love thee; and when I love thee not / Chaos is come again” (3.3.90–91). How does 
Iago bring about the murderous chaos in Othello’s marriage? Brutus loves Julius Caesar, yet 
Cassius turns him against “the foremost man of all this world” (4.3.22). Macbeth is the king’s 
loyal “kinsman,” “subject,” and “host” (1.7.13–14), but the “weird sisters” (1.5.7) and his 
“dearest partner of greatness” (9–10) provoke him to ruthlessly assassinate the helpless Duncan 
in his sleep. And how do Goneril and Regan’s protestations of their love for the old Lear subtly 
contribute to his “evil” (1.1.164) decision to banish Cordelia despite the fact that he “loved her 
most” (120)? This chapter examines the rhetorical strategy that is employed by these characters 
whose temptation leads to horrible consequences. I will analyze a common feature in these 
tragedies: the “friendly” voice that summons malice. This voice (like that of “honest” Iago) is 
trusted as an ally because it identifies with a hidden drive that it recognizes in its trusting 
interlocutor. 
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More specifically, I hope to distinguish two dimensions of this malicious rhetorical 
identification. First, the tempter identifies a latent drive in the victim. This drive is innocuous so 
long as it remains hidden—that is, unexpressed. Lady Macbeth does not invent ambition in 
Macbeth; she invents an argument that inspires its unhindered expression in him: “Hie thee 
hither, / That I may pour my spirits in thine ear / And chastise with the valor of my tongue / All 
that impedes thee from the golden round” (1.5.23–26). To be able to embolden their father in his 
“hideous rashness” (1.1.149)—his careless decision to abdicate his sovereign responsibilities—
Goneril and Regan recognize Lear’s “unruly waywardness” (294) and “unconstant starts” (296). 
The tempter is dangerously perceptive. Consider Julius Caesar’s concern regarding Cassius: “He 
is a great observer, and he looks / Quite through the deeds of men” (1.2.202–03). 
This is one sense in which temptation rests on identification. But the formation of this 
destructive alliance requires more than identifying (and encouraging) the dormant tendency. The 
tempter identifies with his victim by giving him the assurance that he also pursues this tendency. 
To foment jealousy in Othello, Iago has first to “confess” that his own “nature’s plague” is to 
“spy into abuses” (3.3.145–46). The union is cemented by a shared goal. And such a union 
necessarily entails antagonism. In bonding with his victim by wheedling him into believing in a 
common objective, the tempter creates a common enemy out of the one who is opposed to the 
drive—a “scapegoat,” in the words of Kenneth Burke, who serves as “a device that unifies all 
those who share the same enemy” (“Terministic Screens” 51). Here develops the motive for 
murder in these tragedies. Desdemona is not simply the object of Othello’s jealousy. Her trusting 
and forgiving nature stands opposed to his doubtful, vengeful paranoia. Temptation, in short, 
entails the identification of and with the drive of its prey. 
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My argument in this chapter is that the two dimensions of identification in temptation are 
epitomized by the flattering amplification in paradiastole and the belittling diminution in 
meiosis. And before turning to the tragedies to examine the reversal of values that occurs in the 
rhetoric of temptation, in the first section of the chapter, with reference to ancient and early 
modern texts on the art of rhetoric, I will present a brief account of the manner in which 
paradiastole creates meaning. 
 
THE GAME OF PARADIASTOLE 
The two rhetorical figures paradiastole and meiosis bring about a reversal of values—the 
one inflates its subject, the other deflates. For paradiastole, Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria 
offers the following as example: “When you call [appelles] yourself wise instead of cunning, 
brave instead of over-confident, careful instead of mean” (4: 139). Quintilian calls this figure 
“distinction” and emphasizes that it is a form of “definition” (“by which similar ideas are 
distinguished”). Paradiastole is an appellation. More precisely, it is the flattering renaming of a 
vice as a virtue “similar” to it—the flattering renaming of a cunning man, for instance, as a wise 
man. In view of the examples that Rhetorica ad Herennium provides for definitio (for instance: 
“That act of yours is not bravery, but recklessness, because to be brave is to disdain toil and 
peril, for a useful purpose and after weighing the advantages, while to be reckless is to undertake 
perils like a gladiator, suffering pain without taking thought”), the author seems to have meiosis 
in mind (317). 
The type of amplification and diminution in paradiastole and meiosis is not always 
discussed among the figures by manuals of rhetoric. Quintilian himself is reluctant to regard 
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paradiastole as a figure. Aristotle’s Rhetoric, for instance, teaches this rhetorical strategy to the 
would-be orator in the section dealing with epideictic oratory: 
One should assume that qualities that are close to actual ones are much the same as 
regards both praise and blame; for example, that a cautious person is cold and designing 
and that a simple person is amiable or that one who does not show anger is calm; and 
[when praising] one should always take each of the attendant terms in the best sense; for 
example, [one should call] an irascible and excitable person “straightforward” and an 
arrogant person “high-minded” and “imposing” and [speak of] those given to excess as 
actually in states of virtue, for example, the rash one as “courageous,” the spendthrift as 
“liberal.” (79) 
Rhetorica ad Herennium discusses this device in the section dealing with deliberative oratory. 
After introducing the virtues that are relevant to “political deliberation” (161)—wisdom, justice, 
courage, and temperance—the author advises that they “are to be enlarged upon if we are 
recommending them, but depreciated if we are urging that they be disregarded”: the orator is to 
describe what his opponent calls justice as “cowardice, and sloth, and perverse generosity”; 
wisdom as “impertinent, babbling, and offensive cleverness”; temperance as “inaction and lax 
indifference”; and courage as “reckless temerity” (167–69). And Cicero, after discussing the 
same four virtues of deliberative oratory in De Inventione, explains that vice is not only the 
“opposites” of these virtues “but also those qualities which seem akin and close to these but are 
really far removed from them” (333). 
The effective application of paradiastole and meiosis is among the skills of an orator 
equipped for argumentum in utramque partem, which, as Russ McDonald explains, is a 
significant practice in rhetorical education during the early modern period, and of which 
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Shakespeare makes use “in the creation of dramatic conflict” (“Rhetoric and Theater” 451).61 In 
his study of the influence of examples of paradiastole in ancient Greek and Roman texts on early 
modern rhetorical handbooks, Quentin Skinner asserts that Wilson’s Arte of Rhetorique is the 
first in England to discuss this form of “rhetorical redescription” (“Paradiastole” 151). Wilson 
considers giving “vices the names of vertues” as a useful “kinde of amplification” (138–39). But, 
Skinner continues, it is Peacham’s Garden of Eloquence and Puttenham’s Arte of English Poesie 
that, following Quintilian, first name and define this technique as paradiastole among the figures 
(“Paradiastole” 152). 
Puttenham and Peacham, however, feel differently about this figure. In addition to 
flattery, as Puttenham notes, the Curry-Favel is used for “soothing” and “excusing”; it 
extenuates the vice by “moderating and abating” its severity (269). That is, it symbolically makes 
light of a serious transgression by veiling it behind an agreeable translation. The name Curry-
Favel, Skinner explains, “drawn from the grooming of horses, doubly hints at the idea of 
smoothing over blemishes or faults. To ‘curry’ means to smooth or comb out, while Fauvel was 
the name of the horse in Gervais de Bus’s fourteenth-century poem, Le roman de Fauvel, whose 
initials spell out the vices of Flaterie, Avarice, Vilanie, Variete, Envie and Laschete” (Reason 
and Rhetoric 164–65). Puttenham, in other words, as Daniel Javitch points out, is not troubled by 
																																								 																				
61 For a discussion on Iago’s use of argumentum in utramque partem, see Emily Pitts Donahoe, 
“In Utramque Partem: Arguing Both Sides of the Question in Othello,” English Literary 
Renaissance, vol. 48, no. 3, 2018, pp. 314–38. And for the use of this device in Julius Caesar, 
see Don J. Kraemer, Jr., “‘Alas, thou hast misconstrued every thing’: Amplifying Words and 
Things in Julius Caesar,” Rhetorica, vol. 9, no. 2, 1991, pp. 165–78. 
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the figure’s “moral or epistemological dubiousness”; he is interested in its “aesthetic effect” 
(“Poetry and Court Conduct” 877). Skinner writes that he is interested in its ability to invent 
“unfamiliar ways” to view an action (“Moral Ambiguity” 279). And Laura Kolb writes that he is 
interested in its ability to “subtly … alter shared perceptions and social reality” (“Debt’s Poetry” 
403). Peacham, on the other hand, does not condone this “vice of speech,” for it opposes the 
truth and maintains wickedness (168–69). 
The lie of paradiastole is the discovery of a good in something that is conventionally 
condemned as bad.62 It is, in Bacon’s words in his essay on praise, “shews, and species virtutibus 
similes” (258–59). A fit device for epideictic oratory, paradiastole turns opprobrium into 
approbation. In the process of this transformation, paradiastole self-destructively undermines 
any claim to truth. What is exposed in the paradiastolic lie is that both the customary 
disparaging interpretation and the new adulatory interpretation fail at perfect definition. In fact, 
paradiastole changes the nature of definition: what follows the sabotage of the truth-telling 
signifier is a contest between inadequate signifiers to grasp an elusive signified. The chaotic 
																																								 																				
62 It is important to emphasize here that paradiastole is different from exaggerated praise. While 
both may be employed for purposes of flattery or temptation, the lie of exaggerated praise is an 
effect of hyperbole. Unlike paradiastole, hyperbolic praise does not entail the translation of a 
negative concept into its positive version. Among Shakespeare’s tragic heroes, it is perhaps 
Coriolanus who is most immune to exaggerated praise. In the opening Act, the “modest” 
Coriolanus rebukes Cominius and Lartius for praising his accomplishments: “You shout me forth 
/ In acclamations hyperbolical; / As if I loved my little should be dieted / In praises sauced with 
lies” (1.9.50–53). 
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conflict that results from this lie is evident, when used with ill intentions. In A Rhetoric of 
Motives, Burke writes that “a thing is identified by its properties”; its identity is established by 
“ethical” descriptions of its properties (23–24). And “cunning” rhetoric establishes identity by 
describing a property of interest “using terms not incisive enough to criticize it properly” (36). 
Thus, in rhetorical identification, there is always “the possibility of malice and the lie”; there is 
always the possibility of “deliberate cunning” when “an identification favorable to the speaker or 
his cause is made to seem favorable to the audience” (45). Shakespeare encapsulates the 
workings of this evil lie in the speech of Hecate (3.5.2–33), the “mistress” of the witches in 
Macbeth. The “art” of this “close contriver of all harms” has “a dismal and a fatal end”: “distilled 
by magic sleights,” the “artificial sprites” that she conjures up, “by the strength of their illusion,” 
bring about “confusion.” 
 
King Lear 
Let us look at the paradiastolic game in King Lear. Whereas Julius Caesar is cut from the 
Republic because of his inattention to the opinion of others, King Lear is shut out of his kingdom 
as a result of blindly leaning on what his daughters say (or do not say). As the “all-licensed” 
(1.4.168) Fool mockingly observes, Lear was “a pretty fellow” when he had “no need to care 
for” their opinion (159–60). It is his own obligations to which he is inattentive, while naively 
hoping to “retain / The name and all th’addition to a king” (1.1.132–33). Stephen Greenblatt 
groups Lear with Richard II, Mark Antony (in Antony and Cleopatra), Coriolanus, Duke 
Vincentio, and Prospero. What these characters have in common is “the desire to escape from the 
burdens of governance,” which “leads to disaster” (Shakespeare’s Freedom 81). In The 
Development of Shakespeare’s Rhetoric, Stefan Keller points to the many times that Lear resorts 
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to the rhetorical figure aposiopesis (literally meaning “becoming silent”) (192–95). According to 
Puttenham, an “auricular figure of defect,” the “Figure of Silence” or the “Figure of 
Interruption,” which is “when we begin to speak a thing and break off in the middle way,” can 
serve several purposes: when the subject is “needed no further to be spoken of,” when the 
speaker is “ashamed or afraid” to speak, or when the speaker wants to appear “threatening, and 
to show a moderation of anger” (250). Keller identifies these functions in Lear’s use of the 
figure—both in interrupting the speech of others (like Kent in the opening scene) and his own 
speech. Can we not also consider this figure, which withdraws from speech before it is 
completed, in the context of King Lear, to epitomize the act of abandonment? After all, Peacham 
does liken the use of aposiopesis to retreat in war (118). 
Aside from his anger, fear, and shame, does this figure not also illustrate Lear’s “fast 
intent / To shake all cares and business” so that he can “unburdened crawl toward death” 
(1.1.36–39)? Lear’s “darker purpose” (34) is the shameless dereliction of his duties, the 
deliberate avoidance of fulfilling them. His need for love from his daughters is a need to depend 
on them (and loving Cordelia “most,” he relies mainly on “her kind nursery” [120–21]). By 
securing the future of his daughters with their inheritance and in return demanding security from 
them, Lear is, Katharine Maus writes, “divesting himself prematurely” (Being and Having 120). 
Lear’s wish, therefore, is to unburden himself of the autonomy required for carrying out one’s 
responsibilities, the most important of which is the caring for oneself. 
Goneril and Regan team up with their father not simply by means of their (extravagant 
and empty) promises to look after him—it is by means of what their promises of love imply. 
Their moving speeches in the opening scene contain implicitly within themselves Lear’s explicit 
“darker purpose.” When Goneril boasts of her unspeakable love (“A love that makes breath poor 
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and speech unable” [1.1.58]), she does more than vow to devote herself entirely to her father’s 
imposition. As does Regan, who is “made of that self-mettle” (67) as her sister, when she 
contends that she is “alone felicitate” (73) in loving Lear and that she is “an enemy to all other 
joys” (71). In addition to giving assurance to their father that they will fulfil his need, the astute 
sisters identify with this need. Goneril and Regan’s “glib and oily” (222) declarations of their 
love for Lear insinuate a blatant lack of care for their own responsibilities as wives to their 
husbands.63 
In flattering her irresponsible father, Goneril describes her own avoidance of (marital) 
responsibilities as an indescribable good: 
Sir, I love you more than word can wield the matter: 
Dearer than eyesight, space, and liberty, 
Beyond what can be valued rich or rare, 
																																								 																				
63 Lynda Boose argues that Cordelia’s inheritance is Lear’s “attempt to keep her”; Lear “will not 
freely give his daughter her endowment unless she purchases it with pledges that would nullify 
those required by the wedding ceremony” (“The Father and the Bride” 332–33). Similarly, in his 
psychoanalytic reading of the play, Jeffrey Stern sees Lear’s love test as a marriage ceremony: 
before choosing a husband for Cordelia, Lear demands “the ultimate claim of her affection as 
well as of her allegiance.” “Pledging her truth of love to Lear,” Stern asserts, “she will in effect 
be plighting her troth to him.” The same applies, Stern contends, to Goneril and Regan—Lear 
“will give his lands to their husbands after the daughters have sworn a husband’s prerogative to 
him.” Thus, Lear intends “to regain by marrying its new queen(s) the kingdom he has 
renounced” (“The Transference of the Kingdom” 300). 
	 170 
No less than life, with grace, health, beauty, honor, 
As much as child e’er loved or father found, 
A love that makes breath poor and speech unable. 
Beyond all manner of so much I love you. (1.1.53–59) 
Unlike Cordelia, Regan plays the paradiastolic game of undercutting a previous interpretation by 
proposing a more appealing one, and outdoes Goneril: 
I am made of that self-mettle as my sister 
And prize me at her worth. In my true heart 
I find she names my very deed of love, 
Only she comes too short, that I profess 
Myself an enemy to all other joys 
Which the most precious square of sense professes, 
And find I am alone felicitate 
In your dear highness’ love. (67–74) 
Both speeches are attempts to “find” a name (in terms of love) for careless dependency. These 
rhetorical inventions, on the surface, pleasingly express the love of a child to her parent. Both 
instances, however, contain a disguised indifference to the love of a wife to her husband. More 
than their pleasing expression of filial love, it is this inconsideration that appeals to Lear’s own 
carelessness. 
At this point, Lear expects Cordelia to invent an even “more opulent” (84) name. But 
Cordelia instantly detects her sisters’ ruse and exposes it: 
Why have my sisters husbands if they say 
They love you all? Happily, when I shall wed, 
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That lord whose hand must take my plight shall carry 
Half my love with him, half my care and duty. 
Sure, I shall never marry like my sisters.64 (97–101) 
Cordelia’s “nothing” is a refusal to take part in the paradiastolic game of “more [or] less”: “I 
love your majesty / According to my bond, no more nor less” (90–91). Her defiance is a defence 
of acting responsibly in accordance with one’s “bond” after Goneril and Regan vie with each 
other to dignify irresponsibility. It is, as Kenneth Graham puts it, “the resistance of a consensual 
moral law that has been driven underground” (“Plainness” 455). 
It is worth adding that in contrast to Goneril and Regan’s glib game of paradiastole, Kent 
plays the dangerous game of parrhesia. In The Courage of the Truth, Michel Foucault writes that 
																																								 																				
64 Under different circumstances, in Othello, Desdemona makes a similar argument for “divided” 
love for father and husband: 
My noble father, 
I do perceive here a divided duty. 
To you I am bound for life and education; 
My life and education both do learn me 
How to respect you. You are the lord of duty; 
I am, hitherto, you daughter. But here’s my husband, 
And so much duty as my mother showed 
To you, preferring you before her father, 
So much I challenge that I may profess 
Due to the Moor my lord. (1.3.179–88)	
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this tragedy “begins with a story of parrhesia, a test of frankness: who will tell the king the 
truth?” (286). In his Fearless Speech, Foucault argues that parrhesia entails frankness, truth, risk 
of punishment, criticism, and sense of duty. Based on Quintilian’s question, “What is less 
‘figured’ than true freedom?” (4: 49), Foucault writes that parrhesia is “the zero ground” of 
rhetorical figures (21). Such truth-telling is devoid of any flattering amplification. Foucault 
explains that the rhetorician, to persuade his audience, may conceal his own opinion beneath 
rhetorical devices, but the parrhesiastes frankly expresses “his own opinion … avoiding any kind 
of rhetorical form which would veil what he thinks” (12). And he does not have any doubts about 
the truth of his opinion: “The parrhesiastes says what is true because he knows that it is true; and 
he knows that it is true because it is really true” (14). He is in possession of the truth and his 
“truth-having is guaranteed by the possession of certain moral qualities,” the most important of 
which is courage (15). Courage is the “proof” of his sincerity because of the risk he takes in 
standing up to a figure of authority to disclose his truth; he may even “risk death to tell the truth 
instead of reposing in the security of a life where the truth goes unspoken” (17). 
The danger in the game of parrhesia comes from the possibility of the critical truth 
“hurting or angering” the figure of authority “who exercises power over him” (17). Parrhesia is 
always from “below” and aimed at “above” (18). Notwithstanding the danger involved, the 
parrhesiastes speaks the truth not because he is forced to speak, for he is “free to keep silent,” 
but because it is his duty; his voluntary truth-telling is “out of a sense of moral obligation” (19). 
In parrhesia, Foucault summarize, “the speaker uses his freedom and chooses frankness instead 
of persuasion, truth instead of falsehood or silence, the risk of death instead of life and security, 
criticism instead of flattery, and moral duty instead of self-interest and moral apathy” (20). 
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The parrhesiastic declaration of one’s own opinion (in spite of hurting or angering the 
other) stands in stark contrast to the flattering identification with the other. Wilson has nothing 
but praise for the former strategy. In a world filled with “flatterers, fauners, and soothers of mens 
sayings,” Wilson wishes there would be more “honest” orators who “speake boldly and without 
feare, euen to the proudest of them” (230). It is therefore quite interesting that Institutio Oratoria 
considers oratione libera as a figure only when it is “feigned and artificially produced,” only 
when it is a mask for adulatio (4: 48–49), and that licentia in Rhetorica ad Herennium 
impartially encompasses truth-telling and flattering identification (348–55). According to the 
latter text, there are two types of licentia. The first is “when, talking before those to whom we 
owe reverence or fear, we yet exercise our right to speak out, because we seem justified in 
reprehending them, or persons dear to them, for some fault.” But to avoid appearing “pungent,” 
the orator is to add praise (laude) to his licentia, for “the praise frees the hearer from wrath and 
annoyance, and the frankness deters him from error.”65 What is more, such precautionary praise 
leads to friendliness (amicitia): the orator will seem “friendly both to the hearers and to the 
truth.” And the second is “craftier” than the first. It is, under the “pretence” of frankness, either 
to simulate fear about stating that which the audience finds acceptable or to reproach that which 
the audience finds reproachful. This type of licentia does not require to be “mitigated by praise” 
because it is “of itself agreeable to the hearer’s frame of mind.” 
																																								 																				
65 Puttenham has this type in mind in presenting parrhesia as the need of the “fine and subtle 
persuader” to “seem to bespeak pardon” so as to palliate the “offence or scandal” of his 
“licentiousness” (312). 
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Neither type of licentia (nor Quintilian’s oratione libera when it is a cover for flattery) is 
the dangerous parrhesia that Foucault examines in his genealogy. In the first type, which leads to 
amity between the speaker and the hearer, praise defuses the risk involved in the exposure of the 
truth. It is no longer blunt, unvarnished truth but truth “mitigated” by paradiastolic laud. As 
David Colclough observes, parrhesia becomes “a figure of excusing, essentially an apology for 
speaking out, rather than the act of speaking out itself” (“The Rhetoric of Free Speech” 194). 
And the second type is paradiastolic or meiotic identification under the guise of truth.66 
Accordingly, the “all-licensed” Fool, despite all of his blunt truth-telling, does not count 
as a parrhesiastes precisely because he is “all-licensed” and consequently immune to Lear’s 
anger.67 More relevant to the present study, it becomes clear that it is not only the content of 
Kent’s truth that hurts and angers his king. His dutiful participation in the dangerous game of 
parrhesia “out of a sense of moral obligation” is a direct offence to Lear’s decision to “shake” all 
of his duties and obligations. Kent’s “unmannerly” objection to the “mad” Lear hopes to bluntly 
correct his misjudgement of Cordelia: 
What wouldst thou do, old man? 
Think’st thou that duty shall have dread to speak 
When power to flattery bows? 
																																								 																				
66 It is not surprising, then, that after licentia, the author discusses deminutio, which is to 
“moderate and soften” the speech “in order to avoid the impression of arrogant display” (355). 
67 A good example of parrhesia occurs in Othello when, at the end of the play, Emilia finally 
finds the courage to speak out against her husband despite the consequences of disclosing the 
truth. 
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To plainness honor’s bound 
When majesty falls to folly. Reserve thy state, 
And in thy best consideration check 
This hideous rashness. Answer my life my judgment: 
Thy youngest daughter does not love thee least, 
Nor are those empty-hearted whose low sounds 
Reverb no hollowness. (1.1.142–52) 
But for the Lear whose “bow is bent and drawn” (140), the “untender” (103) truth pales in 
comparison to the seductive lies. 
Lear sides with Goneril and Regan against Cordelia because their subtle 
acknowledgement of their inattention to duty in their exaggerated testimonies of exclusive love 
taps into Lear’s own desire to free himself of “all cares and business.” He falls for their replies to 
his test of love not because they assure him that they will care for him (for Cordelia promises 
that as well) but because they indirectly cheer his intention to put himself completely in the care 
of his daughters—they indirectly cheer dependability. And he grows angry at Cordelia’s 
“nothing” for two reasons. First, as William Dodd notes, “aware that Lear is exercising power 
over her by requiring her to place her agency at his service,” Cordelia’s refusal to care only for 
him is a refusal to sacrifice her “autonomy” (“Impossible Worlds” 490). More importantly, her 
refusal angers Lear because it indirectly counsels him to preserve his own autonomy and care for 
himself—just as Kent’s warning to “reserve thy state” (147) angers him. Cordelia’s adamant 
“plainness” (1.1.126), as Graham puts it, is composed of patient self-sufficiency and angry 
assertiveness, “withdrawal from emotional involvement with the world around it” and “forceful 
declarations or assertions to influence the world from which it is withdrawing” (“Plainness” 
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441). Her silence is both a pronouncement of her independence and a denouncement of her 
father’s dependence.68 
Like Timon of Athens, Lear’s careless generosity soon meets with disappointment. His 
dependence on Goneril and Regan spirals out of control and into their humiliating desertion of 
him. Ironically, it is the “weary negligence” (1.3.12) and “faint neglect” (1.4.62) of Goneril that 
initiates the rift between the father and his wicked daughters. The very quality that lovingly 
unites them against Cordelia now hatefully divides them. (Another aspect of this irony is that it is 
Cordelia—not Goneril and Regan—who later in the plot separates from her husband to care for 
her father.) Even so, Lear stubbornly carries on with his carelessness: after the failure of 
surrendering his royal powers to the “unnatural hags” (2.2.459), he surrenders himself into the 
care of nature (“Here I stand your slave, / A poor, infirm, weak, and despised old man” [3.2.19–
20]). This time, however, Lear is recklessly aware of the dangers involved: “you servile 
ministers” of nature “That will with two pernicious daughters join / Your high-engendered 
battles ’gainst a head / So old and white as this” (21–24). His negligence of himself reaches its 
climax as he gradually dispenses with even his reason. And in madness, he approaches “the thing 
itself”: “Unaccommodated man” (3.4.98–99). The king divests himself of the most basic 




68 This reluctance to take responsibility that sets the plot in motion also concludes it. As 
Greenblatt observes, the play ends with “a chorus of renunciation”; and it remains unclear who 
among the survivors will take control of Britain (Shakespeare’s Freedom 92). 
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Returning to paradiastole, we find that it does more than lie. As the rhetorical figure 
identifies the vice by interpreting it as a virtue, in commending it, the rhetorician identifies with 
the vice. In the act of praise, the subject is the advocate of its object. Moreover, this form of 
praise (the discovery of goodness in the bad object) unavoidably lays blame on the subject of the 
initial blame that it is countervailing. The established negative interpretation is denounced as a 
lie. In their analysis of paradiastole in Montaigne and Hobbes, Rachelle Gold and Jim Pearce 
underline the “violence” and “anxiety” in this figure of “strife,” a figure that is “born of and 
tending toward the reproduction of contention” (“The Perils of Paradiastole” 188). Blame 
operates in tandem with praise in paradiastole. As Frank Whigham observes in Ambition and 
Privilege, “flattery and slander … interpenetrate absolutely” (40). With regard to Puttenham’s 
example of calling an unthrift a liberal gentleman, Whigham writes: “a ‘literal’ description of the 
‘fact’ of prodigality in the spendthrift can be defused by terming the quality ‘liberality’ and so 
converting the criticism to praise. At the same time, such a conversion deflects attention from the 
substantive remark to the character of the critic; not only is the spendthrift ‘really’ a liberal 
gentleman, but the critic is a slanderer” (40). Let us now look at how Cassius slanders Julius 
Caesar as he glorifies envy. 
Like Othello, Brutus murders one whom he loves out of honour, out of a sense of duty to 
prevent a future offence: 
But ’tis a common proof 
That lowliness is young ambition’s ladder 
Whereto the climber upward turns his face; 
But when he once attains the upmost round 
He then unto the ladder turns his back, 
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Looks in the clouds, scorning the base degrees 
By which he did ascend. So Caesar may; 
Then, lest he may, prevent. And since the quarrel 
Will bear no color for the thing he is, 
Fashion it thus: that what he is, augmented, 
Would run to these and these extremities. 
And therefore think him as a serpent’s egg 
Which, hatched, would as his kind grow mischievous, 
And kill him in the shell. (2.1.21–34) 
Brutus “fashions” a suspicion into a surety. Or, as Garry Wills puts it, Brutus treats a 
“hypothetical” (that is, Julius Caesar’s tyranny) as an “inevitability,” and leads the conspirators 
to execute “an actual assassination in the name of that hypothetical tyranny” (Rome and Rhetoric 
65). Brutus’s worries about the future of Rome, however, are not misguided. The Republic is 
losing its freedom of speech. The first act of the play contains several references to the 
suppression and censorship that Julius Caesar has implemented in Rome. The tribunes of the 
people, Murellus and Flavius, “for pulling scarves off Caesar’s images, are put to silence” 
(1.2.278–79). When talking Caska into joining the conspiracy, Cassius is cautious not to use 
Julius Caesar’s name (“Now could I, Caska, name to thee a man” [1.3.72]). And when the 
“blunt” (1.2.288) Caska asks if the person under discussion is Julius Caesar, Cassius replies, “Let 
it be who it is” (1.3.80). Even Brutus is afraid to engage in a dialogue with Cassius when the 
subject is Julius Caesar (1.2.162–75). Brutus instructs Cassius to continue their conversation in 
the privacy of their homes (296–99). And the second Act begins with the secret meeting of the 
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“faction” (2.1.77) in Brutus’s garden at night. Thus, compared to the conspiracy of Othello and 
Iago, theirs is not a conspiracy born of deluded paranoia. 
Like Othello, Brutus wishes in vain that he could put a stop to this future threat without 
having to shed blood: 
We all stand up against the spirit of Caesar, 
And in the spirit of men there is no blood. 
Oh, that we then could come by Caesar’s spirit 
And not dismember Caesar! But, alas, 
Caesar must bleed for it. (167–71) 
Unlike Othello, however, it is not the drive to punish past misdeed that moves Brutus but rather 
the drive to equality. There is an uncompromising resistance to being abused in Othello; in 
Brutus, to being overshadowed. Othello murders Desdemona because of her alleged adultery, 
Brutus murders Julius Caesar because his dictatorship would infringe upon the rightful freedom 
of all Romans. 
To defeat the rise of a dictator, in the opening Act, Cassius ennobles (and enables) envy 
when he urges Brutus to carefully observe his own name by comparing it with that of Julius 
Caesar, for envy develops from such comparison: 
“Brutus” and “Caesar”—what should be in that “Caesar”? 
Why should that name be sounded more than yours? 
Write them together, yours is as fair a name; 
Sound them, it doth become the mouth as well; 
Weigh them, it is as heavy; conjure with ’em, 
“Brutus” will start a spirit as soon as “Caesar.” (1.2.142–47) 
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But by honouring envy, by honouring “thoughts of great value, worthy cogitations” (50), Cassius 
is also furtively inveighing against the man who upbraids careful observation (201–03), the man 
who with his careless nod has “become a god” (116). In The Gay Science, Friedrich Nietzsche 
paradiastolically renames the honourable envy of Brutus that brings down the despotic Julius 
Caesar as “Independence of the soul”: “No sacrifice can be too great for that: one must be 
capable of sacrificing one’s dearest friend for it, even if he should also be the most glorious 
human being, an ornament of the world, a genius without peer—if one loves freedom as the 
freedom of great souls and he threatens this kind of freedom” (150). Nietzsche hints at the 
difference between the envy of Brutus and Cassius when he highlights Brutus’s “finest honor” in 
appreciating the “height” of Julius Caesar. The spiteful Cassius does not think highly of Julius 
Caesar. 
“Since Cassius first did whet me against Caesar,” Brutus soliloquizes, “I have not slept” 
(2.1.61–62). Taking into account that Julius Caesar “would be crowned” (12), “whetting” Brutus 
against Julius Caesar signifies urging him to realize that he must take a stand against Julius 
Caesar’s “high-sighted tyranny” (117). Similarly, in Macbeth, the verb whet (etymologically 
meaning “to sharpen”) connotes the violent reaction to tyranny. Malcolm convinces Macduff to 
revenge the slaughter of his family: “Be this the whetstone of your sword. Let grief / Convert to 
anger; blunt not the heart, enrage it” (4.3.228–29). In the bloody context of Macbeth, whet is 
associated with anger, which the composed Brutus avoids. And in Hamlet, the ghost of the father 
reappears to “whet” the son’s “almost blunted purpose” (3.4.110). Denmark and Scotland are not 
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opposed to kingship itself—the problem is the murderous usurpation of the crown.69 The Roman 
Republic, on the other hand, due to its bitter experience with monarchy, equates kingship with 
tyranny (“My ancestors did from the streets of Rome / The Tarquin drive when he was called a 
king” [2.1.53–54]). “Whetting” Brutus against Julius Caesar also foreshadows the manner of the 
assassination: Julius Caesar is stabbed to death for his ambition. Thus, Brutus has not been able 
to sleep (as his wife confirms [252]) ever since he has sharpened his resolve and his sword to 
prevent the tyrannical rule of Julius Caesar. Moreover, recalling Celia’s remark, in As You Like 
It, that “the dullness of the fool is the whetstone of the wits” (1.2.49–50), whetting is associated 
with thinking.70 Brutus’s initiation into the conspiracy begins with his “friend” (1.2.36) Cassius 
																																								 																				
69 In Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling, Michel Foucault argues that Shakespeare’s political plays 
centre around “the question of the foundation of sovereign right”: “How can a sovereign succeed 
in legitimately exercising power that he seized through war, revolt, civil war, crime, or violating 
oaths?” (58). Shakespeare seems to also be interested in the question of dynastic succession. 
With regard to Macbeth, in “Linguistic Taboos and the ‘Unscene’ of Fear in Macbeth,” Silvia 
Bigliazzi claims that through the character of Banquo, Shakespeare presents a contradiction that 
makes “the idea of dynastic succession ambiguous”: Banquo “reinstat[es] patrilineality and at the 
same time challeng[es] the very idea of royal descent, as Banquo is no king himself” (57). 
70 It is worth mentioning that the consonant pairing of whet with wit is a common topic in early 
modern texts. Thomas Wilson, for instance, in his treatise on the art of rhetoric, writes that 
“those that haue good wittes by Nature, shall better encrease them by arte, and the blunt also 
shall bee whetted through arte, that want Nature to helpe them forward” (6). And in the section 
discussing the role of memory in oratory, Wilson instructs the orator on how “to amende an euill 
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wishing that “noble Brutus had his eyes” to see “this age’s yoke” (61–62) and ends with 
Cassius’s parting words, “think of the world” (300), the same Cassius who is “very dangerous” 
(210) for thinking too much. It is not only thinking about Julius Caesar’s tyranny that appeals to 
Brutus. Thinking itself, which is being silenced under Julius Caesar’s tyranny, “whets” Brutus. 
David Daniell highlights the cold rationality to which Brutus is accustomed—manifest in his 
planning out the assassination for the conspirators, in his behaviour toward his wife, in his 
funeral oration to the plebeians, in his quarrel with Cassius (“Introduction” 49–60). A serious 
motive behind Brutus’s harsh sentence “It must be by his death” (2.1.10) is the liberation of 
thought. Finally, in addition to all of this, “whetting” Brutus refers to stimulating a desire of his. 
Thus, not only Brutus himself, but that which Cassius has awakened in him will not sleep. 
 Just as Iago “echo’st” (3.3.105) Othello, Cassius becomes a “glass” (1.2.68) for Brutus to 
“discover” (69) himself in Cassius, to see his own “shadow” (58) through “reflection” (68). As 
Miranda Anderson observes, after equating “the limits of perception” with “the limits of 
introspection,” Cassius offers “the external medium of his extrospective perspective” as a 
“supplement to Brutus’s troubled introspection” (“Fission-Fusion” 162). Cassius’s “story” 
(1.2.92) is one to which they can both relate: “I cannot tell what you and other men / Think of 
this life; but, for my single self, / I had as lief not be as live to be / In awe of such a thing as I 
																																								 																				
memorie, and to preserue a good,” concluding with: “euen as by labour the witte is whetted, so 
by lithernesse the witte is blounted” (245). Francis Bacon, in his praise of friendship, says that 
friendship is “healthful and sovereign for the understanding” (170). With this “fruit” of 
friendship, “a man learneth of himself, and bringeth his own thoughts to light, and whetteth his 
wits as against a stone, which itself cuts not” (171). 
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myself” (93–96). This opening is an invitation (extended to Brutus and other men) to death 
should they find themselves in “awe” of an equal. Death is preferred to fear of another man. And 
since the “subject” of this relatable “story” is “honor” (92), such a death would be honourable. 
We can be certain that this is not only the “story” of his “single self” because he has already 
heard Brutus say he would not have Julius Caesar as king (82), and he relates this story 
immediately after Brutus’s “Set honor in one eye and death i’th’ other / And I will look on both 
indifferently; / For let the gods so speed me as I love / The name of honor more than I fear 
death” (86–89). Cassius is indeed echoing Brutus. But for Brutus to take part in a secret “story” 
that is “of yourself which you yet know not of” (70), Cassius must ease into it as though it is the 
“story” of his “single self.” 
Despite their shared “story,” what distinguishes Cassius from Brutus is that which he has 
in common with Iago: his opposition to Julius Caesar is out of rancorous spite, not honour. 
According to Plutarch’s account of Julius Caesar’s life, Brutus’s own desires to oppose Julius 
Caesar had been “blunted” by the generous clemency and favouritism that Julius Caesar had 
shown him: 
For not only had his life been spared at Pharsalus after Pompey’s flight, and the lives of 
many of his friends at his entreaty, but also he had great credit with Caesar. He had 
received the most honourable of the praetorships for the current year, and was to be 
consul three years later, having been preferred to Cassius, who was a rival candidate. For 
Caesar, as we are told, said that Cassius urged the juster claims to the office, but that for 
his own part he could not pass Brutus by. (7: 587) 
And in his account of Brutus’s life, Plutarch writes that Brutus “objected to the rule, but Cassius 
hated the ruler” (6: 143). 
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What drives Cassius and what he awakens in Brutus is envy, the wary eyeing of another’s 
rise. Julius Caesar perceives the envy in Cassius: “He reads much, / He is a great observer, and 
he looks / Quite through the deeds of men” (1.2.201–03). “Such men as he,” Julius Caesar 
continues, “be never at heart’s ease / Whiles they behold a greater than themselves, / And 
therefore are they very dangerous” (208–10). The Republic, Coppélia Kahn notes, “is intricately 
bound up with the basically agonistic, highly competitive nature of the Roman ruling elite” 
(“Friendship and Emulation” 273). And in “The Crisis of the Aristocracy in Julius Caesar,” 
Wayne Rebhorn reads this tragedy as “a struggle among aristocrats—senators—aimed at 
preventing one of their number from transcending his place and destroying the system in which 
they all ruled as a class” (78). In the Republic, Rebhorn writes, “each man sees the rise of 
another as an impairment of his personal status and importance, as a degradation or loss of rank 
even when such a loss has not actually occurred” (87). Rebhorn, however, is not interested in the 
difference between Brutus and Cassius. Instead, Rebhorn argues that the envy that drives all of 
the senators in Julius Caesar is a re-presentation of the aristocratic identity in Shakespeare’s 
England. 
Be that as it may, Cassius’s envy is a spiteful one.71 His accounts of the swimming 
contest in the “troubled Tiber” (100–15) and Julius Caesar’s fever in Spain (119–28) betray his 
hatred as he degrades the “tired Caesar” who was as helpless “As a sick girl.” Not once 
throughout the play does Brutus insult Julius Caesar. The honourable Brutus acts out his envy 
																																								 																				
71 In Shakespeare and Republicanism, Andrew Hadfield claims that Cassius has “honourable” 
and “personal” motives for assassinating Julius Caesar, the latter being “having been slighted by 
the dictator” (176). 
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but never forgets his love for the object of his envy: “As Caesar loved me, I weep for him; as he 
was fortunate, I rejoice at it; as he was valiant, I honour him; but, as he was ambitious, I slew 
him. There is tears for his love; joy for his fortune; honor for his valour; and death for his 
ambition” (3.2.23–27). Mark Antony, at the end of the play, appreciates this difference between 
Brutus and Cassius: 
This was the noblest Roman of them all. 
All the conspirators save only he 
Did that they did in envy of great Caesar; 
He only in a general honest thought 
And common good to all made one of them. (5.5.68–72) 
While it is the envy of Brutus and Cassius that has Julius Caesar pay for his ambition with his 
death, it is only Brutus’s envy that is for the “common good”—bringing Julius Caesar down so 
as to preserve equality in Rome. It is Brutus’s consideration for the whole of Rome that stands 
opposed to the inconsiderate Julius Caesar, not the selfish envy of the conspirators. 
 
Macbeth 
We have seen that meiosis is naturally embedded in paradiastole. But this is a meiosis 
that is implied rather than openly developed. Values reversed, Cordelia’s “price” falls (1.1.195) 
in the eyes of Lear because she does not support his wish to abandon “all cares and business,” 
the very wish that his “pelican daughters” (3.4.72) invitingly celebrate. The “divers purposes” of 
meiosis that Puttenham explains are particularly pertinent here: to appear modest and “avoid the 
opinion of arrogance”; “to bring our adversaries in contempt”; “to comfort or cheer any perilous 
enterprise,” “disable” and “abase” our “enemies and … their forces,” and “make light of 
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everything that might be a discouragement to the attempt”; “to excuse a fault”; and to foster 
“pleasant familiarity” with our “equals or inferiors” (304–05). These functions of meiosis are 
engrafted in paradiastole as well. Puttenham himself, when expanding on meiosis, arrives at 
paradiastole: the “Disabler” is used 
to excuse a fault, and to make an offense seem less than it is, by giving a term more 
favorable and of less vehemence than the truth requires, as to say of a great robbery, that 
it was but a pilfry matter; of an arrant ruffian that he is a tall fellow of his hands; of a 
prodigal fool, that he is a kind-hearted man; of a notorious unthrift, a lusty youth; and 
such like phrases of extenuation, which fall more aptly to the office of the figure Curry-
Favel. (305) 
Among the “offices” of paradiastole there is meiosis. 
Here it is necessary to distinguish between two types of meiosis. While meiosis, in 
general, brings amity and accord between the speaker and his audience by modestly extenuating 
their character flaw and comfortingly debilitating the might of the objector to this flaw, there is a 
special type of meiosis that carries out all of these functions but out of spite. This explains why 
Puttenham discusses this figure twice. Before its full treatment (304–06) among the 
“sententious” (or, rhetorical) figures, meiosis is briefly mentioned (269) among the “sensable” 
figures. The “sensable” meiosis is used to “diminish and abase a thing by way of spite or malice, 
as it were to deprave it.” 
Immediately after, Puttenham cautions against the “vice” of tapinosis, which is to “abase 
your thing or matter by ignorance or error in the choice of your word.” What is peculiar is not 
only that Puttenham feels the need to warn against this “vicious manner of speech” before 
tapinosis is fully disapproved of (344–45) in the separate section allotted to the “vices” in 
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speech. When describing tapinosis in its appropriate place, it is not the words “ignorance” and 
“error” that are repeated but the words “diminish” and “abase”: “It is no small fault in a maker to 
use such words and terms as do diminish and abase the matter he would seem to set forth, by 
impairing the dignity, height, vigor, or majesty of the cause he takes in hand.” This is not to 
suggest that tapinosis is not inadvertent meiosis; this is to suggest that inadvertent meiosis is only 
one form of tapinosis. Puttenham seems to be more critical of deliberate spiteful meiosis than 
inadvertent meiosis, especially since he translates the Greek tapinosis into the “Abaser” (the 
same word he uses to describe spiteful meiosis).72 According to Puttenham, therefore, while 
“sententious” meiosis “disables” its object, “sensable” meiosis “disables” its object by “abasing” 
it out of “spite or malice.” To revise an earlier statement: among the “offices” of the paradiastole 
of the tempter there is spiteful meiosis. In such a paradiastole, the defence of the vice is 
necessarily attended with the malicious attack against the virtuous censure of that vice. I will 
show this feature of paradiastole in the rhetoric of Lady Macbeth. 
Even before his appearance in the play, we learn of Macbeth’s drive. The wounded 
Captain (who has received his wounds rescuing Malcolm from “captivity” [1.2.5]) tells Duncan 
of the “brave Macbeth”: “Disdaining Fortune with his brandished steel, / Which smoked with 
bloody execution, / Like valor’s minion carved out his passage” (16–19). Malcolm, who will 
succeed Duncan, is shown to be less competent in battle than Macbeth in this warrior society. 
This itself is an incentive for Macbeth to “o’erleap” (1.4.49) him. More important is Macbeth’s 
“disdain” for Fortune in battle. “Doubtful it stood” (7) when Fortune was on the side of the 
																																								 																				
72 Quintilian uses the term humilitatis to describe the Greek tapinosis (meaning “lowering” or 
“reduction”), “by which the importance or dignity of something is diminished” (3: 366–67). 
	 188 
enemy. “Like Valour’s minion,” nevertheless, Macbeth “carved out his passage” through the 
doubt. Macbeth has little patience for Fortune and her uncertainty.73 Fortune, Bryan Lowrance 
observes, in early modern culture, embodies “non-autonomy,” “the fragility and possible failure 
of action,” and “passivity” (“Modern Ecstasy” 828). Fighting for his king, Macbeth leaves 
nothing to chance. Instead, “with bloody execution,” he “carves out” the outcome of the battle. 
This urge to secure success foreshadows Macbeth’s susceptibility to the “charm” (1.3.38) of the 
three witches and their “strange intelligence” (77). It is the simplicity and certainty in their 
manner of predicting the future, the definiteness of their “prophetic greeting” (79) that he “shalt 
be king hereafter” (51), that takes hold of Macbeth’s attention. As Kenneth Burke observes, the 
witches are “representative of Macbeth’s inner temptations” (Grammar 307). 
Not yet resolved, Macbeth sides with Fortune—“If chance will have me king, why, 
chance may crown me / Without my stir” (1.3.146–47)—because, as his wife knows well, he is 
“too full o’th’ milk of human kindness” (1.5.15) to remorselessly secure his future success 
through evil means: 
Thou wouldst be great, 
Art not without ambition, but without 
The illness should attend it. What thou wouldst highly, 
That wouldst thou holily; wouldst not play false, 
And yet wouldst wrongly win. Thou’dst have, great Glamis, 
That which cries, “Thus thou must do,” if thou have it; 
And that which rather thou dost fear to do, 
																																								 																				
73 Recall the “shift and change of mood” (1.1.85) of Fortune in Timon of Athens. 
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Than wishest should be undone.74 (16–23) 
Lady Macbeth understands that she must suspend “human kindness” in Macbeth for him to 
“screw” his “courage to the sticking-place” (1.7.60) and realize his ambition. 
Lady Macbeth is tempted by the promise of the witches more than her husband, and she 
plans to use her own persuasive skills to scold that which stands in the way of the crown. To 
encourage Macbeth’s “black and deep desires” (1.4.51), she unites with him in his impatient urge 
to forge the future: “I feel now / The future in the instant” (1.5.55–56). This phrase, Howard 
Marchitello avers, “speaks directly to the dream of instant action that collapses present and 
future into a single moment” (“Speed and the Problem of Real Time” 433). Greenblatt asserts 
that Lady Macbeth, after reading the letter from her husband, “speaks of the crown as if it were 
already on Macbeth’s head” (“Introduction” 2711). “It is she,” write Sandra Clark and Pamela 
																																								 																				
74 In “Linguistic Taboos and the ‘Unscene’ of Fear in Macbeth,” discussing “linguistic 
interdiction” in this play, with regard to this passage, Silvia Bigliazzi writes: 
Lady Macbeth mentions neither the crown nor the murder but alludes to them only 
through strategies of indirection pivoting on deictic markers (“that,” “it”), a most generic 
action verb (“do”) and a prefixed negative (“undone”). Her allusiveness suggests the 
symbolic enormity of the crime, which requires reticence even in solitary rumination … 
Lady Macbeth does not pronounce what she has in mind, thus inaugurating a strategy of 
reticence which will prove to be crucial in the play’s communicative system … Whether 
in the presence of each other or in solitude, Macbeth and his wife never call the crime by 
its name but by the generic, although pragmatically and symbolically highly connoted, 
master concept “doing.” (60) 
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Mason, “who not only determines that he will become what the Sisters have ‘promised’ but also 
that this should come about ‘the nearest way’” (“Introduction” 9–10). To summarize, Lady 
Macbeth wishes for the eradication of the distance between the present thought of the act and its 
future execution. 
First, before Macbeth’s arrival, she builds her own courage by emptying herself of the 
“milk of human kindness”: 
Come, you spirits 
That tend on mortal thoughts, unsex me here, 
And fill me from the crown to the toe top-full 
Of direst cruelty! Make thick my blood, 
Stop up th’access and passage to remorse, 
That no compunctious visitings of nature 
Shake my fell purpose nor keep peace between 
Th’effect and it. Come to my woman’s breasts 
And take my milk for gall, you murd’ring ministers, 
Wherever in your sightless substances 
You wait on nature’s mischief. Come, thick night, 
And pall thee in the dunnest smoke of hell, 
That my keen knife see not the wound it makes, 
Nor heaven peep through the blanket of the dark 
To cry, “Hold, hold!” (38–52) 
To inspirit her “mortal thoughts” with “cruelty” and fortify her “fell purpose” with “gall,” she 
liberates them of “remorse” and “compunctious visitings.” 
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And later, using a most unnerving imagery, she conveys to Macbeth this resolve that no 
feelings of pity or guilt can unnerve: 
I have given suck, and know 
How tender ’tis to love the babe that milks me; 
I would, while it was smiling in my face, 
Have plucked my nipple from his boneless gums 
And dashed the brains out, had I so sworn as you 
Have done to this. (1.7.54–59) 
And thus, Lady Macbeth with her “undaunted mettle” (73) teams up with Macbeth to unleash his 
drive to “carve,” “with bloody execution,” how the future plays out. 
Now let us look at this instance of identification from a rhetorical point of view. Earlier 
in the play, it is “justice” that is “with valor armed” (1.2.29). And later in the play, “wisdom” is 
said to “guide … valor / To act in safety” (3.1.53–54). The type of valour that is valued in 
Scotland cautiously fights against injustice. But Lady Macbeth associates valour with the 
persuasive effects of her tongue, which is to embolden Macbeth’s ambition to “play false” and 
“wrongly win.” The word valour, derived from the Latin valere, etymologically connotes both 
“courage” and “worth.” The valour of her tongue intends to paradiastolically “encourage” a new 
“worth” in ambition. Recall that after Goneril describes her love to be “beyond what can be 
valued rich or rare,” Regan asks to be “prize[d] … at her worth.” Cassius dignifies envy as 
“Thoughts of great value, worthy cogitations,” which is a “hidden worthiness” (1.1.57) in Brutus. 
And Iago assures Othello that he has “worthy cause” to be jealously “too busy in my fears” 
(3.3.252–53)—that is, to be engrossed in the affairs of others. Thus, to brace Macbeth’s ambition 
(an ambition that does not shy away from the “illness” that “should attend it”), Lady Macbeth 
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must invent a new name for ambition. The “unsex[ed]” valour of her tongue recasts ambition in 
terms of manly valour: “When you durst do it, then you were a man; / And to be more than what 
you were, you would / Be so much more the man” (1.7.49–51). To advocate such manliness, she 
becomes as manly as the man she wants her husband to become. 
Lady Macbeth also knows that this new valuation requires her to “chastise” that which 
“impedes” it. What prevents the ambition to “play false” and “wrongly win” is Duncan’s manner 
of rewarding his soldiers: “I have begun to plant thee and will labor / To make thee full of 
growing” (1.4.28–29). Fortune, which Macbeth “disdains,” best represents Duncan’s uncertain 
reward system, a system in which the time of reaping the rewards of one’s deeds is never 
determined. Such a system demands patience, for the reward remains in doubt. Duncan’s first 
words to Macbeth highlight this uncertainty: 
O worthiest cousin! 
The sin of my ingratitude even now 
Was heavy on me. Thou art so far before 
That swiftest wing of recompense is slow 
To overtake thee. Would thou hadst less deserved, 
That the proportion both of thanks and payment 
Might have been mine. Only I have left to say, 
More is thy due than more than all can pay. (1.4.14–21) 
Macbeth can never be certain of the “thanks and payment” for his service to Duncan. 
It is this doubt that Lady Macbeth must “chastise”—that is, viciously rename. Doubt, 
consequently, is meiotically feminized. Adelman, in Suffocating Mothers, draws attention to the 
“womanish softness” and “feminine vulnerability” of Duncan (132). Even his murder, Adelman 
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points out, is “a display of male sexual aggression against a passive female victim” (133)—
Macbeth likens himself to Tarquin as he approaches Duncan’s bed (2.1.55). The “unsex[ing]” of 
Lady Macbeth, therefore, also includes her being cleared of the doubt that is associated with 
Duncan. And after freeing herself of “remorse” and “compunctious visitings,” she disparages 
doubt to her husband as unmanliness: “Wouldst thou have that / Which thou esteem’st the 
ornament of life, / And live a coward in thine own esteem, / Letting ‘I dare not’ wait upon ‘I 
would’” (1.7.41–44). Lady Macbeth meiotically devalues doubtful fortune as she 
paradiastolically values the resolute valour to seize fortune. Incidentally, Shakespeare shows the 
potential for this meiotic attack against doubt in Macbeth early in the play: the word disdain 
etymologically means “to consider unworthy.” This is further insinuated in the sexual imagery in 
“carv[ing]” Lady Fortune with his “brandished steel.” 
Macbeth’s “vaulting ambition” (1.7.27), which is incited to “outr[u]n the pauser, reason” 
(2.3.108), is quite different from the despotic ambition of Julius Caesar. It is Julius Caesar’s 
careless nod (1.2.118) that arouses the envy of his fellow senators. Julius Caesar’s wish to “soar 
above the view of men” (1.1.73), “scorning the base degrees / By which he did ascend,” is a 
flagrant disregard for the equal rights of others. While Julius Caesar’s ambition “scorns” those 
beneath him, Macbeth’s ambition “disdains” the unpredictability of chance. Macbeth’s wish to 
soar is a violent impetuousness to clutch the future fruits of his action in the present. In 
“Macbeth’s War on Time,” Donald Foster claims that Macbeth is “plagued” by an “impulse to 
take revenge on time itself” (324). “Macbeth’s answer to his humiliation at the hands of the 
clock,” Foster argues, “is to take a literal revenge: he will attack time with a dagger, will break 
time’s laws, will take the future now in the ignorant present, seizing forcibly that which he has 
come already to perceive as his” (329). Macbeth yearns for that act that would be “the be-all and 
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end-all” (1.7.5). He wants the assassination of Duncan to “catch / With his surcease success” (3–
4); that is, he wants to raze the gap of uncertainty between the execution of the act and its 
promised reward—“If it were done when ’tis done, then ’twere well / It were done quickly” (1–
2). The assassination, however, as Greenblatt explains, “proves … politically untenable”: “There 
are no clean murders. One crime leads to another and then to another, without bringing the 
criminal any closer to the security or contentment that each desperate act is meant to achieve. 




As the final example, I will demonstrate the presence of meiotic devaluation in 
paradiastolic unveiling in Iago’s rhetoric. Othello himself captures this duality with his phrase 
“close dilations,” which also intimates “close delations.” As Patricia Parker explains, Othello’s 
phrase suggests rhetorical “opening,” “uncovering,” or “bringing before the eye” at the same 
time that it suggests “secret accusations” (“Dilation” 61)—that is, the simultaneous operations of 
paradiastolic amplification and meiotic diminution. 
Othello is a conscientious guardian of justice. He cannot allow any misdeed to go 
unpunished. Three times he leaves his newly-wed bride to correct a wrong—to respond to the 
“scurvy and provoking” (1.2.7) insults of his furious father-in-law, to protect Cyprus against the 
unexpected threat of a Turkish invasion, and to settle the drunken “barbarous brawl” (2.3.151) 
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between his soldiers.75 These incidents serve to highlight the extent of Othello’s sensitiveness to 
the barbarity of injustice. Not considering the Turkish threat, which dissipates on its own, the 
other two altercations are incited by the mischievous Iago. The first is resolved through a rational 
legal process supervised by the Duke (1.3). As Alvin Kernan observes, “the assembled, ranked 
governors of Venice … control passions that otherwise would have led to a bloody street brawl 
and bring justice out of what otherwise would have been riot” (“Introduction” lxvi). And the 
“foul rout” (2.3.189) in Cyprus is resolved through Othello’s ruling to discharge the one 
responsible: “he that is approved in this offense, / Though he had twinned with me, both at a 
birth, / Shall lose me” (190–92). For the upright Othello, the committing of an offence equals the 
losing of his love. In addition, Othello makes an “example” (230) of Cassio for his inappropriate 
behaviour so as to discourage misbehaviour in others—punishment as a means to deter further 
crimes. To prevent being betrayed again, in other words, Othello makes an example of anyone 
who betrays his love. Even his suicide at the end of the play can be viewed as self-punishment 
for the unjust murder of his wife. As Paul Cefalu observes in “The Burdens of Mind Reading in 
Shakespeare’s Othello,” in the final scene Othello “emerges as the divine leveler of his own prior 
acts of cruelty” (294). 
With material that he garners from the two disputes that he instigates, shrewd Iago 
concocts his “monstrous” (1.3.382) plot to meticulously work Othello’s sensitiveness to injustice 
into paranoid jealousy. It is obvious from the start of the play that Iago himself suffers from 
																																								 																				
75 Othello is abused even before his appearance in the play. As Janet Adelman observes, “no 
other play subjects its ostensibly tragic hero to so long and intensive a debunking before he even 
sets foot onstage” (“Iago’s Alter Ego” 125). 
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jealousy—disturbing thoughts that come with the anxiety of being abused. He tells Roderigo that 
he hates Othello because he believes he has been unfairly treated in Cassio’s promotion. Iago, 
who has shown his competence to Othello “at Rhodes, at Cyprus, and on others’ grounds, / 
Christened and heathen” (1.1.27–28), should have been selected as lieutenant. Instead, Othello 
has appointed the “counter-caster” (29) Cassio, 
That never set a squadron in the field, 
Nor the division of a battle knows 
More than a spinster—unless the bookish theoric, 
Wherein the tongued consuls can propose 
As masterly as he! Mere prattle without practice 
Is all his soldiership.76 (20–25) 
Later, when he is once more brooding over the cause of his hate for Othello, he suspects that 
Othello has cuckolded him: “It is thought abroad that twixt my sheets / He’s done my office. I 
know not if’t be true, / But I, for mere suspicion in that kind, / Will do as if for surety” (1.3.365–
68). Iago’s uncanny ability to conceal his contempt for Othello from Othello is indeed 
remarkable: 
Others there are 
Who, trimmed in forms and visages of duty, 
																																								 																				
76 Iago also resents the courtly eloquence of Cassio. In “In Utramque Partem: Arguing Both 
Sides of the Question in Othello,” Emily Donahoe suggests that “it seems possible that Cassio 
was promoted and Iago passed over in part because of the differences in their rhetorical abilities 
or at least because of their skill in relating to the Venetian aristocracy” (326). 
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Keep yet their hearts attending on themselves 
And, throwing but shows of service on their lords, 
Do well thrive by them and, when they have lined their coats, 
Do themselves homage. These fellows have some soul 
And such a one do I profess myself. (1.1.47–53) 
This “traitor” is as “ensteeped” as the “guttered rocks and congregated sands” that “enclog the 
guiltless keel” (2.1.69–70). 
Iago’s revenge against Othello, therefore, is not based on “surety” of wrongdoing but 
“mere suspicion” of wrongdoing treated as “surety.”77 As Catherine Bates puts it, the 
“credibility” of Iago’s “tissue of lies rests … on the force not of truth but of probability and 
plausibility” (“Shakespeare’s Tragedies of Love” 191). And knowing that Othello will act upon 
wrongdoing, Iago schemes to lead Othello “by th’ nose / As asses are” (379–80) to regard 
“suspicion” as “surety.” To do so, in the temptation scene (3.3), Iago forms a secret alliance with 
his victim to pry into the affairs of others to expose misconduct.78 And for Othello to let his 
guard down to enter into this private partnership of paranoid eavesdropping, Iago first admits to 
his own paranoia: “I confess, it is my nature’s plague / To spy into abuses and of my jealousy / 
Shape faults that are not” (145–47). Thus identifying with his victim gives Othello the solace of 
knowing that he is not alone in being jealous. 
																																								 																				
77 In contrast, the Duke refuses to accept Brabantio’s charge against Othello based merely on 
“thin habits and poor likelihoods” (1.3.108). 
78 Cefalu argues that the motive for Iago’s evil is “his consuming tracking of others” (271). 
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That Othello trusts Iago even after Iago reveals that he “imperfectly conceits” (148) from 
“his scattering and unsure observance” (150) points not only to Othello’s trusting nature but also 
to his own closeted inclination to “spy into abuses.” In fact, is this not why Venice hires Othello 
in the first place? The function of this mercenary for the city is to courageously go beyond the 
borders of Venice so as to uncover misconduct. Among the multiple senses that Patricia Parker 
identifies in the term “close dilations” (122)—and its alternate “close delations”—in Othello’s 
request to Iago to reveal the “monster” (106) in his thoughts, one is particularly germane here. 
Aside from meaning “secret” or “private,” the adjective close in this term refers to “something 
constricted or closed” (“Dilation” 61). Accordingly, “close dilations,” Parker points out, “convey 
the sense of partial opening and partial glimpses of something closed or hid.”79 Thus, despite all 
the exhortations of Othello prompting Iago to “dilate” and “delate” the secret that is “too hideous 
to be shown” (3.3.107), Iago’s “close” monstrous thought is not completely unknown to Othello. 
As Burke observes in A Grammar of Motives, “Iago, to arouse Othello, must talk a language that 
Othello knows as well as he” (414). From one perspective, Othello’s repeated pleas to know 
Iago’s hidden “monster” appear as though he is testing the waters before his own—with which 
he is familiar “by parcels”—surfaces. 
Thanks to Iago’s encouragement, Othello can now freely give voice to his suspicions: 
“Haply, for I am black / And have not those soft parts of conversation / That chamberers have, or 
for I am declined / Into the vale of years” (3.3.261–64). Othello agonizes over these doubts after 
																																								 																				
79 Earlier in the play, Othello tells the Duke that in the process of wooing Desdemona, he was 
implored to “dilate” his “pilgrimage” to her because “by parcels she had something heard” 
(1.3.153–54). 
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Iago leaves. More importantly, these doubts are already stated by Othello earlier in the play prior 
to the machinations of Iago. In Venice, before he delivers his “unvarnished tale” (1.3.90) to the 
Duke, Othello explains, 
Rude am I in my speech, 
And little blessed with the soft phrase of peace 
For, since these arms of mine had seven years’ pith 
Till now some nine moons wasted, they have used 
Their dearest action in the tented field, 
And little of this great world can I speak 
More than pertains to feats of broils and battle; 
And, therefore, little shall I grace my cause 
In speaking for myself. (81–89) 
Here, Othello admits that, being accustomed to “feats of broils and battle,” he lacks the charm 
and grace of a city gentleman. And a little later when Desdemona asks for permission to 
accompany her husband to Cyprus, Othello assures the Duke that it is not “to please the palate of 
my appetite, / Nor to comply with heat the young affects / In my defunct and proper satisfaction” 
(259–61). Desdemona’s presence will not distract him from his military duties because he no 
longer possesses “young affects.” 
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In both cases, Othello seems to suggest that the love between him and Desdemona exists 
in spite of his shortcomings.80 It is therefore important to remember that the doubts that Othello 
entertains after Iago awakens “the green-eyed monster” (3.3.164) in him are not invented by 
Iago. Iago cleverly nurtures the “ensteeped” jealousy. As Burke writes in his essay on Othello, 
Iago embodies “steely suspicion” (187); nevertheless, “Othello’s suspicions … arise from within, 
in the sense that they are integral to the motive he stands for” (166). Similarly, Kernan observes 
that Iago exploits “latent ‘Iagolike’ feelings and thoughts in Othello” (“Introduction” lxxi). And 
Iago knows well that there is no remedy once these paranoid doubts are let loose in the mind: 
“Not poppy, nor mandragora, / Nor all the drowsy syrups of the world / Shall ever medicine thee 
to that sweet sleep / Which thou owed’st yesterday” (3.3.327–30). 
Furthermore, Othello’s words immediately after he voices his doubts are: “She’s gone, I 
am abused, and my relief / Must be to loathe her” (265–66). Once more, abuse signifies the 
cancelation of love. Desdemona, like Cassio before her, loses Othello’s love. And in the final 
scene, as Othello approaches Desdemona’s bed to murder her, he is less concerned about putting 
an end to Desdemona’s life than he is concerned about putting an end to her crime: “Yet I’ll not 
shed her blood, / Nor scar that whiter skin of hers than snow / And smooth as monumental 
																																								 																				
80 Tom McAlindon observes in “What Is a Shakespearean Tragedy?” that “the sheer speed with 
which Othello’s love and nobility are turned to hatred and baseness is sometimes taken as 
incontrovertible proof that both (if genuine at all) were exceptionally fragile” (8). 
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alabaster; / Yet she must die, else she’ll betray more men” (5.2.3–6). This is punishment as a 
means to prevent the recurrence of the crime.81 
In sum, in the reversal of values that Iago orchestrates, it is paranoid doubt that is 
encouraged, and the trust that Desdemona embodies is disgracefully contrived as certainty of 
adultery. Iago crafts this reversal in irony: “That cuckold lives in bliss / Who, certain of his fate, 
loves not his wronger; / But, oh, what damned minutes tells he o’er / Who dotes, yet doubts; 
suspects, yet soundly loves” (3.3.165–68). Thus, in temptation, the target of the meiosis is the 
prevailing system of valuation that stands in the way of the unconventional system of valuation 
that the paradiastole ventures to advance. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In my reading of these four tragedies, I have tried to show that temptation does not take 
place in a vacuum. There is a “darker purpose” that is already “ensteeped” in the victim of 
temptation—a suppressed wish that is shared by the tempter and his victim. For the victim, his 
“darker purpose” is “close”; but the tempter openly and secretly pursues his. It is open in the 
sense that he is conscious of his wish. It is secret because his society is intolerant of it. The 
tempter, in other words, is inherently vindictive. And the temptation leads inevitably to chaos. 
																																								 																				
81 In Shakespeare’s Freedom, Greenblatt claims that in Othello’s murder of Desdemona, there is 
“a perverse, perverted fantasy of undoing the hideous stain that he believes she has brought upon 
herself and turning her again into the smooth, unchanging paragon of beauty that he desires” 
(32). Greenblatt’s statement views this act of punishment as a means to rectify Desdemona’s 
alleged crime. 
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After espying his wish in his victim, the tempter “dilates” a relatable “story”—which is and is 
not the “story” of his “single self”—to bring the victim’s wish before his eyes. Like a “mirror,” 
the tale of this confession to his own dark wish “echoes” that of the other. At the same time that 
the “close contriver” adds “worth” and “value” to the wish, he spitefully “chastises” the 
customary interpretation that demands its suppression. Such “close dilations,” therefore, do more 
than “whet” the “distilled” wish. Once in league with his tempter, the victim becomes violently 
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